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Abstract
Access control is an important aspect of any information system. It is a way of ensur-
ing that users can only access what they are authorised to and no more. This can be
achieved by granting users access to resources based on pre-defined organisational and
legislative rules. Although access control has been extensively studied, and as a result,
a wide range of access control models, mechanisms and systems have been proposed,
specific access control requirements for healthcare systems that needs to support the
continuity of care in an accountable manner have not been addressed. This results
in a gap between what is required by the application domain and what is actually
practised, and thus access control solutions implemented for the domain become too
restrictive. The continuity of care is defined as the delivery of seamless health care
services to patients through integration, coordination and sharing of information be-
tween providers. This thesis, therefore, designs a context-based access control model
that allows healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in an accountable manner
in case of an infrequent access request involving an emergency situation. This research
uses the Tanzania’s healthcare system as a case study domain.
The contributions from this thesis to the body of knowledge are as follows:
1. A generic methodological approach, named COIL, for gathering comprehensive
access control requirements in the healthcare domain is developed. The proposed
COIL methodology is the synthesis of four elements: contexts, privacy and secu-
rity capabilities from national electronic healthcare initiatives, legislations and
organisational rules. Each of the four components of the COIL approach has its
own impact in relation to access to electronic health records.
2. A taxonomy for classifying access control models is also proposed in this thesis.
The intent of the proposed taxonomy is to identify how existing access control
models can be classified classified against the proposed Role and Context-Based
ii
Access Control (RoC-BAC) model.
3. To support the continuity of care in an accountable manner, a new context-
based access control model is proposed. The Role and Context-Based Access
Control model is developed for the healthcare domain, and it is an extension
of traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with health-related
contexts and obligations.
4. With the proposed RoC-BAC model, a new concept of health-related contexts
is also introduced. It represents specific contexts from the healthcare domain
that should be evaluated by an access control system in order to support the
continuity of care.
5. A prototype that implements Role and Context-Based Access Control model
is developed. The prototype, called CEATH (Context-Enhanced Access in a
Tanzania Healthcare) system, was developed so as to achieve two purposes:
1. to demonstrate that RoC-BAC model is practical and, 2. to evaluate the
performance overheads introduced by new entities and relations. Through its
support of context-based policies, and especially health-related contexts, it has
been demonstrated in this thesis that the incorporation of health-related con-
texts and obligations helps healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in an
accountable manner in case of unexpected emergency situation, which in turn
supports the continuity of care.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.1 opens this thesis with a discussion
on researcher’s motivations behind a research in electronic healthcare. Section 1.2
analyses one of the major challenges in electronic healthcare, that is security, by
discussing factors that contribute to breaches in electronic healthcare information
systems. Section 1.3 presents the main focus of this thesis in terms of research problem,
implementation approach and research aim and objectives. The research methodology
adopted in this thesis is discussed in Section 1.4, followed by expected contributions
to the body of knowledge in Section 1.5. The list of publications associated with this
research work are listed in Section 1.6. An outline of the thesis is provided in Section
1.7.
1
1.1 Research Motivation
1.1 Research Motivation
The ever increasing use of information and communication technologies affects almost
every aspect of our lives from business, government to entertainment. In business,
the usage of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) has significantly
improved customer services, lowered costs and standardised processes and operations.
ICT has also been used in public services by the governments to enable citizens, en-
terprises and organisations to easily, quickly and at a lower cost to conduct businesses
with the government. Despite its successful adoption and use in other domains, the
usage of ICT in healthcare is still very low. It has been noted by researchers from
academia and industry that, the usage of ICT in healthcare as compared to other
industries is behind by as much as ten to fifteen years (Goldschmidt, 2005).
Although many healthcare professionals around the world recognise the benefits in-
troduced by ICT, they also cite various barriers hindering their implementations in
practice. Among their reasons include lack of access to capital, complexity of elec-
tronic healthcare information systems, lack of standards to permit exchange of clinical
data, and unavailability of reliable evidence to suggest economic impact of using ICT
to deliver high quality care. The latter reason is a result of overestimation of its results
and unfounded expectations (Tan, 2005), (Shekelle et al., 2006), (Stroetmann et al.,
2006), (Anderson, 2007). The healthcare domain also faces resistance from health-
care professionals to acquire and commit to new mindset and skills, and resistance
to adapt and learn new skills and competencies. In some countries, like Tanzania,
the healthcare domain also suffers from the lack of national policies and regulatory
frameworks that are designed to reduce the impact of external factors in ICT adop-
tion. In addition to these challenges, healthcare as a domain suffers from issues that
go beyond medical problems that could benefit from the adoption and use of ICT.
Some of these problems include lack of highly qualified healthcare personnel, rapidly
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ageing population, increase in the number of non-communicable and life style diseases
and also an increase in the number of people living with some form of disability.
In case of a rapid ageing population, the World Health Organisation (WHO) reports
that the proportion of people aged sixty-five years and older is growing faster than any
other age group in human history (World Health Organisation, 2012a). On their 2012
report on world population ageing, the United Nations, for instance, estimated that
the number of people aged sixty-five years and older will double as a proportion of
the global population, from 7% in 2000 to 16% in 2050 (United Nations DESA, 2012).
Both longer life expectancy (44 years in 1950, estimated to be 77 years in 2050) and an
alarmingly declining fertility rates are considered as the main contributors for such a
rapid ageing population (World Health Organisation, 2012a). In relation to healthcare
and the need for human resources for health, the aged population is likely to suffer
from age-related diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and Alzheimer and
require long-term care.
Similarly, there is a rise in a number of non-communicable and lifestyle diseases which
are chronic and expensive to treat. On its global status report on non-communicable
diseases, the WHO noted that out of fifty seven million deaths that occurred globally
in the year 2008, thirty six million were due to non-communicable and life style diseases
(World Health Organisation, 2011). To highlight more on this, in a report published
by the World Health Organisation (2005), China is estimated to lose about US $558
billion in national income between 2006 and 2015 from deaths due to a combination
of heart diseases, stroke and diabetes. The increase in chronic health conditions and
the rise in world’s ageing population go hand in hand with disability. As of September
2013, it was estimated that more than one billion people, which is about 15% of the
world population were living with some form of disability (World Health Organisation,
2012b). It is common especially in developing countries for people with disabilities
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(about 8%) to have less access to healthcare services hence experience unmet health-
care needs (World Health Organisation, 2013b).
Since Electronic Health Record (EHR) resides at the centre of any electronic health-
care information system, its adoption and use results in numerous benefits to patients,
healthcare professionals, healthcare organisation and the government as a whole. In
this thesis, EHR represents a lifetime record of a patient with key health history and
care within the healthcare system. They enable faster, safer and better healthcare ser-
vices to patients by providing access to medical information “to the right hands in the
right time”. The EHRs also improve patient safety as they provide an overview of clini-
cal and medical history, which in turn helps to avoid potential errors and complications
(Eysenbach, 2001), (Grimson, 2001), (Wyatt & Sullivan, 2005), (Paulson & Snyder,
2005), (Tan, 2005), (Shekelle et al., 2006), (Mukherjee & McGinnis, 2007). Further-
more, the adoption of ICT in healthcare also promises better access to specialist care
in all geographical areas.
1.2 Access to Medical Records
Regardless of its promise to offer benefits to individuals, healthcare organisations
and third party payers to healthcare services (like insurance companies), we read
about inappropriate access to medical records on a regular basis. The United States
of America is one of the countries where security breaches involving EHRs have been
extensively reported (DHHR, 2013). Between 2009 and 2012, about twenty one million
patients have had their medical records exposed in data security breaches in the United
States of America alone. The reasons leading to their exposure include theft of medical
records, which is the most common reason with about fifty four percent (54%) of the
overall breaches, lost records and devices with about eleven percent (11%) and hacking
with 6%. Although theft and hacking are regarded as the biggest threats to medical
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records, it is unauthorised access or disclosure that has been consistently ranked as
one of the leading issues. It is second to theft with 20%.
Although there is low reporting on data security breaches in Tanzania and Africa in
general due to majority of the implementations being in the infancy stages, several
researchers have conducted studies to identify issues, challenges and opportunities
of Electronic Health Records from the healthcare consumers’ (which are referred as
patients throughout this thesis) standpoint. From a survey conducted by Nehemiah
(2014) in three hospitals in Tanzania involving 240 participants, the healthcare con-
sumers indicated hacking (79.5%), malicious software (69%), and unauthorised access
(70%) as the common problems that could affect EHRs.
Based on the data from America and Tanzania consecutively, it can be noted that,
not only will unauthorised disclosure of medical records threaten patients’ privacy,
it may also inflict significant damage to both patients’ health and lives if necessary
preventive measures are not established. While patients’ lives may be affected due
to malicious modification of diagnosis data, their health may be affected by improper
use of medical records. The compromise may also result in social embarrassment
or prejudice, identity theft, blackmailing and may even affect their insurability. For
the healthcare organisation where the compromised medical records are collected,
processed, and stored, any security breach may result in monetary loss and damage
in reputation.
There are more reasons contributing to data security breaches in electronic healthcare
information systems, including:
Digitisation of Records: One of the key benefits that motivates the adoption
and use of ICT in healthcare is the digitisation of medical records forming Electronic
Health Records (EHRs). Contrary to paper-based records, digitised medical records
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allow electronic healthcare information systems to gather and exchange accurate and
appropriate data, and thus satisfy clinical, administrative and transactional needs
of the healthcare providers, payers as well as other users. These records contain
personal identifiable information such as name, date of birth, address, phone number,
bank name, routing number and saving and checking number. They also contain a
patient’s medical history as well as financial and insurance information.
Basically, EHRs contain personal and sensitive clinical information that would allow
thieves, for example, to fraudulently open up new lines of credit in their victim’s
name, if compromised and which will in turn destroy their credit record when they
get billed for medical procedures that they didn’t even know about. Additionally,
EHRs guarantee higher financial pay-outs to the computer hackers. On the black
market in the United States of America, for instance, a portion of a single set of
patient’s EHR can fetch up to $50 compared to $1.50 for credit card information, $3
for date of birth, $3 for social security numbers and $6 for mother’s maiden name
(Hayes, 2014). The EHRs can fetch larger sum of money because of the availability of
more personally identifiable information, in which criminals can use for a whole range
of fraudulent activities, including blackmailing (Hayes, 2014). The average payout for
a medical identity theft is around $20,000 compared to $2,000 for a regular identity
theft (EMC, 2013).
It is also common for stolen EHRs to be used to make false or inflated insurance
claims, to obtain addictive prescription drugs or to receive medical treatment at the
account holder’s expense. To make matters worse for the domain which could highly
benefit from adoption and use of ICTs, it takes twice as long to identify medical
information fraud compared to regular identity theft. Usually when a bank account
is compromised, a victim may delete or change personal information. In healthcare,
however, patients’ health information cannot be cancelled or altered and neither the
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victim nor the healthcare organisation can prevent criminals from using the data. It
is also hard to notice when a patient’s healthcare information has been compromised,
unless there is money involved.
Insecure Code: A successful Electronic Health Record (EHR) is characterised
with an ability to follow an individual patient whenever, wherever he or she receives
care. This means that medical records of the patient need to be highly shareable
between collaborating healthcare providers and systems. To achieve high shareability
in the healthcare domain, the electronic healthcare information systems are built using
complex software that includes many diverse components, interconnected in multiple
ways. As software becomes complex, the ability of a human being to design, develop,
produce, distribute, and maintain the software is increasingly challenged (Paul, 2007),
(Rice, 2007). Thus, it becomes easy to introduce security flaws (Baskerville, 1993),
(Soffa, 2007).
System Integration: In a modern healthcare environment, a Hospital Information
System (HIS) can be defined as a computerised system that is designed to meet all
information needs within a hospital. It is a full integrated, comprehensive solution
that provides healthcare organisations with a wide range of tools for hospital manage-
ment, clinical tasks and patient administration. HIS may include Clinical Information
System, Patient Administration System, Radiology Information System or Picture
Archiving and Communication System (PACS), Pharmacy Information Management
System (PIS) and Laboratory Information Systems (LIS). Usually, each of these sys-
tems is vulnerable to security threats, and integrating them expands the attack surface
and therefore increases the chances for a security breach to occur.
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1.3 Research Problem
The high growth rate of Internet and mobile phones utilisation in Tanzania in the past
decade is a result of a construction of the national fibre optic cable network, known
as National ICT Broadband Backbone (NICTBB), and an extensive use of mobile
broadband. The implementation of these technologies have had an impact on almost
every aspect of an urbanised citizen’s life, ranging from business to entertainment.
In business, the usage of ICT has significantly improved customer services, lowered
costs and standardised processes and operations; in public services, its usage has
enabled citizens, enterprises and organisations to easily, quickly and at the lower
cost to conduct businesses with the government. Based on availability of ICT, there
are various ministries and agencies, including Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA),
which are providing services and conducting business with the citizens efficiently and
effectively (Oreku et al., 2011).
In spite of the proliferation of ICT use in numerous application domains in Tanzania,
its usage in healthcare is still low. In this thesis, five main reasons have been identified
as the contributing factors to this situation. These include
• Lack of training and exposure of healthcare professionals,
• Lack of access to capital by healthcare providers (whether as an individual
healthcare provider or a healthcare organisation as a whole),
• Lack of standards to permit the exchange of clinical data
• Lack of legislation and regulations to guide implementations of EHR systems as
well as to guide EHRs access and use
• Healthcare professionals’ resistance towards adoption and use of information
systems and information management systems
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As a result of these challenges, Tanzania healthcare system is characterised as a com-
bination of both manual and electronic healthcare system that does not support in-
frequent access requests in case of emergencies. To better handle infrequent access
requests that affect the delivery of seamless health care services to patients through
integration, coordination, and sharing of information between providers in a Tan-
zania healthcare system, this thesis develops a generic methodological approach for
gathering comprehensive access control requirements in a healthcare domain and then
proposes a new context-based access control model named Role and Context-Based
Access Control (RoC-BAC) by extending the traditional Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) model with Break-The-Glass (BTG), using contexts and obligations.
This thesis is designed to address the following research question:
How will the contexts be defined and used to better handle infrequent
access requests associated with emergencies in an accountable manner?
This main research question can be narrowed into the following questions that accom-
modate Tanzania healthcare system, which is used as a case study domain:
1. What are the technical and non-technical challenges facing the Tanzania health-
care system?
2. What are the limitations of the existing approaches designed to control access
to electronic health records, and how to utilise them to support the continuity
of care?
3. Which access control requirements are addressed into the current electronic
healthcare information systems and how were those requirements specified?
4. How can contexts that is specific to the healthcare domain be defined and in-
corporated into an existing access control solution?
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5. Which factors affect the performance of a system that implements Role and
Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) against a system that implements
traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model?
1.3.1 Proposed Approach
To address the main research question presented in Section 1.3, a research approach
adopted in this thesis involves a specification of access control requirements that are
appropriate for healthcare organisations in a Tanzania healthcare system (using the
newly designed COIL methodology), developing a new context-based access control
model named RoC-BAC that handles better infrequent access requests. In this thesis
the proposed COIL methodology is a combination of contexts, privacy and security
policies from national e-health initiatives and legislative and organisational rules.
To support the continuity of care by providing flexible access to medical records in
an accountable manner, the new RoC-BAC model is an extension of the traditional
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with Break-The-Glass using contexts and
obligations. With the proposed model, a new concept named health-related contexts
is also introduced.
1.3.2 Research Aim and Objectives
The main aim of this research is to design a new context-based access control model
that supports the continuity of care by better handling infrequent access requests in
an accountable manner. To this end, the following objectives were set:
• To investigate the characteristics of the Tanzania healthcare system, with special
consideration on human resources for health and its status on the implementa-
tion of electronic healthcare information systems
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• To identify which access control requirements are addressed in EHR systems and
categorise them, and also to investigate how those access control requirements
were obtained
• To evaluate existing access control models and analyse their suitability for the
modern healthcare environments
• To examine how contexts are defined and used in various application domains,
and how can they be incorporated into an access decision of an electronic health-
care system
• To propose a new context-based access control model that addresses infrequent
access requests into its access decision
• To implement a prototype for both role based access control and a new context-
based access control in order to evaluate performance overheads introduced by
contexts and obligations into the Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-
BAC) model.
1.4 Methodology
The research methodology adopted for this thesis involves a combination of desk
research, data collection and prototyping. Mainly, it consists of a literature review,
data collection, designing and formalisation of a context-based access control model,
and prototype design and development as well as evaluation. Each component of the
research methodology are discussed herein
1. Literature Review: To gain a comprehensive understanding of the challenges
addressed by this study, a literature survey in relation to the Tanzania’s healthcare
system and access control models and mechanisms was conducted. This analysis
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led to the general understanding of the Tanzania’s healthcare system, discussed
in Chapter 2 and also a thorough understanding of the limitations of the existing
access control models for the healthcare domain, discussed in Chapter 3. More-
over, an investigation on traditional access control models offered the basis for
further analysis of access control requirements for the healthcare domain as well as
theoretical formalisation of the new context-based access control model.
2. Data Collection: In this research, data collection was conducted in two phases.
While the second phase involved collection of access scenarios from the Tanza-
nia’s healthcare system, the first phase involved obtaining real healthcare data for
evaluation purposes.
During the initial stages of this research, and when the overall goal was to design
a framework for securing patients’ healthcare information, the general procedure
for research clearance that would allow the researcher to access real healthcare
data in a Tanzania’s healthcare system was followed. Three separate permissions
were to be obtained before the researcher could be allowed to access healthcare
data. The permissions were from: 1. the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
(MoHSW); 2. the National Institute of Medical Research (NIMR) which oversees
all the research in the healthcare domain in Tanzania and 3. the hospital that
will provide data, in this case the Muhimbili National Hospital (MNH) and Ilala
Municipal Council (overseeing the Mnazi Mmoja Health Centre, Amana Hospital
and Buguruni Health Centre). In all the six institutions, a research proposal has
to be written and submitted. The research proposal is then assessed by Ethical
Committee of each institute in terms of the value of its contributions to the general
community, feasibility of the research process, and the capability of the researcher
to undertake the proposed research.
The researcher followed the above procedures and the permissions were then granted
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by the three main institutions (that is, MoHSW, NIMR and Ilala Municipal Coun-
cil). The research clearance certificates from NIMR and Ilala Municipal Council
are in Appendix A. With these clearance certificates at hand, the DIT Research
and Ethics Committee also granted the researcher the DIT Ethical Approval under
the condition that no real healthcare data should be used. Based on this restriction
and the restrictions of the trans-border data flow in relation to healthcare data,
it was agreed with the supervisors that only simulated healthcare data should be
used for evaluation. The schema of the dataset used is based on the schema similar
to that of the Muhimbili National Hospital (MNH).
The access rules used during evaluation stage in this research were collected from
different healthcare facilities in Tanzania. These access rules were obtained partly
from an observation survey carried out at the Muhimbili National Hospital (MNH)
and a questionnaire distributed to healthcare professionals and systems adminis-
trators working in several healthcare facilities within a Tanzania healthcare system.
The questionnaire used to obtain the access rules is in Appendix B.
3. Access Control Requirements: Since the current healthcare system in Tan-
zania works with both paper-based and electronic medical records, the first step
towards designing a relevant access control model for the domain was to identify
adequate access control requirements that would support the continuity of care
by better handling infrequent access requests. To help with identification of ac-
cess control requirements, a new methodology for gathering access control require-
ments was developed. The newly proposed COIL (Contexts, Organisational rules,
e-health Initiatives and Legislative rules) methodology is a result of the synthesiza-
tion of contexts, privacy and security capabilities from national e-health initiatives,
legislative and organisational rules. It allows easy specification of access control
requirements and can also be used as a guideline to evaluate access control sys-
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tems in a modern healthcare environments. The COIL methodology is discussed
in detail in Chapter 4.
4. Model Design and Formalisation: This thesis proposes a new context-based
access control model named Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC)
that supports the continuity of care by better handling infrequent access requests.
The proposed context-based access control model is the main contribution of this
research to the body of knowledge. Its design is divided into two parts: initial
high-level design, where a theoretical model was designed during early stages of this
research, and a detailed design. With the latter, a detailed model was designed by
extending the traditional Role-Based Access Control model with Break-The-Glass
approach, using contexts and obligations. The new context-based access control
model is discussed in Chapter 5.
5. Prototype Design and Development: A prototype named CEATH, that is
Context- Enhanced Access in a Tanzania Healthcare system, has been designed
and implemented in order:
• To demonstrate the applicability of the new Role and Context-Based Access
Control (RoC-BAC) model
• To examine overheads introduced by incorporation of contexts and obligations
into Role and Context-Based Access Control model (using CEATH system)
against that of a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model (enforced in to
EMR-RBAC system)
In addition to other techniques such as special configuration of Unified Modeling
Language (UML), known as SecureUML, Entity-Relationship Model (Chen, 1976)
has been used for the conceptual design of the system. With an earlier approach,
techniques such as Class and Sequence Diagrams were used to identify require-
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ments and for analysing the relationship between modules. Yii framework which
requires Java (as a server side scripting language) and MySQL, which is an open-
source relational database management system were the main components used to
implement the two prototypes, as discussed in Chapter 6.
6. Evaluation: The evaluation part of this research was carried out in three phases.
Initially, the capabilities of RoC-BAC are compared against other access control
models (including DAC, MAC, RBAC and ABAC) based on criteria specified by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Further, an evaluation of
performance overheads introduced by new elements and relations (that is, contexts
and obligations) was performed. Finally, the usability of the CEATH system which
implements RoC-BAC model is evaluated by the healthcare professionals in Tanza-
nia. Prototypes for CEATH and EMR-RBAC wwere implemented in two hospitals
to allow healthcare professionals to use the system before its usability is measured
by System Usability Scale. The discussion on different aspects of evaluation is in
Chapter 7.
1.5 Expected Results
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the body of knowledge, including:
1. A generic methodology, named COIL, for gathering comprehensive access control
requirements in the healthcare domain is proposed. The COIL methodology is
the synthesis of four elements: contexts, organisational rules, electronic health-
care initiatives, and legislative rules. Each of the four components of the COIL
methodology has its own impact in relation to access to electronic health records.
2. A taxonomy for classifying access control models is also proposed in this thesis. The
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intent of the proposed taxonomy is to identify how existing access control models
can be classified against the proposed Role and Context-Based Access Control
(RoC-BAC) model.
3. To support the continuity of care in an accountable manner, a new context-based
access control model is designed. The Role and Context-Based Access Control
model is developed for the healthcare domain, and it is an extension of traditional
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with health-related contexts and obli-
gations.
4. With the proposed RoC-BAC model, a new concept of health-related contexts is
also introduced. It represents specific contexts from the healthcare domain that
should be evaluated by an access control system in order to support the continuity
of care.
5. A prototype that implements the Role and Context-Based Access Control model is
developed. The prototype, called CEATH (Context-Enhanced Access in a Tanzania
Healthcare), was developed in order to achieve two purposes: 1. to demonstrate
that RoC-BAC model is feasible and, 2. to evaluate the performance overheads
introduced by new entities and relations. Through its support of context-based
policies, and especially health-related contexts, it has been demonstrated in this
thesis that the incorporation of health-related contexts and obligations helps health-
care professionals to bypass access rules in an accountable manner in case of an
infrequent emergency access, which in turn supports the continuity of care.
1.6 Publications
This research has produced a total of twelve publications. That is, one Book Chapter
(BP), three Journal Articles (JA) and eight Conference Papers (CP). These publica-
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tions are listed here based on their association with three research contributions
1.6.1 Contribution I: Taxonomy of Access Control Models
CP. Omary, Z., Mtenzi, F., and Wu, B. “Taxonomy of Access Control Models
for Healthcare Systems” To be submitted in the 7th International Conference
on Information Technology (ICIT 2015), Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan,
Amman, Jordan, May 12-15, 2015
1.6.2 Contribution II: COIL
CP. Omary, Z., Mtenzi, F., Wu, B., “Controlling Access to Patients Information
using Cases”, presented at the International Conference on Information Society
(i-Society 2011), London, United Kingdom, June 27- 29, 2011.
CP. Omary, Z., Mtenzi, F., and Wu, B. “Context for Securing EHRs in a Dynamic
Healthcare Environment” the 5th International Conference on Information Tech-
nology (ICIT’11), Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan, May
11-13, 2011
1.6.3 Contribution III: RoC-BAC
CP. Omary, Z. Dynamic Context-Aware Access Control Framework for Securing
Electronic Healthcare Records in Tanzania: Implementation Approach, Health-
care Informatics Society of Ireland (HISI)15th Annual Conference , Dublin, Ire-
land, 17-18 Nov 2010
BC. Omary, Z., Mtenzi, F., Wu, B. Context and Access Control for Healthcare
Frontiers of Information Technology, MASAUM Networks 2012, ISBN: 978-969-
9742-00-2
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CP. Omary, Z., Mtenzi, F., Wu, B., “Dynamic Context Aware Access Control
Model for the Areas with the Shortage of Healthcare Professionals”, Interna-
tional eHealth, Telemedicine and Health ICT Forum for Educational, Network-
ing and Business, ISSN 1998-5509. Editors: Jardanova, M. and Lievens, F.
Luxembourg, G.D. of Luxembourg, April 18-20, 2012. pp. 831-835.
1.6.4 Other Publications
The following articles and conference papers related to electronic healthcare and Tan-
zania healthcare system were also published
CP. Omary, Z., Lupiana, D., Mtenzi, F., and Wu, B. “Challenges to E-Healthcare
Adoption in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Tanzania,” First Interna-
tional Conference on Networked Digital Technologies (NDT’09), IEEE, pp.201-
209, 28-31 July 2009, ISBN: 978-1-4244-4614-8, pp. 201 - 209.
JA. Omary, Z., Lupiana, D., Mtenzi, F., and Wu, B. “Analysis of the Challenges
Affecting E-healthcare Adoption in Developing Countries: Case of Tanzania”,
in the International Journal of Information Studies (IJIS), Volume 2, No. 1,
2010, 38-50.
JA. Omary, Z., Mtenzi, F., and Wu, B. “Politics vs. Electronic Healthcare: Discus-
sion on How Politics Affect E-Healthcare Adoption” in the International Journal
of Digital Society (IJDS), ISSN 2040 2570 (Online), Volume 1, Issue 2, 2010.
JA. Omary, Z., Mtenzi, F., Wu, B., and O’Driscoll, C. “Ubiquitous Healthcare
Information System: Assessment of its Impacts to Patient’s Information” in the
International Journal of Information Security Research (IJISR), ISSN: 2024-
4639, Volume 1, Issue 3, 2011, 71-77.
CP. Omary, Z., Mtenzi, F., and Wu, B. “Design and Development of a Framework
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for Securing E-healthcare Information” The 14th Annual Conference on Health-
care Informatics Society of Ireland (HISI), Dublin, Ireland, 18-19 November
2009.
CP. Omary, Z., Mtenzi, F., and Wu, B. “How does Politics Affects e-Healthcare
Adoption” The Fourth International Conference on Internet Technologies and
Secured Transactions (ICITST), London, United Kingdom, 9-12 November 2009,
ISBN: 978-1-4244-5647-5, pp. 1-8.
CP. Omary, Z., Mtenzi, F., Wu, B., and O’ Driscoll, C. “Accessing Sensitive Patient
Information in Ubiquitous Healthcare Systems The 5th International Conference
on Internet Technologies and Secured Transactions (ICITST 2010)”, London,
United Kingdom, 8-11, Nov 2010, ISBN: 978-1-4244-8862-9, pp. 1-3.
1.7 Thesis Structure
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organised as follows.
In Chapter 2, the background to the Tanzania’s healthcare system is discussed. Among
others, this chapter discusses its organisational structure as well as challenges that
Tanzania as a country faces, with special consideration on human resources for health.
The chapter also discusses the status of electronic healthcare adoption and use in the
country.
The traditional access control models which have been implemented in numerous
application domains are discussed in Chapter 3. Among others, the Chapter analyses
the suitability of traditional access control models in modern healthcare environments,
before proposing a taxonomy for classifying access control models.
Chapter 4 discusses the development of a generic methodology for gathering compre-
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hensive access control requirements for the healthcare domain. It is a combination of
contexts, privacy and security capabilities, legislative and organisational rules. COIL
is, in fact, a methodological approach performed to identify a comprehensive list of
access control requirements for the healthcare domain.
Chapter 5 discusses the design of context-based access control model named RoC-
BAC, which is an abbreviation for Role and Context-Based Access Control. To
support the continuity of care by better handling infrequent access requests in an
accountable manner, the developed RoC-BAC model is an extension of the well-
known and widely adopted traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model
with health-related contexts and obligations. With this model, a new concept named
health-related context is also introduced.
The prototype implementations of RBAC and RoC-BAC models are discussed in
Chapter 6. While CEATH system was designed and implemented in order to demon-
strate that RoC-BAC model is feasible, the EMR-RBAC system which is built from
traditional RBAC model is purposely implemented in order to allow the comparison
of the two models in terms of their performance as a result of the introduction of new
entities and relations.
Chapter 7 discusses an evaluation of the proposed RoC-BAC model against that of a
pure RBAC model. In particular, this chapter discusses three distinct ways that RoC-
BAC can be evaluated. That is, firstly, based on the criteria specified by NIST that
can be used to evaluate access control systems, followed by comparative analysis of the
performance of two prototypes that implements RBAC and RoC-BAC. And finally,
evaluation of CEATH by healthcare professionals in Tanzania’s healthcare system.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, summarises its main findings and points out future
research work that could be investigated.
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Chapter 2
Tanzania Healthcare System
The main contribution from this thesis is a new context-based access control model
purposely designed to support the continuity of care by better handling infrequent
access requests, in an accountable manner. This research uses Tanzania’s healthcare
system as a study domain. The chapter begins with a review on country’s historical
background in Section 2.1 followed by a discussion on healthcare service delivery
system in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 examines challenges of the traditional healthcare
system against those of a modern healthcare system whereas ICT is used, also known
as e-healthcare. The status of e-healthcare adoption in the country is analysed in
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
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2.1 Background
Tanzania is a country in the east coast of Africa, consisting of Tanzania mainland
and Zanzibar archipelago. The country has a total area of 945,454 square kilometres
(sq.km), of which 883,954 is land and the remaining 61,500 is inland water. The
country shares borders with Kenya and Uganda to the North, Rwanda, Burundi,
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia to the West, and Malawi and
Mozambique to the South. There is also a long coast of Indian ocean to the East.
Figure 2.1: A map of Tanzania showing administrative regions
(Source: Tanzania Government)
The data obtained from the 2012 population and housing census indicate that, the
country had a total population of 44,929,002 people, of which, 1,303,568 people were
residing in Zanzibar and the remaining 43,625,434 people were in Tanzania mainland
(NBS, 2012a). Since Tanzania is one of the countries with highest birth rates in the
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world (about 39.664 per 1,000 people), it is estimated by the National Bureau of
Statistics that its population as of December 2014 was 47, 421, 786 people, and more
than 44% of the total population is under the age of fifteen years old (NBS, 2012b).
The population distribution in Tanzania is characterised to be highly uneven. While
the majority of the population in Tanzania mainland (about seventy seven percent)
resides in the rural areas, the situation is completely different in Zanzibar where its
population is predominantly urban (with about sixty percent) (Madulu, 2012; NBS,
2010). This huge difference between rural and urban population distribution between
these two parts of the country is due to the fact that Zanzibar is more urbanised than
its counterpart (Madulu, 2012).
Table 2.1: Population and Housing Census 1978 - 2012 (Source: NBS, 2012b)
1978
Census
1988
Census
2002
Census
2012
Census
Tanzania
Mainland
17,036, 000 22,584,000 33,462, 000 43,625, 000
Tanzania
Zanzibar
476,000 641,000 982,000 1,304,000
Tanzania 17,512,000 23, 225,000 34,444,000 44,929,000
The country is also characterised by an annual population growth rate of 2.7% in
Tanzania mainland and 2.8% in Zanzibar. This has been proven by an increase of
more than ten million people in ten years, with an average of 87,000 children born
every month throughout the country, as shown in Table 2.1. With the current annual
population growth rate, the population in Tanzania is expected to double in the next
twenty six years (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013).
It is also estimated that Tanzania has a gross national income per capita of $ 860
and life expectancy of sixty one (61) years. With more than sixty percent of the
population living below the national poverty line, the country has a high under-five
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Table 2.2: Tanzania Statistics (Source: NBS, 2012a)
Total Population (projection in 2014) 47, 421, 786
Gross National Income per Capital ($) 2013 860
Life expectancy at birth (years) 2012 60.9
Probability of dying under Five (per 1000 live birth) 68
Probability of dying between 15 and 60 (M/F) per 1000 456/311
Total annual expenditure on health per capita ($, 2012) 83
Total expenditure on health as % of GDP (2012) 6.0
Total adult literacy rate (%) 2008-2012 73.21
Primary school net enrolment ratio(%) 2008-2011 98.2
mortality rate of about 15.2%. On a positive note, in relation to education, Tanzania
has had a remarkable success in reduction of illiteracy since its independence in 1961.
From the 2012 population and housing census, Tanzania has recorded a 73.21% of
literacy rate among women and men, which is an accomplishment from the 70% illit-
eracy rate the country inherited at independence in 1961 (NBS, 2010), (NBS, 2012a),
(World Health Organisation, 2012c). These statistical figures are summarised in Table
2.2. Subsequent to the background of the country reviewed here, Section 2.2 discusses
its healthcare delivery system.
2.2 Health Delivery System
Administratively, Tanzania is divided into 30 regions, of which five are in Zanzibar
and the remaining 25 are in Tanzania mainland. Each region is divided further into
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districts. The districts are further divided into divisions, and divisions into local wards
and sheshias (in Zanzibar), as presented in Table 2.3. Wards are divided further into
villages and streets for rural and urban areas respectively (Othman et al., 2003). In
2012, the government of the United Republic of Tanzania created four new regions
and nineteen districts, which brings a total administrative districts to 143, of which
133 are in Tanzania mainland and 10 are in Zanzibar (Prime Minister’s Office RALG,
2012), (NBS, 2013).
Table 2.3: Tanzania administrative divisions (Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2009),
Prime Minister’s Office RALG (2012)
ZANZIBAR TANZANIA Mainland TOTAL
Regions 5 25 30
Districts 10 133 143
Divisions 20 516 536
Local Wards and Sheshias 332 2,542 2, 874
The current healthcare delivery system in Tanzania was established upon indepen-
dence in 1961 following colonial, urban and curative-based healthcare system from
earlier colonial regimes. Contrary to colonial governments in numerous cities, such
as Madras (currently known as Chennai, India), which encouraged private-for-profit
healthcare services by offering subsidies to healthcare practitioners (Mills, 1998), in
Tanzania, however, the overall healthcare system was characterised by little equity
and accessibility to the population as a whole. During the colonial period, “proper
doctoring” was only confined to British citizens and there were only 12 medical doctors
out of 120 Tanzanian with university degrees (Gish, 1973).
After independence in 1961, the government provided free medical services to all cit-
izens and private-for-profit medical practice was banned. In the late 1960s, the post-
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colonial government through the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW)
began to expand healthcare services, infrastructure and other resources to the rural
areas, which was also associated with implementation of various policies and strate-
gies. One among the popular policies developed by the government at the time em-
phasized on equitable distribution and access to healthcare resources and services
(MoHSW, 1990). The government also set a strategy to train indigenous practition-
ers. Based on these policies and strategies, a large number of medical doctors were
trained, and healthcare services were offered free of charge in all public health facilities
(Abel-Smith & Rawal, 1992).
As part of economic recovery and structural adjustment, the government of the United
Republic of Tanzania introduced the regulated private practice in 1991 and the cost
sharing policy in all public health facilities in July 1993. This latter policy aimed to
improve efficiency and to foster sustainability in the provision of healthcare services
through community participation (Munishi, 1997). To enable citizens to get familiar
with the newly introduced policy and also to control flow of patients to referral and
consultant hospitals, the MoHSW introduced user charges in two distinct phases. The
charges were first introduced in referral and consultant hospitals, whereby anyone vis-
iting a referral hospital was required to pay, and later the charges were introduced
for patients attending health centres and dispensaries. As part of the policy, there
were also automatic waivers and exemptions granted to specific services, groups and
diseases such as all maternity services, children under five and specific (including tu-
berculosis and leprosy) and chronic diseases that would drain a substantial amount of
income if patients would be asked to pay. Although healthcare as a service has evolved
since independence, there are still some geographical inequalities in relation to access
to healthcare services in the country. With development and the availability of op-
portunities, some regions of the country tend to attract more healthcare professionals
that others.
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There are also some positive changes that characterise the Tanzania’s healthcare sys-
tem. First and foremost, today’s healthcare system is marked by a reform and im-
provement. There has been an expansion of healthcare services in rural areas facil-
itating greater access to the rural population. And the majority of the population
currently lives within five kilometres of a healthcare facility, which is an improvement
compared to more than 90 percent living within 10 kilometres in the 1980s (MoHSW,
2003), (National Bureau of Statistics, 2009). The doctor population ratio has also
improved to 1: 30,000 from 1:50,000 in 2006 (Manzi et al., 2012). Despite the im-
provement, this ratio is still low compared to 2.7 and 2.8 doctors per 1,000 people in
Ireland and United Kingdom respectively (World Bank, 2015) and the recommended
rate of 1:1000 doctor to population ratio and 1:7,500 dentist to population ratio for
developing countries by the World Health Organisation (WHO) (Kinfu et al., 2009).
Table 2.4: Tanzania Health Statistics in 1961 (Source: Kinfu et al., 2009)
Total Population 10, 400,000
Birth rate per 1000 population 49.3
Death rate per 1000 population 20.3
Life expectancy 44
Under 5 mortality rate per 1000 population 240
The low doctor to population ratio is due to numerous reasons including fast growing
population and low student registrations in medical schools among others (Mkony,
2010). The ratios for pharmacists, dentists, nurses and other healthcare professionals
are exceedingly low by international comparison (Manzi et al., 2012). Table 2.4 shows
other health statistics in Tanzania in 1961. These and other characteristics of the
Tanzania healthcare system that might affect the continuity of care are discussed
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further in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Referral Health System
The healthcare services in Tanzania are offered by a number of institutions through
a referral system that is categorised into different levels, ranging from community
level to treatment abroad. The healthcare institutions forming a referral structure
include dispensaries, health centres, district hospitals, regional hospitals and, referral
and consultation hospitals, as shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: The referral structure of the Tanzania healthcare system (Source: Author)
As pointed out by the World Health Organisation (2008), an effective referral system
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ensures a close relationship between all levels of the health system and helps to ensure
that people receive the best possible care closest to home. It also assists in making
cost-effective use of hospitals and primary health care services. Additionally, a referral
system should be able to offer support to health centres and other primary health care
providers by experienced staff from district and regional hospitals. This in turn helps
build capacity and enhances access to better quality care.
Despite a long list of proven benefits of a referral health system, the Tanzania’s health-
care system is characterised with an acceptable informal referrals that affect the ef-
ficiency and effectiveness of the overall healthcare system. It is actually common for
patients to seek healthcare services in secondary health facilities, including district
and regional hospitals, without being referred by a primary care health facility such
as a dispensary or a health centre. This practice results in i. patients receiving optimal
care not at the appropriate level, which could be costly ii. secondary health facilities
not being used cost-effectively, iii. patients who mostly need specialist health services
cannot access them in a timely manner and iv. primary health care facilities being
under utilized (World Health Organisation, 2008). The acceptable informal referrals
in a Tanzania’s healthcare system are indicated by dotted lines in Figure 2.2.
This section reviews each of the units responsible for providing health care services
in Tanzania mainland as discussed in its national health policies: MoHSW (1990),
MoHSW (2003), and MoHSW (2007).
Village Health Service: To ensure that each individual or household takes care
of its own health, the government of the United Republic of Tanzania established a
village health post to all villages without a health facility in 1990 (MoHSW, 1990).
The village health post is the lowest level of health care delivery in the country, and it is
offered at the community level. It offers preventive services which could be provided
at homes. Usually, the village health post does not require a permanent building
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to offer its services but rather only an office is required for storage of medicine and
equipment. Two village health workers are required for each village health facility, one
who will deal with maternal child problems and the other will deal with environmental
sanitation. The village health workers are chosen by the village government amongst
the villagers and are given a short training before they can start providing services to
citizens.
The health services offered at the village or community level include
• Health education about diseases in the community
• Health education about clean and safe water, hygiene and environmental sani-
tation
• Advice on food and nutrition and, maternal and child health
• Collection of statistics on diseases and immunisations, and
• Treatment of minor ailments
Dispensaries: This is the first formal level-one health care unit in the country,
providing comprehensive primary health care services to citizens. Each dispensary is
expected to serve between 6,000 and 10,000 people, and to supervise all the village
health workers in its ward. A dispensary is staffed by a clinical assistant, with one
or two helpers: a public health nurse or a nurse midwife and a rural health assistant
(NBS, 2012b). The clinical assistants usually receive a three year course of training
in anatomy, physiology and hygiene with good grounding in diagnostic methods and
treatment of common diseases.
The following are some of the health care services offered by dispensaries:
• Health education to people served by the dispensary
• Maternal and child health and delivery services
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• Treatments and immunization services to children
• Treatment of diseases
• Continuation of treatment for tuberculosis, mental and other diseases in collab-
oration with higher level health facilities
• Health care services and health education to schools
• Conduct visits to villages for the purpose of identifying health problems and
trying to solve them or refer to higher health facility
• Provide expertise and supervision to village health workers in the villages served
by the dispensary
• Refer patients with complicated conditions to higher-level health facilities, es-
pecially health centres
Health Centres: This is the second formal level-one health care service delivery unit
in Tanzania, supporting dispensaries and are expected to serve about 50,000 people.
Although, health centres give priority to preventive measures and hygiene, they are,
however, extensively used for treatment of common diseases. Each health centre is run
by a clinical officer with a secondary school education and more elaborate education
in diagnosis, treatment and minor surgery (NBS, 2012b). The clinical officer running
a health centre is usually assisted by one or two clinical assistants, a nurse or a nurse
midwife with one or two child health aids, a health aid and a health assistant.
Health centres offer similar services to those offered by the dispensary but with more
sophisticated services. These include
• In-patient department with 20-30 beds for patients who require short hospital-
ization
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• Supervision of dispensaries as well as provision of primary health care services
in the division
District Hospitals: The district is a crucial level in the provision of health care
services in the country. Each district is expected to have a district hospital serving
about 250,000 people. For those districts which do not have government hospitals,
the government usually negotiates with religious organisations to designate voluntary
hospitals as district hospitals. The district hospital contains a mixture of qualified staff
with different specialities, including: graduate and assistant medical officers, nurses
of different qualifications, pharmacists, laboratory technicians, radiologists, health
officers and health secretaries. The health services offered at district hospitals include
the following:
• Conducting on-job training for all medical staff in the district
• Identifying major health problems in the district and working out strategies to
overcome them
• Conducting operational research aimed at providing efficient health services in
the district
• Participating in the training of health staff of the district hospital
• Referring patients who require special treatment to regional hospitals
Regional Hospital: This is a hospital establishment providing level two referral
hospitals from level one hospitals, that is district hospitals. They are responsible for
providing health care services in a region. As of 2012 figures from the National Bureau
of Statistics (NBS), there were about eighteen regional hospitals in the country (NBS,
2012b). The regional hospital offers the following functions
• Provides all services offered at the district level but at the higher level of expertise
32
2.2 Health Delivery System
(and more staff, with about 5-10 doctors and 1-2 consultants)
• Offers second level referral services from level one hospitals
• Conducts teaching and training of middle and operational level health cadre,
including clinical assistants and nurses
• Conducts health research programs including operational research of health sys-
tems research in the region
• Provides technical skills to lower health facilities in the region and offer spe-
cialised treatment in medicine, surgery, obstetrics and gynaecology and paedi-
atric.
National, Referral and Consultant Hospitals: This is level three and the
highest level of health care services delivery in the country. As its name suggests, the
national, referral and consultant hospitals act as referral centres for level two hospitals.
• National Hospital: The Muhimbili National Hospital (MNH) is the only
national hospital in the country, supervised by the Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare (MoHSW). It also acts as the zonal referral hospital for the Eastern Zone.
• Zones for Referral Hospitals: Currently, there are four sophisticated
zonal referral and consultant hospitals in the country. These are Muhimbili
National Hospital (MNH), two voluntary agency hospitals (Bugando Medical
Centre (BMC) and Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre (KCMC)) and Mbeya
Hospital, which is owned by the government. These referral hospitals are located
on the Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern Highlands zones respectively.
Referral hospitals are equipped with a mix of qualified specialists and consultants
as well as sophisticated modern medical equipments so that to allow healthcare
professionals are able to handle cases which would otherwise be referred abroad.
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The referral hospitals offer the following services:
– All the medical services offered at the level two health facilities but at a
specialist level
– Conducts the training of high and middle level health personnel
– Teaching undergraduate and postgraduate medical students plus other al-
lied courses
– Conducts research in the medical field
– Conducts outreach visits to other hospitals in the zone to offer specialists
support services to the medical staff
• Specialised Hospitals: There are two specialised hospitals in Tanzania
mainland. These are, Mirembe Hospital (in Dodoma) and Kibongoto (in Moshi)
providing health care services to mentally ill and tuberculosis patients respec-
tively. These hospitals are directly supervised by the Ministry of Health and
Social Welfare (MoHSW) and, are equipped with qualified specialists and con-
sultants as well as sophisticated modern medical equipment to allow healthcare
professionals to deliver health services as needed.
Treatment Abroad: For health care services that are not available in Tanzania,
patients are referred abroad for treatment on government subsidy.
The health facilities in Tanzania may also be categorised based on ownership. That
is, health facilities owned by the government (also known as public hospitals or public
health facilities), and those owned by non-government organisations such as those
owned by parastatal organisations, religious institutions and private organisations.
As summarised in Table 2.5, by September 2014, Tanzania mainland had a total
of 6,270 health facilities. Of these, 4,739 are government owned and the remaining
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Table 2.5: Number of health facilities in Tanzania (Source: MoHSW, 2013b)
Type of Facility
Government Owned Non-Government Owned Total Facilities
YEAR
2013 2014 2013 2014 2013 2014
Dispensaries 3,099 4,219 1,312 1,259 4,411 5,478
Health Centres 336 416 126 158 462 574
Hospitals 70 104 109 114 179 218
Total 3,505 4,739 1,547 1,531 5,052 6,270
1,531 are owned by non-government organisations. For government owned health
facilities, there are 4,219 dispensaries, 416 health centres and 104 hospitals. With
non-government health facilities, there are 1,259 dispensaries, 158 health centres and
114 hospitals. From these statistics, it can be noted that dispensaries occupy 88%
of all health facilities, followed by health centres that account for 9% and hospitals
constitutes only 3%. Section 2.2.2 discusses the status of human resources for health
in the Tanzania’s healthcare sector.
2.2.2 Health Workforce
The statistics on human resources for health show that the number of qualified health
workers in Tanzania have declined in absolute numbers relative to the size of the
population. The shortage began in 1990s when the government retrenched health
workforce and imposed an employment freeze, resulting into a loss of about one third
of health workers. Within ten years, between 1995 and 2005, out of 23,474 university
graduates, the government employed only 3,036 healthcare workers, which is about 16
per cent of the overall graduates. Even now, the number of graduates from medical
schools employed by the government is still very low.
In 2006, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) reported that, there were
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about 29,000 staff working in government-owned health facilities (with an estimate of
65% shortage) and about 6,000 staff working in private hospitals (with an estimate
of 86% shortage). To meet the demanding needs of the health system, the ministry
estimated that an additional of 144,700 health workers would have to be trained and
employed to work in government-owned health facilities and another 39,400 for non-
government facilities. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 summarises the shortage of health workers
for both private and public health facilities in Tanzania.
Table 2.6: The Status of Human Resources for Health in Private Health Facilities (Source: MoHSW,
2008a)
Facility
Level
Available
Health
Facilities
Health Workers
Staff
Shortage
%
Required
Staff
per Estab-
lishment
2005
Required
Staff
for
Existing
Facilities
Available
Staff
2006
Staff
Shortage
2006
Hospitals 132 197 26, 004 3, 251 22, 753 87.5
Health Cen-
tres
150 36 5, 400 758 4, 642 86.0
Dispensaries 1, 641 7 11, 487 1, 842 9, 645 84.0
Training
Institutions
36 * 756 288 468 61.9
TOTAL 1, 959 43, 647 6, 139 37, 508 85.9
Attrition Rate 0.5% per year 1, 875
TOTAL NEW STAFF REQUIRED FOR PRIVATE HEALTH FACILITIES 39, 383
* indicates health facilities or institutions with varying staffing level
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Table 2.7: Human resources status in Government-Owned Health Facilities (Source: MoHSW, 2008a)
Facility
Level
Health Facility Health Staff
Required
Staff
to fill the
existing
Gaps
Available
Facilities
2006
New
Facilities
2007–
2017
Total
Required
per
Establishment
2005
Required for
Existing
Facilities
Medical
Professionals
Available
2005
Shortage
2006
Shortage
%
PHSDP
Requirement
2007-
2017
Referral and
Specialised
Hospitals
8 – 8 * 8, 546 4, 477 4, 069 48 – 4, 069
Regional Hos-
pitals
21 – 21 346 7, 266 2, 481 4, 785 66 – 4, 785
District Hos-
pitals
95 19 114 197 22, 458 7, 364 15, 094 67 3, 743 18, 837
Health Cen-
tres
331 2, 074 2, 405 36 11, 916 4, 908 7, 008 59 49, 776 56, 784
Dispensaries 3, 038 3, 108 6, 146 10 30, 380 9, 384 20, 996 69 31, 080 52, 076
Training
Institutions
72 4 76 * 1, 711 449 1, 262 74 – 1, 262
Total 3, 565 5, 205 8, 770 – 82, 277 29, 063 3, 214 65 84, 599 137, 813
Attrition Rate 0.5% per year 4, 230 6, 891
88, 829 144, 704
TOTAL NEW STAFF REQUIRED (2007-2017) 88, 829 144, 704
* indicates health facilities or institutions with varying staffing levels
3
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Table 2.8: Student enrolment by major fields and level of study (Source: SARUA, 2011)
Major Field of Study Number of students enrolment
Undergraduate PG Dip. Master Doctoral Post Doctoral
Agriculture 640 0 101 10 0
Business, Management and Law 9935 1035 2528 24 0
Education 14,569 61 96 1 0
Human Sciences 1628 0 302 4 1
Humanities and Social Sciences 11596 877 599 16 0
Science, Engineering and Technology 7852 607 202 44 0
The human resources situation in the healthcare sector in Tanzania is in severe cri-
sis, according to statistics presented in Table 2.6 and 2.7 and also from a report by the
World Health Organisation (WHO). In its recent report, the World Health Organisation
(2013a) estimates the global shortage of 7.2 million health workers, with 83 countries
Tanzania inclusive facing an acute shortage of healthcare workers from community
level to qualified ones including doctors, specialists, nurses and other professionals.
The reasons behind such a crisis include poverty, migration of health workers to in-
dustrialised countries (brain drain), poor governance, poor living and working condi-
tions, and retirement and deaths of health workers. There is also internal migration
of health workers out of general health services to horizontal health programmes, as
a result of low salaries and overwork.
In comparison to the other fields of study, there is also a low capacity of enrolment in
medicine in Tanzania. For the year 2011, for instance, the Tanzania Commission for
Universities (TCU) enrolled a grand total of 135,367 students, of which 92,977 were
enrolled in public universities and the remaining 42,390 in private universities (NBS,
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Table 2.9: Medical Doctor First Year Enrolment Capacity for Different Universities in Tanzania
(Source: TCU, 2012)
University Name Capacity for First
Year Medical Doctor
Enrolment
Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences
(MUHAS)
200
International Medical & Technological University
(IMTU)
180
Catholic University of Health and Allied Sciences
(CUHAS)
150
Kilimanjaro Christian Medical College (KCMC) 150
University of Dodoma 120
Hurbert Kairuki Memorial University 50
Saint Francis University 50
Total 900
2013). With sample data of students enrolment based on major fields and level of
study presented in Table 2.8. While Education and Human Sciences enrolled 14,569
and 11,596 undergraduate students respectively (SARUA, 2011), medicine is capable
to enrol only 900 medical degrees students in a year across seven universities, as shown
in Table 2.9.
The ratio of health workers per population in a Tanzania healthcare system is still
far below the rate recommended by the World Health Organisation (WHO), that is
22.8 doctors, nurses and midwives per 10,000 population. The 2013 statistics from
the MoHSW (2013), and sample data presented in Table 2.10, indicate that there was
a total of 346 medical specialists and consultants, 1,135 medical doctors working in
different parts of the country and 14,096 nurses and nurse midwives. These ratios
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Table 2.10: Health Workers per Population Ratios at National Level (per 10,000 Population)
(Source: MoHSW, 2013)
Profession Total HRH per 10,000 Population
Medical Specialists and Consultants 346 0.079
Medical Doctor 1,135 0.260
Nurse and Nurse Midwives 14,096 3.231
Medical Attendants 19,666 4.508
Assistant Medical Officer 1,741 0.399
Assistant Nursing Officer 4,248 0.974
equal 0.079 medical specialists and consultants, 0.0260 medical doctors and 3.231
nurses and nurse midwives for every 10,000 population. Similar to skilled health
workers, the ratios are also low for the supporting workers.
Despite the government’s effort to establish strategies and policies that aim to reduce
the low ratio between health workers and population (especially in rural areas), the
region-wise distribution is highly uneven. As depicted in Table 2.11, Dar es Salaam has
a total population 4,364,541 that can be served by 223 medical doctors, Manyara has
1,425,131 people and 21 medical doctors, and Kigoma has 2,127,930 and 16 medical
doctors. From these statistics, one medical doctor is expected to serve a population of
19,572 in Dar es Salaam, 67,863 in Manyara and 138,620 in Kigoma (MoHSW, 2013).
Furthermore, out of 16 medical consultants in the country, 11 works in Mwanza, 3 in
Arusha and 2 in Kilimanjaro. There are various reasons that influence health workers’
area of choice of practice resulting into uneven region-wise distribution. These may
include future career plan, better living and working conditions and the availability
of private health facilities that would allow public health workers to engage in private
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Table 2.11: The distribution of health workers in selected regions in a Tanzania) (Source: MoHSW,
2013)
No. Region Population
Medical
Consultants
Medical
Specialists
Medical
Doctors
Nurses
&
Nurse
Midwives
1. Dar es Salaam 4,364,541 - 141 223 1,274
2. Kilimanjaro 1,640,087 2 32 91 1,065
3. Iringa 941,238 - 4 52 1,011
4. Mbeya 2,707,410 - 11 128 1,211
5. Mwanza 2,772,509 11 58 128 1,179
6. Kagera 2,458,023 - 1 26 788
7. Arusha 1,694,310 3 6 45 425
8. Mtwara 1,270,854 - 1 24 350
9. Kigoma 2,127,930 - 2 16 414
10. Manyara 1,425,131 - 3 21 385
11. Rukwa 1,004,539 - 2 17 332
12. Pwani 1,098,668 - 6 32 314
- indicates no health worker in the region
health work.
In addition to the shortage of health workers, the Tanzania’s healthcare system is
characterised by an increasing number of patients, as shown in Table 2.12. For the
year 2008, for instance, there was a total of 36,425,330 outpatients who received
treatment from various health facilities throughout the country. Among them, 5%
received treatment in hospitals, 13% in health centres and the remaining 82% in
dispensaries, as summarised in Table 2.12. Looking at the regional distribution of
medical consultants, specialists and doctors, a 2013 report published by the MoHSW
(2013) noted that, 68% of all medical consultants were based in Mwanza, 47% of
medical specialists and 20% of all medical doctors were working in Dar es Salaam.
Out of a total of 64, 449 health workers, only 32,036 are considered to be serving the
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Table 2.12: Number of patients treated annually in Tanzania mainland between 2000 and 2009
(Source: MoHSW, published by the NBS (2012b))
Year Outpatients Inpatients
Hospitals Dispensaries Health Centres
2000 989, 101 13, 697, 988 1, 874, 346 626, 700
2001 1, 167, 139 17, 218, 371 2, 511, 624 680, 263
2002 1, 328, 395 19, 695, 356 3, 258, 520 701, 568
2003 1, 491, 909 22, 935, 688 3, 659, 615 1, 390, 273
2004 1, 532, 028 23, 552, 460 3, 758, 027 2, 125, 388
2005 1, 619, 700 24, 900, 276 3, 973, 085 2, 237, 146
2006 1, 754, 925 26, 976, 136 4, 304, 787 2, 837, 252
2007 1, 842, 671 28, 328, 093 4, 520, 026 2, 979, 115
2008 1, 934, 805 29, 744, 498 4, 746, 027 3, 128, 071
2009 1, 128, 286 32, 718, 948 5, 220, 630 3, 440, 870
rural population which is about 75% of the total population (MoHSW, 2013). For
the medical doctors, Dar es Salaam has a high ratio of about one medical doctor per
20,000 population, compared to the national average of 3.5:100,000. These ratios are
low compared to 2.7 and 2.8 medical doctors per 1000 population in Ireland and United
Kingdom respectively and an average of 3.4 medical doctors per 1000 population in
Europe (World Bank, 2014). The regional distribution of hospitals in Tanzania is
presented in Table 2.13.
As a result of a shortage in human resources for health, it is common to find mid-level
health workers performing basic health care jobs that were meant for skilled health
workers in order to support the continuity of care. This thesis, therefore, supports
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Table 2.13: The regional distribution of health facilities in Tanzania) (Source: MoHSW, 2013)
No. Region
Designated
District
Hospital
National P
ri
v
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te
P
u
b
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c
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eg
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n
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l
Regional
or
Zonal
S
p
ec
ia
li
st
Faith-
Based
Zonal Total
1. Dar es Salaam 1 16 4 5 2 3 40
2. Kilimanjaro 5 3 3 1 1 4 1 18
3. Iringa 3 3 4 1 4 18
4. Mbeya 2 2 6 1 6 1 18
5. Mwanza 2 4 5 1 2 1 17
6. Kagera 5 1 3 1 6 16
7. Arusha 3 3 4 1 4 15
8. Mtwara 1 1 1 3
9. Kigoma 1 2 1 4 8
10. Manyara 1 3 1 2 7
11. Rukwa 2 1 1 4
12. Pwani 5 1 1 7
13. Dodoma 1 3 1 1 2 8
14. Lindi 1 4 1 2 9
15. Morogoro 4 1 1 2 13
16. Mara 4 1 1 1 2 9
17. Ruvuma 1 1 2 1 4 10
18. Shinyanga 1 2 4 1 9
19. Singida 1 2 1 5 9
20. Tabora 1 3 1 2 7
21. Tanga 2 2 4 1 4 13
Total 41 1 39 64 23 2 4 60 3 237
the existing approach to health care service delivery by proposing a new context-
based access control model that allows healthcare professionals to access patients’
information in an accountable manner in case of infrequent emergency. The proposed
access control solution addresses the shortage of qualified health workers at all levels
of the healthcare system in Tanzania.
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2.3 Traditional Health System
This section provides a discussion on the issues facing the Tanzania’s healthcare system
as a result of its partial implementation of electronic medical records. The section is
divided into three parts: Section 2.3.1 discusses what a traditional health system is,
Section 2.3.2 analyses issues associated with traditional health system in terms of the
type of medical records supported and used, and Section 2.3.3 discusses the benefits
of e-healthcare adoption and use.
2.3.1 Introduction
Barely in use before 1999, electronic healthcare or e-healthcare has now become a
topical “buzzword” used to characterise the usage of ICT in the health care industry
(Sharma et al., 2006), (Omary et al., 2009). Electronic healthcare has flourished in
the past decade due to limitations imposed by traditional health care service delivery
which uses traditional “paper-based” medical records. In this thesis, a traditional
medical record is defined as a “paper-based repository of patient information that is
reviewed or used by the health provider for either clinical, research or financial pur-
poses” (Harman et al., 2012). These records are used by skilled health workers, such
as medical doctors and medical specialists, to manually record patient’s medications
and tests on every patient’s visit to the healthcare facility. More commonly, they
are known as “paper charts”, and each unit of the hospital has the responsibility to
maintain its own set of records for each patient.
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Figure 2.3: Flow Chart for Traditional Medical Record System (Source: Krishna, 2010)
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To provide a thorough understanding of the risks and disadvantages of traditional
medical record systems, this thesis uses a scenario from Krishna (2010), depicted in
Figure 2.3, to show how these records work in the provision of care.
The process begins when a patient visits a hospital and an assistant (labelled “clerk”)
asks a patient for his personal information. Based on the information provided by
the patient, an assistant retrieves the respective medical record from existing storage
(whether paper file or computerised file system). After records have been retrieved,
the patient may then request one or more health services. These may include: appoint-
ment with the physician (same as a medical doctor in case of a Tanzania healthcare
system), a prescription refill from the pharmacy or any other administrative service.
If a patient requests to see a physician, an assistant first checks whether that patient
has an appointment or not. If there is no appointment, the assistant then books a new
appointment and notifies the patient. If an appointment exists, an assistant notifies
the physician about the appointment with the patient.
Upon meeting a patient, the physician evaluates the patient’s condition and deter-
mines whether there is a need for the requested tests or not. If tests are needed, the
physician then passes this information to an assistant using traditional communication
methods such as “phone, fax or post (which includes a messenger)”. The assistant
then notifies a laboratory with the patient’s details and list of tests ordered by the
physician. Upon arriving for tests in the laboratory, the patient is asked again by a
pharmacist for personal information in order to verify what that particular patient is
saying against information received from the physician, through an assistant. Usually,
this verification procedure is done before any tests are made. When the laboratory
test results are ready, they are passed to an assistant, who in turn passes them to
the physician. The physician then prescribes the patient’s necessary medications after
verifying complete medical records. The prescription note is sent to the assistant who
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will send it to the pharmacy using traditional communication methods. The phar-
macist prepares medication from the prescription note received and then notifies the
assistant who will notify the respective patient.
Similarly, when a patient requests a prescription refill, an assistant notifies the phar-
macy, the patient information is then verified and a pharmacist checks if that patient
has any refills for prescription. When the medication is ready, the pharmacist notifies
an assistant whose responsibility is to notify the patient. If no refills are found, the
pharmacist notifies the physician.
2.3.2 Challenges of the Traditional Health System
There are various limitations of a traditional paper-based medical record system that
have led to the movement to electronic medical records. Among the generic challenges
that do not only affect the traditional paper-based medical record system include:
Ambiguity: Since recording of patient information in many hospitals in Tanzania
are on paper and thus referred to as paper-based medical records, Gillies (2006) iden-
tifies limitations associated with these type of records. Among others, paper-based
medical records are characterised with the following features: i. the handwriting may
be illegible or long-winded; and abbreviations may vary ii. it is hard to tell whether
data items are temporarily missing, misfiled or will never be available, and iii. the
language used can be ambiguous (Wyatt & Wright, 1998). The illegible handwriting,
for instance, has been identified as a major source of adverse events, not just for doc-
tors. As argued by Lærum et al. (2001), these issues of paper-based medical records
tend to impede the continuity and quality of care to patients.
Fragmented Records: Depending on a particular need, it is common for patients
to visit healthcare providers who are geographically separated from one another. A
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patient may visit a General Practitioner (GP) for general health services, a phys-
iotherapist when experiencing physical problems and a psychologist for psychiatric
issues. These healthcare providers may be within one single large hospital or health-
care providers located in different areas from one another, outside the hospital. In a
traditional healthcare system, each provider is expected to maintain its own records
and also to update its copy of records whenever a patient pays a visit. The frag-
mented medical records in a traditional health system become a challenge when a
patient decides to change healthcare provider, and a new provider is required to look
for information regarding previous health conditions and treatments so as to create
a new set of records. As pointed out by Schoenberg & Safran (2000) and McClellan
(2009), it is not easy to retrieve such records in a traditional system.
Limited Accessibility: An access to patient’s medical records in a traditional
health system is limited to one individual at a time, and only possible on-site where
access is requested (Rindfleisch, 1997). The difficulty in accessing and retrieving such
records increases when a patient receives treatment from more than one department
(say, hypertension and orthopaedic) in a single large hospital. When a patient’s pa-
per file is in the hypertension clinic and the patient is currently in the orthopaedic
department for check-up, the latter department has to wait until that file is released.
This act can be fatal, sometimes leading to death.
Lack of Support to Unexpected or Infrequent Access: A traditional paper-
based system requires a lot of space that costs hospitals an enormous amount of
money to store and maintain medical records. Regardless of hospital spending, the
traditional system on the other hand works very poorly for unexpected or infrequent
access requests, such as emergencies, that are common in the healthcare domain since
doctors cannot start patients diagnosis and treatment unless medical records are avail-
able (Chen & Zhong, 2012), (Ferna´ndez-Alema´n et al., 2013). In addition, traditional
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medical records are characterised with limited locked storage, and anyone can access
them without being held accountable. In other words, the traditional medical records
are associated with the lack of accountability, confidentiality and security.
Error-Prone Data Exchange: In a traditional medical record system, data is
mainly exchanged through paper-based forms, calls, faxes, and even post (through
a messenger) (Liu, 2010). These traditional methods are very insecure. As pointed
out in Section 2.3.1, for every laboratory test required and medication prescribed,
a physician has to pass information to an assistant who is responsible for notifying
the laboratory and pharmacy respectively. When laboratory tests or prescriptions
are ready, a laboratory technician and pharmacist are required to notify an assistant
who will then notify the patient. That being said, the overall flow of information in a
traditional paper-based medical system is slow, and error-prone since human beings
are involved directly with data exchange.
Labour-Intensive Data Storage and Retrieval: There is a wide range of data
types and formats that are gathered, stored, retrieved and shared in healthcare, in-
cluding x-rays pictures, blood works and CT-Scan reports. First and foremost, paper-
based records are stored in bulk and vulnerable to damage from wear and tear, fire,
water and coffee spilling. Based on the type of medical records stored, it is difficult
to maintain a single file with all of the data types. Similarly, the whole process of
data storage and retrieval is labour intensive to hospital staff (either an assistant or
a medical doctor). Consider, for instance, the level of difficulty in storage and re-
trieval that arises from a patient who has been receiving care from the same hospital
for five years. The first challenge is, the hospital will have all the information in a
single file. When a medical doctor needs to compare patient diseases for the past
three years for instance, an assistant has to go through the whole file and retrieve all
the data required. After records have been analysed by the medical doctor, which is
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time consuming and even error-prone, an assistant has to re-file every single piece of
information as it was before retrieval (Miller & Sim, 2004).
High Cost in Care Delivery: Tanzania is one of the countries relatively with low
per capita spending on health. While World Health Organisation (WHO) recommends
$54 as a per capital health spending, its spending per person is $15.75, as outlined
in the third Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP III) (MoHSW, 2009). To minimise
health care costs and to improve the quality of care delivered, Tanzania is in the initial
stages of an implementation of a national e-health information system that is expected
to reduce costs in care delivery (MoHSW, 2013c).
2.3.3 Benefits from E-healthcare Adoption
The adoption and use of e-health information systems promise to offer a wide range
of benefits to the government, healthcare providers as well as citizens. This section
briefly discusses the advantages of e-healthcare.
• Life Saving: Too often people neglect their screenings and tests that could
even lead to death. Contrary to a traditional paper-based medical system, the
electronic health system is capable of sending appropriate alerts and reminders
to notify a physician about a screening or test for a certain patient under his
care. This ability of an electronic health system is only possible as a result of
a patient’s basic information (such as age, gender, and family history) being
compared against a database of best practices.
• Quality of Care: There are two main ways through which electronic health-
care are sought to improve the quality of care. These are:
- Health web portals: Despite the dangers involved, one of the most signifi-
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cant and growing uses of the Internet in healthcare is the availability of web-
sites that contain and allow people to search for health and health-related
information, thus improving their knowledge regarding healthy lifestyles,
health and self-treatment. The health web portals can also be used by
healthcare professionals to search for health-related information purposely
for education and research.
– Collaboration: Two healthcare professionals located in two geographically
separated areas may collaborate with one another through video confer-
encing to discuss issues pertaining to a particular medical case. Although
considered theoretically feasible, this knowledge sharing approach, how-
ever, is difficult to achieve due to the nature of physicians’ work as well as
privacy, security and confidentiality concerning patient information.
• Improved Physician’s Efficiency: In his article titled“What is e-health?”,
Eysenbach (2001) highlights ten promissory e
′
s in e-healthcare, where efficiency
is one of them. Other e
′
s stands for “Enhancing” quality of care, “Evidence-
based” care, “Empowerment” of patients through knowledge bases of medical
information, “Encouragement” of a new relationship between patient and health-
care professional(s) and “Education” of physicians through online sources. The
list also includes “Enabling” of information exchange and communication, “Ex-
tending” the scope of care beyond domain’s conventional boundaries, “Ethics”
and, “Equity” between the haves and have-nots.
Using a scenario discussed in Section 2.3.1, every time a patient visits a health
facility in a traditional paper-based medical system, the patient is supposed to
provide personal information and a suggestive symptoms before any services are
offered. Since legible and complete electronic medical records are readily avail-
able for immediate access at any given point of time, the physician responsible
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will already have information about the type of medications that patient is tak-
ing or has taken previously, laboratory test results and even allergies. This, in
fact, reduces waiting time dramatically and improves the quality of treatment
by offering more meaningful interactions between the physician and patients.
• Physician-Patient Relationship: With its ability to allow inexpensive re-
trieval of patient information from anywhere and at anytime, electronic health
records are already redefining the physician-patient relationship resulting from
sensitive information that is being shared between patients and physicians. In
particular, through EHRs, a physician gains a capability to know all health
information about his patient from the patient’s body to the state of health
(Ball & Lillis, 2001).
• Reduced Expenses: There are numerous ways that healthcare providers and
the government may reduce expenses through adoption of e-healthcare. These
include:
- There is an existence of digital imaging services that can virtually eliminate
the need for films and x-rays. A radiology department in a healthcare
organisation with an electronic healthcare information system in place can
send digital x-ray films to physician’s smart phone or any other hand-held
devices.
- Costs can also be reduced by cutting back on unnecessary tests and treat-
ments. Although not discussed in detail, the Tanzania national e-health
strategy considers e-healthcare as a “cost-effective” and secure use of infor-
mation and communication technologies in support of health and its related
fields (MoHSW, 2013c). Section 2.4 discusses the status of e-healthcare im-
plementations in the country.
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2.4 E-healthcare in Tanzania
E-healthcare is a field at the intersection of medical informatics, public health and
business (Eysenbach, 2001). It refers to health care services and resources delivered
through information and communication technologies that provides an opportunity for
healthcare providers to improve quality of services delivered to patients. E-healthcare
also improves patient safety and helps the general public to avoid unnecessary costs.
The common information systems that are readily available in the modern health-
care environment include Hospital Information Systems (HIS), Radiology Information
Systems, Laboratory Information Systems, Pharmacy Information Systems and Elec-
tronic Health Record (EHR) Systems (National Center for Biotechnology Information,
2012). Among these, EHR systems play a significant role in the provision of healthcare
services as they store patients’ previous medical records and make them available to
healthcare professionals and other information systems whenever the need arises.
Currently, hospitals in different ownership groups such as those owned by the govern-
ment and non-government organisations (including private organisations, parastatal
and religious institutions) in Tanzania are implementing electronic healthcare infor-
mation systems, and in particular EHR systems, as summarised in Table 2.14. As
part of this research, a survey was conducted to identify electronic medical or health
record systems that have been implemented within the Tanzania healthcare system,
together with their respective access control mechanisms (see Appendix B). One no-
table thing that was identified while conducting this investigation was that, there
was neither a national policy nor a legislation designed to protect electronic records
from unauthorised access and use which is currently in action in Tanzania. From a
close follow-up with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) and the
newly established, electronic Government Agency (eGA), the researcher was infor-
mally notified that there are ongoing efforts aiming to establish a national policy and
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a legislation known as Data Protection and Piracy Act. This act is expected to be
part of cyber-crime laws, and incorporates access procedures to electronic healthcare
records.
Table 2.14: Electronic healthcare information systems implemented in various health facilities in
Tanzania
Hospital Name System Name Access Control
Mechanism
MNH Napier-EHR RBAC
Tumbi Special Hospital OpenMRS RBAC
Amana Hospital – RBAC
Morogoro Regional Hospi-
tal
OpenMRS RBAC
Ocean Road Cancer Insti-
tute
OpenMRS RBAC
Hindu-Mandal Hospital Computed Radiography –
Bugando Hospital – RBAC
Mtoni Health Centre Care2X RBAC
Haydom Lutheran Hospi-
tal
Care2X RBAC
St. Elizabeth Hospital Care2X RBAC
KCMC Care2X RBAC
Marangu Lutheran Hospi-
tal
Care2X RBAC
Arusha Lutheran Medical
Centre
Care2X RBAC
Wasso Designated District
Hospital
Care2X RBAC
Tumaini Health Centre Care2X RBAC
Kijenge Health Centre Care2X RBAC
USA River Health Centre Care2X RBAC
Njiro Health Centre Care2X RBAC
– indicated as available by the respondent but was not specified
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The MoHSW also incorporates several components of healthcare information systems
in its current (provisional) national health policy. The Health Management Infor-
mation System (HMIS), District Health Information System (DHIS), Mobile Health
(mHealth) and Short Message Service (SMS) for Life are among the components in-
corporated for efficient data collection, processing and use. The HMIS was established
for the first time in 1994, and aimed at supplying each level of the healthcare sector
with necessary information in a timely and accurate manner. The DHIS was aimed to
supply each district with necessary data in a timely and accurate manner. The only
major difference between HMIS and DHIS lies on size and coverage of the system.
While HMIS collects health information from more than 5,400 health facilities, DHIS
collects the same information in a smaller capacity. However, despite government
efforts to integrate HMIS at the national level, the system has not yet made radical
impacts to the healthcare delivery. As pointed out by Smith et al. (2008), HMIS focus
on managerial activities has been the reason behind its failure.
While mHealth involves the usage of mobile communications technologies, like mo-
bile phones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and patient monitoring devices, to
improve healthcare services and information, SMS for Life aims to help districts to
improve stock managements for anti-malaria drugs. As a result of the construction
of the National ICT Broadband Backbone (NICTBB) infrastructure and an extensive
use of mobile broadband, the implementation of some of these projects is already
ongoing. In relation to the overall progress of e-healthcare systems implementation
in Tanzania, it is safe to say that the country is still in its infancy stage. Using the
Health Information Management Systems Society (HiMSS) Care Continuity Model,
presented in Table 2.15, Tanzania qualifies to be in either Stage 1 or Stage 2, which
is in fact, an infancy stage when it comes to e-healthcare implementation.
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Table 2.15: Continuity of Care Maturity Model (Source: HiMSS, 2014)
STAGE CAPABILITIES
STAGE 7 Knowledge Driven Engagement for a Dy-
namic, Multi-vendor, Multi-organisational
Interconnected Healthcare Delivery Model
STAGE 6 Closed Loop Care Coordination Across
Care Team Members
STAGE 5 Community Wide Patient Record using
Applied Information with Patient Engage-
ment Focus
STAGE 4 Care Coordination based on Actionable
Data using a Semantic Interoperable Pa-
tient record
STAGE 3 Normalised Patient Record with
Share Care Plans using Structural
Interoperability
STAGE 2 Patient Centred Clinical Data using Basic
System-to-System Exchange
STAGE 1 Basic Peer-to-Peer Data Exchange
STAGE 0 Limited to No E-Communication
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter provides a background on the Tanzania healthcare system, where both
traditional paper-based and electronic health systems are working. The chapter began
with a discussion of the healthcare delivery system using a referral pyramid structure,
that begins at the community level with the village health services and goes up to
treatments abroad. Other units forming the pyramid in a Tanzania healthcare system
as shown in Figure 2.2 include regional hospitals serving each region in the coun-
try, district hospitals for each district in a region, health centres for divisions and
dispensaries. One major observation as a result of an observation survey conducted
Muhimbili National Hospital is that, there is a difference between what is written
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in official documents as to how health care services should be delivered, and how it
operates in the real world. It was clear that the majority of Tanzanians do not follow
the referral pyramid structure of the healthcare system and hence, patients make it
a habit which is motivated by the availability of better services to pay a first visit to
either a district or regional hospitals without being referred by a lower level healthcare
facility.
The chapter also discusses characteristics of human resources for health in a Tanzania
healthcare system that affect the continuity of care to patients. Among other issues
discussed that magnifies the shortage of health workers include, migration of health
workers both within the healthcare system and across borders. Since the introduc-
tion of horizontal health programmes, health workers are moving from general health
services to horizontal health programmes (for better payments) and across borders
(for greener pastures), poor governance and an overall lack of investment in human
resources, poor living and working conditions and death and retirement. There is
also an uneven distribution of healthcare workers in the country (as majority of them
are concentrated in urban areas) together with a large number of patients seeking
treatments.
To overcome the shortage of health workers in Tanzania while at the same time sup-
porting the continuity of care, it is common to find mid-level healthcare professionals
performing basic jobs that were meant for skilled health workers. This thesis, hence-
forth, supports an existing approach to health care service delivery by proposing a new
context-based access control model that allows health workers bypass access rules in
case of infrequent emergency access request. This is achieved by extending the tra-
ditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with contexts and obligations.
Chapter 3 discusses different mechanisms that are used to control access to protected
medical information.
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Access Control
This chapter discusses access control models that have been designed for traditional
computing environments. The models discussed include Discretionary Access Control,
Mandatory Access Control, Role-Based Access Control and Attribute-Based Access
Control. As an example of Discretionary Access Control, an Access Control Matrix has
been discussed. The chapter also discusses three implementations of Access Control
Matrix, these are: Access Control List, Capabilities List and Authorisation Table.
Mainly, this chapter focuses on a discussion of Role Based Access Control, a model
which is widely used in healthcare systems today. The rest of this chapter contains
the following. Section 3.1 introduces the chapter followed by definitions of terms and
concepts in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 reviews traditional access control policies followed
by an analysis of their suitability for the healthcare domain in Section 3.4. A new
taxonomy for classifying access control models is in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes
the chapter.
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Access control is used to determine allowed activities of legitimate users, mediat-
ing every attempt of a user to access a resource in a system (Ferraiolo et al., 2003),
(Hu et al., 2006). Commonly, access control evaluates requests to access resources
by already authenticated users, and then it determines whether those requests are
granted or denied based on access control policy. In this way access control seeks to
prevent activity that could lead to a breach of security (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994).
Figure 3.1: Access Control Model (Source: Lampson, 2004)
An access control consists of two major parts, namely, an access control policy and
a reference monitor (Krautsevich et al., 2012). Given an access request, an access
control policy determines which access requests should be allowed and which ones
should be denied. As shown in Figure 3.1, a reference monitor determines whether
such an access is authorised or not, by matching an access request against an access
control policy. Access control also possesses four general functions: identity verifica-
tion, authentication, authorisation and auditing, as shown in Figure 3.2. Normally,
authorisation to a system is performed after an individual user has been identified
and authenticated using for example username and its corresponding password or
even using biometrics such as face and hand. After a successful login procedure, cre-
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Figure 3.2: Identification, Authentication, Authorisation and Accountability (Source: InfoSec, 2014)
dentials used by an authentication service are then associated with every process an
individual user starts.While authorisation tries to answer the question “who is trusted
to perform which operations on this object?”, auditing gathers decisions made by a
reference monitor (including all user access requests and activities). The information
collected can then be analysed to discover what happened to the resource and why
(Sandhu & Samarati, 1996). In other words, auditing is essential if you need to hold
users accountable for their actions. As pointed out by Lampson (2004), authentica-
tion, authorisation and auditing altogether form the gold standard for security.
A given Information Technology (IT) infrastructure can implement access control
systems in many places and at different levels. Operating systems, for example, use
access control to protect files and directories while Database Management Systems
(DBMS) apply access control to regulate access to tables and views. Before delving
further into a discussion of access control models and their implementations, Section
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3.2 defines fundamental elements of an access control policy, that are enforced by an
access control mechanism. These concepts, terms and definitions have been referred
throughout this thesis.
3.2 Terms and Concepts
This section presents concepts, terms and basic definitions that are commonly used
in the access control community, as thoroughly discussed by Hu et al. (2006) and
Hu & Scarfone (2012):
• Subject: is an active entity, generally in the form of a person, process or device,
that causes information to flow among objects or changes the system state.
• Object: is a passive entity that contains or receives information. It repre-
sents a target protected by an access control system. Abstractly, access to an
object implies access to the information it contains. Examples of objects are
records, pages, blocks, segments, files, directories, directory trees, processes and
programs, as well as bits, bytes, words, fields, processors, video displays, key-
boards, printers, clocks, and network nodes.
• Operation is an active process invoked by a subject. When a user of an Au-
tomatic Teller Machine enters a bank card and a correct Personal Identification
Number, a control program that operates on the user’s behalf then allows a sub-
ject to initiate one or more operations such as deposit, withdraw and balance
inquiry.
• Permission (or privilege) is an authorisation to perform some action on a
system. A permission corresponds to a privilege a subject owns over a cer-
tain object. In most computer security literature, the term permission refers
to a combination of object and operation. That being said, when a particular
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operation is used on two different objects, it means these are two different per-
missions. Similarly, two different operations applied to a single object represent
two distinct permissions.
As an example of permissions in a banking system, a bank teller may have per-
missions to execute debit and credit operations on customer records through
transactions while an accountant may execute credit and debit operations on
the general ledger. With this capability in mind, permissions or privileges can
therefore be argued to reduce an access space from where any authenticated sub-
ject can access all information to a space where specific users can only perform
specific actions on specific objects.
In addition to these terms and concepts which are regarded as the fundamental ele-
ments of an access control policy, there are three main abstractions which need to be
considered when planning an access control system. These include: an access control
policy, access control model and access control mechanism.
• Access Control Policy: An access control policy defines high-level security
rules that specify how access is managed in a system and who, under what
circumstances, may access what information. They can either be application
specific, and hence be taken into account by an application vendor, or only
applicable to user actions within an organisation unit or across organisational
boundaries. Access control policies may also pertain to object usage within or
across organisational units, need-to-know, competence, authority and obligation.
Usually, the suitability of a given access control policy depends on protection
requirements for a given system, environment and users.
• Access Control Model: This is a formal representation of a security policy
enforced by an access control that presents limitations of a system. An ac-
cess control model can either be defined as a formalised computing algorithm,
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mathematical representation or a well-recognised formal concept. Roles, Multi
Level Security (MLS) and Usage Control are formal concepts used in Role-Based
Access Control, Mandatory Access Control and Usage Control models respec-
tively. Since access control models bridge a wide gap in abstraction that exists
between access control policies and mechanisms, they are of general interest to
both users and application vendors. Abstractly, an access control mechanism
can be designed to adhere to the properties of a model.
• Access Control Mechanism: At a high level, an access control policy is en-
forced through an access control mechanism that translates user’s access request
in terms of a structure that a system provides. An access control mechanism
defines low level (both hardware and software) functions that implement control
imposed by an access control policy and formally stated by the model in order to
prevent unauthorised access to resources. The majority of traditional access con-
trol mechanisms are based on the notion of a reference monitor that authorises
access to resources managed by the system. The actions are either permitted or
denied based on the privileges established in the system and expressed in terms
of access rights (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994).
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Figure 3.3: Mappings of an access control policy, model and mechanism (Source: Hu & Scarfone,
2012)
The relations and mappings between the access control policy, model and mechanism
is presented in Figure 3.3. An access control system is actually initiated by an access
control policy, which is then formalised by an access control model, if there is any
that can be applied. An access control policy is physically implemented by software
or hardware mechanisms based on an access control policy directly or by an access
control model, indirectly. All the mapping relations between the access control policy
and model, the access control policy and mechanism and the access control model and
mechanism are one-to-many. Section 3.3 reviews common access control policies.
3.3 Access Control Policies
This section discusses three major access control policies that have emerged since
1970s: Discretionary Access Control, Mandatory Access Control and Role-Based Ac-
cess Control. This section also reviews a successor of Role-Based Access Control called
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Attribute-Based Access Control.
3.3.1 Discretionary Access Control
The Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)(1985) defines DAC as
“a means of restricting access to objects based on the identity of subjects and/or
groups to which they belong”. The controls are discretionary in the sense that a
subject with certain access permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps
indirectly) on to any other subject unless restrained by Mandatory Access Control
(Ferraiolo et al., 2003), (Hu et al., 2006). In other words, DAC allows an owner of a
particular access right to a specific object to pass on access right to other subject(s)
based on the owner’s personal preferences. This capability makes the DAC model
more flexible in supporting commercial solutions where no strict information flow is
required.
The manipulation of a shared folder on a server is one sample application that can
benefit from this capability of DAC. The owner (let’s say Anne) with an access right
“read” over a shared folder can easily pass this access right to another subject (Alice,
for example) by creating a username and password pair associated with Alice. Since
Anne can pass her read access right to any subject at her discretion and the system
manager is unable to control any of this from happening, there is, in fact, no real
control on flow of information provided by the mechanism. This lack of information
flow control increases the possibility of unauthorised access and thus, the approach is
not considered suitable for military applications which require a rigorous control of
information flow (Biba, 1977), (Proctor & Wong, 1989), (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994).
Access Control Matrix (ACM) is one of the first discretionary access control models
for computer systems. As defined by Sandhu & Samarati (1994), ACM is a conceptual
model that specifies access rights each subject possess for each object that is managed
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by the system. This classic model was first proposed by Lampson (1971) for protec-
tion of resources within an operating system and later refined by Graham & Denning
(1972). The model was then formalised by Harrison et al. (1976) and called the Har-
rison, Ruzzo and Ullman (HRU) security model. More specifically, Harrison et al.
(1976) developed an access model proposed by Lampson (1971) to a goal of analysing
the complexity of determining the access control policy. The HRU formalisation iden-
tified six primitive operations which had an impact on the authorisation state of ACM.
These are: adding and removing subject, adding and removing an object and granting
and revoking a privilege.
The original model was referred to as an access matrix because an authorisation state
is presented as a matrix that contains a row for each subject and a column for each
object. Each cell of a matrix denotes an access authorised for a subject in a row to
an object in a column. The main function of an access control system with an ACM
approach is to ensure that only operations authorised by the matrix are executed
on objects. This is achieved by the means of a reference monitor, responsible for
assuring that all operations are of the right kind and all attempted operations by
the subject on object are authorised (Anderson, 1972), (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994),
(Samarati & de Vimercati, 2001).
In addition to its ability to implement security policies in ACM, other objectives of a
reference monitor, as discussed by Anderson (1972), are:
• Tamper proof: This means a reference monitor cannot be changed either pro-
gramatically (by malicious code) or manually to guarantee its integrity.
• Invoked: The continuous invocation of a reference monitor means a subject
cannot avoid access control even if it is an operating system itself.
• Verifiable: This means a reference monitor is correct and an implementation of
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a security policy can be logically demonstrated.
Conceptually, an access control mechanism implementing the ACM policy should be
able to answer the question “does subject (S) has right (R) for object (O)?”. This
question can be represented as a triple (S, O, A) where S represents a set of subjects
wishing to exercise privileges, O is a set of objects on which privileges can be exercised
and A is a matrix with rows representing subjects and columns representing objects.
The model includes the access checking rule A[s, o] which ensures that an access
request to an object o is denied if A[s, o] does not contain an access right. The model
also contains a set of commands specifying how to make transitions in (S, O, A).
A = A[s, o]s ∈ S, o ∈ O,A[s, o] ⊆ A (3.1)
Mathematically, the access matrix (A) can be defined using equation 3.1 where access
A[s, o] ⊆ A represents operations that subject s ∈ S can perform on object o ∈ O and
A denotes a set of all access operations that a subject can perform on an object.
Table 3.1: Access Control Matrix (Source: Sandhu & Samarati (1996))
File 1 File 2 File 3 File 4
Anne
OWN - OWN -
R R
W W
Bob
R OWN R R
R W
W
Alice
R R - OWN
W R
W
A simple example of the ACM model is presented in Table 3.1, where OWN, R and W
denote Owner of the file, Read and Write access rights respectively. From this matrix,
a system is keeping track of four files: File 1, File 2, File 3 and File 4 that can be
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accessed by three subjects: Anne, Bob and Alice. The matrix specifies a relationship
between subjects and the four files as follows: Anne is the owner of File 1 and File
3 and can Read and Write in those files. Anne has, however, no access to File 2 and
File 4. Bob is the owner of File 2, can read File 1 and File 4, and can read and write
in File 3. Alice owns File 4 and can read and write in that file. She can also read and
write in File 1, read only in File 2, and she has no access at all to File 3.
There are various approaches for implementing access matrix in practical large sys-
tems. The well-known ones include Access Control List (ACL), Capability List (CL)
and Authorisation Table (AT).
Access Control List
Access Control List (ACL) is, perhaps, the most popular approach for implement-
ing Access Control Matrix (ACM) in practical systems. ACL is a list of permissions
attached to an object, such that each object is associated with an ACL. It is also
regarded as storing ACM in a columnar way. It specifies which users or system pro-
cesses are granted access to objects and what operations are allowed on given objects.
This means that, for each subject using a system, there is a list of access rights such a
subject is allowed to execute on an object, thus, each entry in a list is a pair of subjects
and a set of access rights. As summarised by Samarati & de Vimercati (2001) and
depicted in Figure 3.4, ACL implementations are object-centric because they specify
an object’s legitimate access modes.
By examining an object’s ACL, it is straight forward to determine which modes
of access a subject is currently authorised for an object. It is also easy to revoke
all accesses defined for an object by replacing existing ACL with an empty one
(Samarati & de Vimercati, 2001). However, despite its simplicity, determining access
rights of a subject is not easy and revocation of subject’s accesses is tedious as it re-
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Figure 3.4: Access Control List (Adapted from: Sandhu & Samarati, 1994)
quires every ACL in the system to be checked against a subject (Samarati & de Vimercati,
2001).
Capability List
Capability List (CL) is another implementation of the ACM. Unlike ACL approach
which stores ACM in columns, CL stores it in rows. Each subject in a system is
associated with a capability created from the corresponding row of an access matrix,
indicating access rights each subject is authorised to execute on an object. The capa-
bilities in ACL are subject-centric, as depicted in Figure 3.5. This actually solves the
problem of determining a set of allowed actions by a specific subject by just examining
the subject’s associated capabilities. However, revoking an object’s access mode in
CL requires an examination of each and every subject’s capability list.
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Figure 3.5: Capability List (Adapted from: Sandhu & Samarati, 1994)
Authorisation Table
Authorisation Table (AT) is another implementation of Access Control Matrix (ACM)
inspired by the relational databases. Non-empty entries in a relational table are pre-
sented with three columns: Subjects, Actions and Objects. Each row represents an
access operation a subject can perform on a specific object. This implementation does
not favour one preview over the other, as ACL and CL do. It is also easy to get specific
subject’s access rights by sorting the table by either a subject, which actually corre-
sponds to CL method, or by object, which produces the same effect as ACL. Table 3.2
presents an example of an authorisation table. In the first row of the authorisation
table, it shows that Anne is an owner of File 1.
DAC Summary Remarks
It is worth noting that managing ACM in a large-scale distributed environment is
troublesome. First and foremost, ACM is a static access control solution where sub-
jects and objects need to be predefined. In a large-scale distributed environment with
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Table 3.2: Authorisation Table (Adapted from: Sandhu & Samarati, 1994)
User Access Mode Object
Anne OWN File 1
Anne Read File 1
Anne Write File 1
Anne OWN File 3
Bob Read File 1
Bob OWN File 2
Bob Read File 2
Alice Read File 1
Alice Write File 1
Alice Read File 2
Alice OWN File 4
hundreds of users and thousands of files, the approach becomes costly in terms of stor-
age and space. ACM also becomes inappropriate since the matrix becomes sparse and
most of the cells are likely to be filled with zeros (Samarati & de Vimercati, 2001),
(Zhang et al., 2005b). It is also not easy to impose constraints in DAC, thus, the ap-
proach is considered not to be suitable for the dynamic and collaborative environments
like healthcare. The Discretionary Access Control (DAC) also results into information
leakage caused by weak control of information flow. To solve the problem of infor-
mation leakage within DAC models, Mandatory Access Control was established with
unbreakable rules that are designed to ensure respect for access control demands. The
Mandatory Access Control model, discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2, gives subjects
and objects several levels that cannot be changed by the user, and consequently limits
their power to manage access to their data.
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3.3.2 Mandatory Access Control
The key motivation behind Mandatory Access Control (MAC), first formalised by
Bell & LaPadula (1973), was to overcome the problem of malicious and flawed soft-
ware faced by DAC approaches. Its goal was to achieve mandatory access control so
that access decisions will not be left at the discretion of an individual user or a system
administrator, but rather through an organisation’s security levels (Sandhu, 1993).
TCSEC (1985) defines MAC as a “means of restricting access to objects based on
the sensitivity contained in an object (represented by a security label) and the formal
authorisation (that is, clearance) of subjects to access information of such sensitivity”.
Unlike DAC where access rights are defined by the resource owner based on the re-
source owner’s discretion, MAC enables access rights to be determined by a manager
or a central authority of the system, and users do not have an ability to override an
access policy.
ts > s > c > u (3.2)
MAC policy is widely used in military and civilian governments, and is expressed in
terms of a security label attached to both objects and subjects (Sandhu, 1993). A label
attached to an object, which reflects the sensitivity of information, is called a “security
classification” and a label attached to a subject reflects the user’s trustworthiness not
to disclose sensitive information and is called a “security clearance”. The assignment
of access rights is performed by a central authority not by the resource owner. Access
to a resource object is restricted to those subjects who possess a valid clearance level
(also known as authorisation). A simple form of MAC is represented mathematically
using Equation 3.2, and also shown in Figure 3.6 where hierarchical set of security
levels consists of top secret (ts), secret (s), confidential (c) and unclassified (u).
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Figure 3.6: Controlling information flow for secrecy (Source: Sandhu & Samarati, 1994)
The flow of information dissemination in one direction (either from low to high con-
fidentiality or equivalently, from low to high integrity) is one among the strongest
features of MAC. Despite such a capability that reduces the likelihood of potential
illegitimate information leakage, MAC model is vulnerable to covert channel attacks
(Sandhu, 1996a). As defined by Lampson (1973), covert channels are “those channels
not intended for information transfer at all, such as the service program’s effect on
system load”. The channels can, however, be abused to allow information to be com-
municated between parties, which are not supposed to do so. The idea of the attack is
centred on adding capabilities between entities to illicitly transfer information, thus,
breaking the security policy of the system. In other words, it is a kind of collusion
between the sender and the receiver in a clear violation of the MAC security pol-
icy. These attacks are expensive to eliminate even if they are identified and analysed
(Sandhu, 1996a).
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MAC Summary Remarks
It is useful to note that the MAC model suits access control requirements where an
object’s access right is determined by a central authority and not at the discretion
of the object owner (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994), (Ferraiolo et al., 2003). In addition
to its capability to resolve the problem of information leakage that the DAC model
experiences, MAC remains to be a very rigid model for commercial domains. It
does not allow the user to manage exceptions between different security levels. This
feature of the MAC models results in the overall approach being characterised as
static, which makes it inappropriate for the dynamic and collaborative environments
such as healthcare that require dynamic context information to support the continuity
of care (McCollum et al., 1990).
3.3.3 Role-Based Access Control
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is an access control model that governs access to
resources based on a subject’s organisational role. As defined by Hansen & Oleshchuk
(2003), a role is a “collection of permissions on a set of objects, which are determined
by the system, based on user’s enterprise activities, responsibilities and policies of
the organisation”. The central notion behind RBAC is that permissions are adminis-
tratively associated with roles and users are made members of appropriate roles, and
thus acquiring role permissions (Ferraiolo et al., 1995). In an organisation that adopts
RBAC, roles are usually created based on job functions and users are assigned roles
based on their responsibilities and qualifications. Such a natural mapping between
roles and an organisational structure makes it easy to assign and reassign users from
one role to another. Roles can also be granted new permissions as new applications
are incorporated and permissions can be revoked from roles as needed. The relation-
ship between users, roles and permissions is many-to-many (using double arrows), as
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shown in Figure 3.7. Each user can be associated with one or more roles and each
role can have one or more permissions associated with it.
Figure 3.7: Users, Roles and Permissions
Constraints can be imposed on access requests to prevent unauthorised access or
malicious activities in role based systems. Among the supported constraints are:
a “least privilege” principle, in which no user should be given more privilege than
necessary to finish the task at hand (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994). In this way RBAC
prevents the leakage of access rights to unauthorised entities and also reduces the risk
of fraud. The model also supports the separation of duty constraints which places a
restrictive rule on the potential inheritance of permissions from opposing roles. As
an example of separation of duty, a single person in a banking organisation should
not be allowed to perform both “authorise creation of an account” and “creation of
banking accounts”. Additionally, RBAC allows organisations to separate superuser
capabilities from normal users and assign them to special user accounts, through its
support for role hierarchies.
Historically, the first RBAC model known as RBAC92 was proposed by David & Richard
(1992) in 1992 by identifying and defining concepts related to the concept of roles.
The RBAC92 model was subsequently extended by Sandhu et al. (1996) in order to
propose a conceptual framework that can be used as a basis for implementing RBAC
based solutions. As a result, RBAC96 model was introduced. In the years that fol-
lowed, RBAC became a predominant model for advanced access control due to its high
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performance that reduces cost of deployment and maintenance. This motivated the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to call for a unified standard
by integrating RBAC92 and RBAC96 in the year 2000. Since the research carried out
in this thesis is based on RBAC model, an overview RBAC96 and the resultant NIST
RBAC model are provided. The review focuses on their organisation levels as well as
formal definition of their core models.
RBAC96 Model
Figure 3.8: RBAC96 Family of Reference Models (Source: Sandhu et al., 1996)
Sandhu et al. (1996) proposed a family of four conceptual RBAC models, as sum-
marised in Figure 3.8. The model comprises of RBAC0 (a base model, indicating
that it is the minimum requirement for RBAC implementations), RBAC1 (comprising
of RBAC0 with a support of role hierarchies), RBAC2 (includes RBAC0 with sup-
port of constraints that impose restrictions on acceptable configurations on different
components of RBAC). Also, there is RBAC3, known as a consolidated model, which
includes RBAC1 and RBAC2, and by transitivity RBAC0.
The core RBAC96 model consists of five sets of entities, including Users (U), Roles (R),
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Permissions (P), Administrative Roles (AR) and Administrative Permissions (AP). In-
tuitively, a user is a human being or any other autonomous intelligent agent like a
robot or immobile computer. A role is a job function or job title within an organ-
isation that indicates authority and responsibility conferred on a member of a role.
Permissions refer to an approval of a particular mode of access to one or more objects
in a system (Sandhu et al., 1996) .
Figure 3.9: The RBAC96 Model (Source: Sandhu et al., 1996)
Unlike Discretionary Access Control (DAC) which allows both positive (which means,
give access) and negative permissions (deny access), RBAC96 model allows only pos-
itive permissions which confer to an ability of a permission holder to perform one
or more actions in system objects. Additionally, Administrative Permissions (AP)
control operations which modify components of RBAC, such as adding new users and
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roles or modifying user assignment and permission assignment relations. The APs can
only be assigned to Administrative Roles (ARs).
Mathematically, RBAC96’s core model (RBAC0) by Sandhu et al. (1996) can be rep-
resented as follows:
Definition
• U is a set of Users
• R is a set of Roles
• P is a set of Permissions
• UA ⊆ U ×R, a many-to-many user-to-role assignment relation.
• PA ⊆ P ×R, is a many-to-many permission-to-role assignment relation.
• S is a set of Sessions.
• user : S → U , is a function mapping each session si to the single user user(si), and is constant
for the session’s lifetime.
• role : S → 2R is a function mapping each session si to a set of roles, roles(si) ⊆ {r|((∃r′ ≥
r)[(user(si, r
′) ∈ UA} (which can change with time) and session si has the permission
Ur∈role(si){P |(∃r′′ ≤ r)[(p, r′′) ∈ PA}
• There is a collection of constraints stipulating which values of different components of RBAC
model are allowed or forbidden.
NIST RBAC Model
According to Sandhu et al. (2000), the basic concept of the RBAC model is that users
are assigned to roles through “user assignment” relation and permissions are assigned
to roles through “permission assignment” relation. Particularly, user assignment de-
fines a set of roles to which an individual user can be mapped. For example, user
(named Anne) could be assigned to a role set {Doctor, Emergency Doctor, Specialist
Doctor}. In fact, user assignment determines the super set of roles to which user can
be mapped as part of the user’s organisational duties. Permission Assignment, on
the other hand, specifies a set of allowed activities for a given role. It corresponds to
assigning access rights to roles. The emergency doctor role, for instance, could claim
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the following access rights {write to the patient’s EHR, read patient’s EHR, read past
medical history of a patient}.
The RBAC model requires that user assignment and permission assignment relations
to be many-to-many whereas each user can be assigned to many roles and each role can
have many users. Also, there is a many-to-many relation between roles and permission.
As such, each role can be assigned to many permissions and each permission can be
assigned to many roles. Users acquire permissions by being members of defined roles.
Figure 3.10: NIST RBAC capabilities (Source: Sandhu et al., 2000)
Similar to RBAC96, the NIST RBAC model is organised into four levels with increas-
ing functional capabilities (Sandhu et al., 2000). As presented in Figure 3.10 (labelled
number 1 to 4) and its functional capabilities summarised in Table 3.3, the four levels
of NIST RBAC model are:
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i. Core RBAC, also known as Flat RBAC
ii. Hierarchical RBAC
iii. Constrained RBAC and
iv. Symmetric RBAC
Table 3.3: Variations of NIST RBAC model organised as levels
(Source: Sandhu et al., 2000)
Level Name RBAC Functional Capabilities
1 Flat RBAC
– users acquire permissions through roles
– must support many-to-many user-role assignment
– support many-to-many permission role assignment
– must support user-role assignment review
– users can use permissions of multiple roles simultaneously
2 Hierarchical RBAC
Flat RBAC and
– must support role hierarchy (partial order)
– level 2a requires support for arbitrary hierarchies
– level 2b denotes support for limited hierarchies
3 Constrained RBAC
Hierarchical RBAC and
– must enforce Separation of Duties (SOD)
– level 3a requires support for arbitrary hierarchies
– level 3b denotes support for limited hierarchies
4 Symmetric RBAC
Constrained RBAC and
– must support permission-role review with performance ef-
fectively comparable to user-role review
– level 4a requires support for arbitrary hierarchies
– level 4b denotes support for limited hierarchies
The core NIST RBAC model includes five sets of elements. These are: Users, Roles,
Objects, Operations and Permissions. Like RBAC96, the NIST RBAC model is de-
fined in terms of individual users being members of roles and permissions being as-
signed to roles. A role is a way of naming many-to-many relations between users
and permissions. An operation is an executable image of a program, upon invocation
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executes some function for the user. An object is an entity that contains or receives
information. Ferraiolo et al. (2001) represent these entities mathematically as follows:
Definition
• USERS, ROLES, OPS and OBS represent users, roles, operations and objects, respectively
• UA ⊆ USERS ×ROLES, a many-to-many mapping user-to-role assignment relation.
• assigned users : (r : ROLES)→ 2USERS , the mapping of role r onto a set of users. Formally:
assigned user(r) = {u ∈ USERS|(u, r) ∈ UA}
• PRMS = 2(OPS×OBS), representing a set of permissions
• PA ⊆ PRMS ×ROLES, a many-to-many mapping permission-to-role assignment relation.
• assigned permissions(r : ROLES) → 2PRMS mapping of role r onto a set of permissions.
Formally: assigned permissions(r) = {p ∈ PRMS |(p, r) ∈ PA}
• ob(p : PRMS) → {op ⊆ OPS}, the permission-to-operation mapping, which gives the set of
objects associated with permission p.
• ob(p : PRMS)→ {ob ⊆ OBS}, permission-to-object mapping, which gives the set of operations
associated with permission p.
• SESSIONS representing a set of sessions
• user sessions(u : USERS) → 2SESSIONS , mapping of user u onto a set of sessions
• sessions roles(s : SESSIONS)→ 2ROLES , mapping of session s onto a set of roles. Formally:
session roles(si) ⊆ {r ∈ ROLES|session users(si), r) ∈ UA}
• avail session perms(s : SESSIONS) → 2PRMS , the permissions available to a user in a
session
⋃
r∈session roles(s)
assigned permissions(r).
Advantages of RBAC
There are numerous reasons as to why RBAC is regarded as a generalised approach to
security management (Hansen & Oleshchuk, 2003), (Joshi et al., 2005). One impor-
tant characteristic is, by itself RBAC is policy neutral. It actually provides a means
of articulating a policy rather than embodying a particular security policy (Sandhu,
1996a). The RBAC enforced in a particular system is, in fact, a result of precise sys-
tem configuration and interactions between various system components (Osborn et al.,
2000).
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To demonstrate this capability of RBAC, Sandhu (1996b) shows how traditional
lattice-based MAC can be simulated using the RBAC model and Osborn et al. (2000)
demonstrate how RBAC can be configured to enforce both discretionary and manda-
tory access control policies. More generally, Sandhu (1996a) and Osborn et al. (2000)
established that traditional MAC is just one instance of RBAC as a single Trusted
Computing Base (TCB) which can be configured to enforce RBAC in general and
MAC in particular. RBAC is also credited for its ability to modify security policy to
meet the demanding needs of a commercial organisation. Its flexibility has resulted in
this generic access control approach being recommended in various legislation such as
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (Franqueira & Wieringa,
2012).
Limitations of RBAC
Despite its benefits and being widely adopted, RBAC has some limitations. Oh & Park
(2003) identify two of its limitations. These are:
1. There is no clear separation between two concepts: a “role” and a “task”. In
a real organisation, a task may sometimes require an involvement of multiple
roles.
2. Role inheritance in RBAC does not fully reflect the same process in real or-
ganisations. As a concept in RBAC, when role R1 (a higher role) inherits from
another role R2 (a lower role), this means that R1 inherits full permissions set of
R2. In a real organisation, however, a higher role only inherits partial permission
set of a lower role.
Additionally, access control decisions in modern and collaborative environments like
healthcare are dynamic, and as such privileges and capabilities of users tend to change.
The access rights in these environments may henceforth not solely depend on indi-
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vidual user’s identities. They may, however, depend on context in which an access
request is made. This may include the user’s context, such as location of access and
time when an access request was sent, and the system’s context which may include
system load and network state. The RBAC model is , in fact, not able to consider
context information in access control decision making (Kuhn et al., 2010). To enforce
dynamic context information using RBAC, particularly in large organisations, a “role
explosion” can result in thousands of separate roles being fashioned for different col-
lections of permissions. The fact that access control policies in RBAC are presumably
static (that is, they follow the same access control requirements regardless of any
change in the surrounding environment), hinders the application of RBAC to achieve
a more fine-grained access control required in many modern environments such as in
electronic healthcare to support the continuity of care.
3.3.4 Attribute Based Access Control
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), which is sometimes referred to as Policy-
Based Access Control (Blaze & Keromytis, 1999), (Pimlott & Kiselyov, 2006) or Claims-
Based Access Control (Brown, 2007), has been proposed as a solution to problems
identified in RBAC, including role explosion which results from the model’s inabil-
ity to support context information in its access decisions. ABAC is defined as a
“new generation” access control model that provides dynamic, context-aware and
risk-intelligent access control. This approach is, thus, praised for its ability to achieve
efficient regulatory compliance, reduced time-to-market for new applications and a
top-down approach to governance through transparency in policy enforcement.
With the help of a structured language like eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML), ABAC uses attributes as building blocks in a structured language
that describes access requests and defines access control rules (Karp et al., 2009).
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Figure 3.11: Attribute Based Access Control approach
Generally, ABAC specifies a claim or claims that need to be satisfied in order to grant
access to a resource, and any user who can prove such a claim is granted access to a
resource. For an ABAC policy that contains a claim “above 18”; any person who can
prove that he or she is above 18 years old is granted access. The attributes in ABAC
are categorised into three groups, these are: Subject, Resource and Environment.
A subject is an entity requesting access to perform an action on a resource. Each
subject is associated with a number of attributes including user identification, role,
group memberships, department or company to which user belongs, competencies and
management level.
Other attributes in ABAC are collected from the action the user wants to perform
on the object, and a resource which is acted upon by a subject. A Microsoft Word
document is an example of a resource, and may contain attributes such as name, title,
date and so on. The environment attributes, on the other hand, represent operational,
technical and situational attributes that may need to be considered before permitting
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<Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:context:schema:os"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<Subject>
<Attribute AttributeId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
<AttributeValue>nurse</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Subject>
<Resource>
<Attribute AttributeId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
<AttributeValue>localhost:8080/roc-bac-sys</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Resource>
<Action>
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:
action-id" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
<AttributeValue>read</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Action>
</Request>
Figure 3.12: Access Request in XACML (Source: Author)
or denying access to a resource. They identify context in which access is requested.
Common environment attributes include current time and location from where the ac-
cess request occurred. These attributes can be of any type that is relevant to consider
so as to minimize risks or to plan for precautions. An access control request written in
XACML is presented in Figure 3.12. The request contains three attributes, these are:
subject-id (identifies each subject), resource-id (for an identification of a resource)
and action-id (for action’s identification). These attributes contain values “nurse”,
“localhost:8080/roc-bac-sys” and “read” for subject-id, resource-id and action-id at-
tributes respectively. An analysis of the discussed access control policies for a modern
healthcare environment is in Section 3.4 and a classifications of access control models
is in Section 3.5.
85
3.4 Access Control Policy for Healthcare
3.4 Access Control Policy for Healthcare
This section analyses the suitability of discussed policies to control access in a modern
healthcare environment.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
In a modern healthcare environment, DAC can be implemented as follows: “users” of
the system may include patients, healthcare professionals and other stakeholders such
as insurance companies. While “objects” are fields in a patient’s EHR, “operations”
consist of actions that individual users can perform to an object.
These may include create, read, update and delete. Although theoretically it seems
feasible to implement DAC in a modern healthcare environment, there are, however,
some functionality challenges that make it inappropriate (Baker et al., 1997). One
common challenge that has been reported in literature is the question of ownership of
EHRs and who controls their access when a patient dies. In fact, this question which
can have layers of complexity seems to be both unanswerable and inadequate for the
domain, and thus it has sparked a debate as to who is a true owner of these sensitive
medical records. That is, between a patient to whom records are referred, healthcare
professionals who create the records, Information Technology (IT) specialist (that is,
a system administrator) who maintains the records and has greater control over them,
or a healthcare provider or organisation through which medical records are stored in
their infrastructure (Trotter, 2012).
Using HIPAA regulation, for instance, to evaluate access rights to EHR for different
entities, as illustrated in Table 3.4, neither a patient nor a healthcare provider are
regarded as true owners of EHRs. Typically, a “true owner” of any product would be
able to destroy and change the products they own without recording what changes
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Table 3.4: HIPAAs access rights to EHRs for different
entities (Source: Trotter (2012))
Person or
Privilege
Delete their
copy of data
(Arbitrarily
(without
logs)
edit their
copy of data
Correct the
Provider’s
copy of data
Append to
the
provider’s
copy of data
Health
Provider
No. HIPAA does
not allow providers to
delete copies of patient
records
No. HIPAA does
not allow changes
to the contents of
EHR without a log
of those changes
being maintained
Yes. Providers can
correct their copy
of EHR data, pro-
viding that they
maintain a copy of
the incorrect ver-
sion
Yes. Providers can
add to EHR data,
without changing
the “correctness”
of the previous
instances of the
data
Patients Yes. They can
delete their own
copies of their patient
records, but requests
to providers that their
chart should be deleted
will be denied
No. Patients
cannot change
the “canonical”
version of patient
record
No. Patients can
only suggest that
the “canonical”
version of patient
record be updated
Yes. Under
HIPAA, patients
has the right
to append EHR
records
IT Specialist Kind of. Regula-
tions dictate that IT
specialists and vendors
should not have the
right to delete patient
records. But, through
root or administrative
access to the underly-
ing databases this can
be achieved
Yes. Source code
or database-level
access ensures that
patient records
can be modified
without logging
Yes. Source code
or database level
access ensures that
patient records can
be modified with-
out logging
Yes. Source code
or database level
access ensures that
patient records can
be modified with-
out logging
True Copy-
right Owner-
ship
Yes. You can destroy
things you own
Yes. You can
change things
you own without
recording what
changes you have
made
No. If you hold
copyright to the
material and some-
one has purchased
a right to a copy of
that material, you
cannot make them
change it
No. You have no
rights to change
another person’s
copy of some-
thing you own the
copyright to
have been made. They would also be held responsible for any unauthorised disclo-
sure of protected information, and be able to control contents of their products. For
the healthcare domain, however, this is not the case because if patients are granted
full control to their EHRs, this would definitely change the current fundamentals of
medical practice.
In addition to true ownership, the usage of DAC in a healthcare sector may result
into unscalable permissions. As pointed out by Grimson (2001), EHR is a longitudinal
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healthcare record of the patient which spans from cradle-to-grave. From this definition,
it means that as the time passes the amount of patient’s records increases. And as
the number of users and records grow, it becomes difficult to update permissions
when using DAC (Pervaiz et al., 2010). Alhaqbani & Fidge (2007) also point out
the possibility of creating new security challenges that might be caused by patient
mismanagement of their own records when DAC is used in the healthcare sector.
Mandatory Access Control
Conceptually, the implementation of a MAC-based approach in a modern healthcare
environment will involve definition of security levels for both subjects and objects.
Based on job functions in a healthcare domain, common levels for subjects may include
a system administrator, doctor (who can be defined further with different levels such
as consultant doctor, specialist doctor, senior doctor, junior doctor and so on), a
nurse (registered nurse, senior nurse, student nurse), laboratory technician, help desk
assistant and a patient. These security levels for subjects will then be associated with
different security levels defined for objects (EHRs), and thus access will be controlled
using security levels.
Regardless of conceptually being considered feasible, the MAC implementation in a
modern healthcare environment is likely to be difficult. Its main restrictions comes
from a large number of users expected to participate in a healthcare system, a wide
range of data types, together with a desire to give patients access to their own records
as specified in various legislations discussed in Chapter 4 (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2007).
MAC is also inappropriate for dynamic environments since it is centrally controlled
by a security administrator and users do not have an ability to bypass the already
defined security policies. This actually conflicts with access control requirements for
the domain which is witnessing a large number of unexpected access requests.
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Role-Based Access Control
The past two decades have witnessed a huge explosion in research on RBAC. In
academia, for example, a great number of papers on Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) have been published and the general approach has been adopted as a stan-
dard for security management in commercial organisations (David & Richard, 1992),
(Sandhu et al., 1996), (Sandhu et al., 2000), (Ferraiolo et al., 2001), (Joshi et al., 2005).
The industry’s interest on RBAC has increased dramatically with major IT vendors
offering products that incorporate some form of RBAC such as an Windows Autho-
risation Manager (AzMan) by Microsoft, which was first released in Windows Server
2003 (Microsoft, 2005). The AzMan framework is now used in Windows XP, Windows
Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2 and
Windows Server 2012. There is also a Tivoli Security Policy Manager by International
Business Machines (IBM, 2012), among others.
Despite being widely researched, adopted and used, RBAC is criticized for its inflexibil-
ity towards applications that require context information to be interpreted in real-time
before making access decisions (Huang et al., 2006). Specifying context information
in RBAC may result in role explosion since each context information requires a defini-
tion of a new role and an accompanying permission(s) thus resulting in thousands of
roles and permissions. Furthermore, pretty much all security measures in RBAC can
be overridden by the use of emergency access features, which are extensively used in
everyday work in health facilities. With its inflexibility, RBAC alone cannot ensure
the continuity of care when implemented in a modern healthcare environment. This
thesis, therefore, extends the traditional RBAC model with contexts and obligations
in order to allow health workers to bypass access policies in an accountable manner
in case of unexpected access requests.
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Attribute-Based Access Control
In recent years, ABAC has drawn more attention as an approach which facilitates EHR
accessibility due to its ability to authorise privileges based on attributes of subjects,
objects and the environment. This specification of access rights based on attributes
facilitates fine-grained access control policy administration per each individual sub-
ject. Contrary to RBAC, ABAC does not require separate roles for relevant sets of
subject attributes, and hence, access rules in ABAC can be implemented quickly to
cater for dynamic changing needs of the environments (Karp et al., 2009). In other
words, ABAC’s approach made it easy to include context information in access control
decisions.
As a trade-off to its flexibility, ABAC suffers from complexity associated with the num-
ber of cases that need to be considered for the model. As pointed out by Karp et al.
(2009), for n attributes or conditions using attributes, there are 2n possible combina-
tions. Another major challenge of implementing ABAC in a real domain is that, it
suffers from the lack of agreed meaning of attributes that can be used in the model.
Section discusses access control models that closely relates to the one proposed in this
thesis.
3.5 Models Classification
This section discusses different ways of classifying access control models. This section
is divided into two parts: Section 3.5.1 discusses the generic taxonomy proposed by
this thesis, and Section 3.5.2 reviews access control models that are related to the one
proposed in this thesis and then categorises them based on the proposed taxonomy.
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3.5.1 Introduction
There are numerous ways of classifying access control models. To begin with, Ferraiolo et al.
(1995) started their classification of access control models by grouping them into two
main groups based on access restriction. The two groups are: Discretionary Ac-
cess Control (DAC) (comprising of Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model) and
Non Discretionary Access Control (NDAC), consisting of Mandatory Access Control,
Role-Based Access Control and Attribute Based Access Control models, among others
(Ferraiolo et al., 1995), (Yuan & Tong, 2005). Unlike DAC where access is restricted
based on discretion of the object’s owner, all accesses to resources in NDAC are con-
trolled by a security administrator and organisation’s security policies. This group of
classification is summarised in Figure 3.13.
Figure 3.13: The classification of access control models by Ferraiolo et al. (1995)
There are more approaches for classifying access control models, as presented in Figure
91
3.5 Models Classification
3.14. These may include classification based on the type of information used
Figure 3.14: More approaches for classifying access control models (Source: Author)
for user authentication; which may include identity-based (Gong, 1989), role-based
(David & Richard, 1992)) or group-based access controls models(Kalam et al., 2003).
They may also be classified based on the content of protected object, also known
as content-based access control (Giuri & Iglio, 1997), (Guarino et al., 1999), trust
relationship between resource owner and a requester (also referred as trust-based
access control) (Tran et al., 2005), (Almena´rez et al., 2005) and user’s social rela-
tionship (social-based access control) (Gollu et al., 2007). Other distinguishing char-
acteristics of access control models may include selective history of access control re-
quests made by individual programs, called history based access control (Edjlali et al.,
1998), (Abadi & Fournet, 2003), (Fong, 2004) as well as encryption mechanisms used
(Goyal et al., 2006), (Wang et al., 2006). This thesis extends on the work carried out
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by Ferraiolo et al. (1995) as a base towards further categorisation of access control
models discussed in Section 3.5.2.
3.5.2 Related Work
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a well-established access control model with
widely-recognised advantages, and it is supported by a large number of software prod-
ucts and platforms (Sandhu et al., 1996), (Lodderstedt et al., 2002). The model ad-
dresses access control requirements of commercial organisations, through an introduc-
tion of the role concept (Sandhu et al., 1996), (Ferraiolo et al., 2003), (Ferraiolo et al.,
2004). In RBAC, permissions are attached to roles and users must be assigned to roles
to get the permissions. A role represents specific task competency, such as that of
a medical doctor, or it can embody the authority and responsibility (Sandhu et al.,
1996). Roles define both the specific individuals allowed to access resources as well
as the extent to which those resources can be accessed. Permissions determine what
operations can be carried out on resources under access control. A user must establish
a session to activate a subset of roles to which the user is assigned. Each user can
activate multiple sessions, however, each session is associated with only one user. The
operations that a user can perform in a session depend on the roles activated in that
session and permissions associated with those roles.
The RBAC model supports roles hierarchies that define an inheritance relationship
between roles. To prevent conflict of interest that may arise in an organisation, RBAC
allows the specification of static and dynamic separation of duty constraints. Several
works exist in the literature that improve RBAC functionality for different application
domains. This section discusses the research works that are closely related to the access
control model proposed in this thesis, and particularly how RBAC can be extended
with different concepts or notions to make the overall approach “context-based” or
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“context-aware”.
As part of RBAC’s extensions, Sampemane et al. (2002) introduce a new access con-
trol model for active spaces. The authors define an active space as “a computing
environment that integrates physical spaces and embedded computing software and
hardware entities”. The active space allows interactive exchange of information be-
tween the user and the space. Environmental aspects are adopted into the access
control model for active spaces, and the space roles are introduced into the imple-
mentation of the access control model based on RBAC. The proposed model supports
specification of both Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Con-
trol (MAC) policies. While DAC policies allow users to create and update security
policies for their devices, the MAC policies allow system administrators to maintain
the access matrix.
Covington et al. (2001) introduced a Generalised RBAC (GRBAC) model to help con-
trol access to private information and resources in ubiquitous computing applications.
In fact, the GRBAC model extends the traditional RBAC model by incorporating
the notion of object and environment roles. The environments roles differ from the
subject roles in RBAC but they do have similar properties, including: role activa-
tion, role hierarchy and separation of duty. In the access control framework enabled
by environment roles, each element of permission assignment is associated with a
set of environment roles, and environment roles are activated according to changing
conditions specified in environmental conditions; in this way, environmental proper-
ties such as location and time are introduced to the access control framework. In a
subsequent work, Covington et al. (2002) describe the Context-Aware Security Archi-
tecture (CASA), which is an implementation of the GRBAC model. The access control
is provided by the security services in the architecture. In CASA, security policies are
expressed as roles and managed by the security management service, authentication
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and authorisation services are used to verify user credentials and determine access to
the system resources. The environmental role activation services manage environmen-
tal role activation and deactivation according to environment variables collected by
context management services.
Temporal Role-Based Access Control (TRBAC) is another extension of RBAC, pro-
posed by Bertino et al. (1996) and Bertino et al. (2001). This work adds a time di-
mension to the RBAC model. Its authors [Bertino et al.] introduce the concept of
role enabling and disabling. Temporal constraints determine when the roles can be
enabled or disabled. A role can be activated only if it has been enabled. Joshi et al.
(2005) extend the Temporal Role-Based Access Control (TRBAC) model by propos-
ing the Generalised Temporal Role-Based Access Control (GTRBAC) model. In this
work the authors introduce the concept of time-based role hierarchy and time-based
separation of duty.
Several other researchers have also extended RBAC to incorporate spatial informa-
tion. To cope with spatial requirements, Hansen & Oleshchuk (2003) extend the con-
ventional RBAC model and propose Spatial Role-Based Access Control (SRBAC)
model. The SRBAC model utilizes location in security policy definitions. Another
most important work in this regard is GEO-RBAC (Bertino et al., 2005), which is
probably the most expressive location-based access control model. The role activation
is based on the location of the user. Consider the following as a usage example of
GEO-RBAC in a real world where a user can acquire a role of a patient when in a
hospital grounds and a role of a teacher when in a school compound. The GEO-RBAC
model supports the notion of role hierarchies but does not deal with separation of du-
ties. Another work incorporating spatial information is by Ray & Kumar (2006). In
this work, authors analyse how each component of a traditional RBAC is influenced
by location. The authors define their model using the Z specification language. The
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Location-Based Access Control has been addressed in some other works not pertaining
to RBAC including Leonhardt & Magee (1997), Hengartner & Steenkiste (2004), and
Ray & Kumar (2006).
There are also other works that incorporate both location and time in to the traditional
RBAC. The research work by Chandran & Joshi (2005) combines the main features
of GTRBAC and GEO-RBAC. In their LoT-RBAC model, role is enabled by time
constraints. A user can activate a role if such a role is enabled and an individual user
satisfies location constraints associated with role activation. Another feature worth
mentioning from their work is that, when a role is activated all permissions associated
with such a role can be invoked. Kumar & Newman (2006) proposed the Spatial
Temporal Role-Based Access Control model, that is suitable for pervasive computing
applications. With their access control model, the authors show the association of
each component of the conventional RBAC model with spatial-temporal information.
In addition to location and time, the traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
model has also been extended using purpose information. Ni et al. (2007) proposed
a purpose-based access control model for privacy protection. Their proposed model
is based on the notion of purpose roles through which purpose is categorised into
intended purposes and access purposes. In addition to role attributes and system
attributes, Ni et al. (2007) also incorporate purpose hierarchy into their model. How-
ever, despite its major contribution, the proposed access control model does not deal
with other vital privacy-aware elements, such as obligations and complex conditions
such as providing access for unexpected situations, that form an essential part of
privacy protection.
RBAC can also be extended by the notion of trust. Bhatti et al. (2005) proposed
a trust-enhanced version of their XML-based access control (X-RBAC) framework
for web services. The proposed model, which is an extension of RBAC with trust
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and contexts, incorporates context-based access control. Chakraborty & Ray (2006)
propose a trust-based access control model called TrustBAC. The model extends the
conventional role-based access control model with the notion of trust levels. Users
are assigned to trust levels instead of roles based on a number of factors, including
user credentials, user behaviour history, and user recommendation, and trust levels
are assigned to roles which are assigned to permissions.
With these and other research works in access control, as summarised in Figure 3.16,
this thesis argues that, to gain full advantage of contexts in an access control solution,
the proposed access control system should incorporate context conditions that are
specific to the application domain. In this case, RoC-BAC is designed by extending
the traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with the notion of health-
related contexts, from a chosen study domain.
Figure 3.15: A summary of the taxonomy to classify access control models (Source: Author)
Figure 3.15 presents a taxonomy that can be used to classify access control models.
Two main steps have been designed to enable classification of access control models.
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These are: 1. identifying the original access control model and 2. checking whether
that model has been extended or not, by identifying the notion or concept for an
extension as well as the original access control model. These steps are numbered 1
and 2. The classification begins with the decision to design an access control model
for a specific application or domain. Usually, this is done by proposing a notion or
concept (for instance, security levels in Mandatory Access Control (MAC), designed for
government and military applications, and role concept in Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC), for large commercial organisations. In this thesis, access control models from
the first step are referred as “original access control models”.
The second step involves checking whether the original model has been extended or
not. Similar to the first step, this can be done by identifying a notion or concept
(marked with a dotted rectangle) together with its proposed model. If there is a new
access control model that has been designed, then that notion with its related access
control model are noted. The final step involves checking whether the extended access
control model has been extended again. This process should be repeated until all
the access control models and their extensions have been noted in a hierarchy-style
classification. Figure 3.16 presents a taxonomy of access control models, with the
new RoC-BAC model included. The full list of papers used in the taxonomy are in
Appendix E.
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Figure 3.16: Taxonomy of Access Control Models with RoC-BAC included (Source: Author)
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This chapter has provided an overview of the basic terms and concepts that are com-
monly used in access control research together with a discussion of well-known tradi-
tional access control models, including Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Manda-
tory Access Control (MAC), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute-Based
Access Control (ABAC). The chapter also presents the researcher’s findings from an
analysis of the suitability of traditional models on modern healthcare environment.
The existing literature indicates that, DAC is not suitable for modern healthcare en-
vironments, since the model is static, and lacks proper control of information flow
where an owner of a particular object can pass access rights on that object to any
other subject without restrictions. Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is, however,
suitable for commercial applications where such lack of control on information flow
may be tolerated. MAC, on the other hand, provides a rigorous control of information
flow that is required in military and government applications. In fact, access control
decision making in both DAC and MAC models assign static permissions to roles while
a modern healthcare environments require contexts in its access decision in order to
support the continuity of care.
To overcome the limitations of DAC and MAC usage in commercial organisations,
RBAC was introduced. RBAC is a flexible and policy-neutral approach to access
control, and it has generated great interest in the security community. Despite its
success, RBAC cannot cope with the fundamental requirement of accommodating
contexts in access control decision making. Incorporating contexts into RBAC may
result into role explosion as each context requires a definition of a new role and an
accompanying permission(s), henceforth resulting into hundreds of roles and permis-
sions. To address the limitations of RBAC, a new generation of access control model
called Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) was introduced. The approach uses
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attributes to describe access requests and defines access control rules. The ABAC ap-
proach suffers from the complexity associated with the number of cases that need to
be considered for the model, whereas for n attributes, 2n cases needs to be considered.
For as much as 10 attributes that might need to be considered, these makes 1,024
cases. This thesis, henceforth, proposes a new context-based access control model
that accommodates infrequent access requests associated with emergency situations
in the healthcare domain. Chapter 4 discusses generic access control requirements for
the Tanzania healthcare domain.
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Access Control Requirements
for Tanzania Health System
In this chapter access control requirements for the Tanzania healthcare system are
discussed. These requirements are the by-products of a new methodology called
COIL developed purposely to gather comprehensive access control requirements for
the healthcare domain. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. While Section
4.1 discusses research works that explore different aspects of access control require-
ments for the healthcare domain, Section 4.2 discusses four categories of access control
requirements that forms the COIL (Contexts, Organisation rules, e-health Initiatives,
Legislative rules) methodology. COIL methodology is discussed in Section 4.3, and a
conclusion of the chapter is in Section 4.4.
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4.1 Related Work
This section discusses different approaches to access control requirements in the health-
care domain.
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no previous work that solely pro-
poses a methodology for gathering comprehensive access control requirements for the
healthcare domain. There are, however, research works that elicit some parts of ac-
cess control requirements for the healthcare systems by other means. In a short, one
page paper from 1998, Beznosov (1998) discusses requirements for access control in the
United States of America’s (USA) healthcare sector. He proposed access in the health-
care system to be based on affiliation (that is, subsidiary of the healthcare system a
particular caregiver works for), role (representing a job function that a particular user
is assigned in a current session), location (where does an access request comes from),
time (as its name suggests, which is an important factor for users assigned to shift-
related positions, like nurses and medical doctors) and relationships (representing a
relationship between the user and the patient whose records are to be accessed). It
was, however, not clear from the one-page paper where these conclusions on access
control requirements came from.
Anderson (1996) discussed a general security policy model for clinical information sys-
tems, which includes access control. Motivated by the lack of a comparable security
policy model that spells out clear and concise access rules for a clinical information sys-
tems, Anderson designed a security policy model in a form that is similar to the Bell-
LaPadula model (Bell & LaPadula, 1973) for military systems and the Clark-Wilson
model (Clark & Wilson, 1987) for banking systems. The proposed security policy was
based on the rules set out by the British Medical Association (Sommerville & Horner,
1993), which incorporate much clinical experience, General Medical Council (2001),
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and General Medical Council (Great Britain) (2006). Moreover, Blobel (2004) pub-
lished a paper describing a set of models for authorisation management and access
control in healthcare systems. The access control requirements proposed resulted
from the researcher’s experience and involvement in international EHR architecture
and security standards, including Health Informatics - Electronic Health Record Com-
munication (CEN ENV 13606) standard, Health Level Seven (HL7) - for exchange,
integration, sharing and retrieval of electronic health information and CORBA (a
standard designed to facilitate communication of systems that are deployed on di-
verse platforms).
Evered & Bo¨geholz (2004) published a paper describing how they performed a detailed
case study on access control requirements in a small aged-care facility in Australia
which at the time of the study the facility used paper-based records. Their study
concluded that access control requirements are very complex even for a small health-
care facility. To address the lack of research works on access control requirements
for healthcare systems, Rostad & Edsberg (2006) conducted a study on access con-
trol requirements in the healthcare systems in Norway. Their access control require-
ments were based on audit trails from access logs. One significant observation from
this study was that exception-based access control mechanisms were frequently and
widespread used. To minimise their usage in healthcare systems, Rostad & Edsberg
(2006) proposed a structured and fine-grained logging and analysis of access logs.
Alhaqbani & Fidge (2007) investigated appropriate access control requirements for
processing electronic health records. The researchers pointed out that “access to sen-
sitive patient data needs to be accessible by authorised personnel when needed and
also available in life-critical situations”. They also claimed that no single access control
model is sufficient in a federated healthcare environment, but rather the required level
of data security can be achieved through a judicious combination of three different
mechanisms.
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There have also been various research papers mentioning different access control re-
quirements for healthcare systems. Among others are: Motta & Furuie (2003) who
proposed a contextual role-based access control authorisation model for electronic pa-
tient records. The proposed model, which regulates user’s access to electronic patient
records, is based on organisational roles and was aimed to increase patient privacy and
confidentiality of their data. Bacon et al. (2002) designed a model named OASIS Role-
Based Access Control which satisfies context-sensitive access control requirements in
large-scale systems, such as the national EHR service.
Based on the review of both related research works and projects, in this thesis, access
control requirements for the healthcare domain are grouped into four. These are:
contexts, organisational rules, privacy and security capabilities from national e-health
initiatives as well as legislative rules. As a first step towards the development of
a new methodology for gathering comprehensive access control requirements for the
Tanzania healthcare system, Section 4.2 discusses each single component from the
four parts that form the COIL methodological approach.
4.2 Access Control Requirements
This section discusses four elements of access control requirements for the healthcare
domain. The items discussed include: contexts, organisational rules, national e-health
initiatives, and legislation and regulations.
4.2.1 Legislation and Regulations
The privacy and security of patient health information is a top priority for patients and
their families, healthcare professionals, healthcare providers and the government as a
whole. To protect personal health information from unauthorised access and use, leg-
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islation requires responsible individuals and organisations that collect, process, store,
use and transfer patient health information (either paper-based or electronic) to have
access rules, security policies and other safeguards in place. This section, henceforth,
analyses different parts of legislation in relation to access to electronic medical records
so as to identify access control requirements for the Tanzania healthcare system. The
legislation discussed herein include the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (HIPAA) from the United States of America, the European Union Data
Protection Directive for member states of the European Union and data protection in
Tanzania.
4.2.1.1 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
HIPAA is a “multifaceted law designed to protect the security and privacy of medical
information, and yet to enhance the ease of use with which they can be shared be-
tween entities” (Nanda & Burleson, 2003). It was initially introduced by the Congress
as the Kennedy-Kassebaum Bill (Starr, 1996) and enacted as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Public Law 104-191, in August 21, 1996.
HIPAA has two main goals:
i. Health Insurance Portability: to ensure that individual citizens would be able
to maintain their health insurance between jobs and
ii. Accountability: designed to maintain security and confidentiality of patient
health information. The HIPAA Act also mandates uniform standards for elec-
tronic data transmission, both financial and administrative, which relates to
patient health information (HIPAA, 1996)
These objectives were pursued through three main provisions of the Act, namely: i.
portability ii. tax, and iii. administrative simplification provisions. The access control
requirements are on the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which is promulgated under the third
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provision.
HIPAA incorporates four health information standards addressing administrative sim-
plification. These standards (including transaction and code sets, privacy rules, se-
curity rules and national provider identifier) have been adopted by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The requirements presented in
this section have been extracted from the HIPAA (1996) and Borkin (2003), and
which have been further explained in Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act (HITECH, Feb 17, 2009).
1. Applicability
Under Section 1172 of HIPAA, the HIPAA privacy rule and administrative sim-
plification rules apply to:
• Health Plans: include individual and group plans that provide or pay the
cost of medical care. These may include employer-sponsored group health
plans, health insurance companies, government and church-sponsored health
programs.
• Healthcare Providers: include every healthcare provider, regardless of the
size, who electronically transmits health information in connection with
certain transactions. This category applies to both institutional healthcare
providers like hospitals and non-institutional providers like physicians, den-
tists, psychologists, pharmacies and other practitioners.
• Health care clearinghouse: refer to public or private entities, including a
billing service, repricing company, community health management informa-
tion system, and “value-added” networks and switches, that either process
or facilitate the processing of health information received from another en-
tity in a nonstandard format or containing nonstandard data content into
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standard data elements or a standard transaction or vice versa (that is,
receives a standard transaction from another entity and processes or facil-
itates the processing of health information into a nonstandard format or
nonstandard data content for the receiving entity)
2. Protected Information
The privacy rule protects all “individually identifiable health information” held
or transmitted by applicable entities, in any form or medium, whether electronic,
paper or oral.
The “individually identifiable health information” is information, including de-
mographic data, that relates to
• the individual’s past, present or future physical or mental health or condi-
tion
• the provision of health care to the individual, or
• the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to the
individual
3. Healthcare Professionals’ Responsibility
(a) Disclosure of Identifiable Health Information
Section 1177 (a) OFFENSE - A person knowingly and in violation of this
part
• Uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier
• Obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an in-
dividual
• Discloses individually identifiable health information to another per-
son and in turn that person should be punished. The punishment may
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range from monetary fines (between $50,000 to $250,000) to imprison-
ment (between 0 and 10 years).
(b) Minimum Necessary Access
HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered entities to establish, develop and
implement reasonable policies and procedures that limit protected health
information with minimum access to achieve purpose of disclosure.
4. Patient Rights and Consent
(a) Individual Access
One of the main access control requirements that is crucial in the healthcare
domain is an ability to allow individual patients to access their protected
health information. With some exceptions, the HIPAA Privacy Rule allows
individuals to have rights to review and obtain copies of their protected
health information in a covered entity’s designated record set. Among
the circumstances excluded from the rule include: physiotherapy notes,
information compiled for legal proceedings and laboratory tests to which
certain legislation prohibits its access.
(b) Personal Representative
In relation to uses and disclosures of the individual’s protected health infor-
mation, HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered entities to treat a personal
representative (or a parent in case of a minor patient) in the same way as
the individual patient whose information is being processed. A personal
representative is formally defined as a person who is legally authorised to
make healthcare decisions on behalf of the concerned individual.
(c) Patient Consent
To disclose protected health information for other than the intended origi-
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nal purpose (treatment, payment or other healthcare operations), covered
entity must obtain individual’s written authorisation.
5. Access Control
Section 164.312 (a)(1) of HIPAA Security Rule defines two requirements for
access control (Department of Health and Human Resources, 2007), including
(a) Unique User Identification - each user should be assigned a unique username
or number for identifying and tracking user identity.
(b) Emergency Access Procedure - For emergency access requests, healthcare
providers are required to determine types of situation that would require
such an access to information system or application that contain EHRs.
4.2.1.2 European Union Data Protection Directive
The European Union Data Protection Directive regulates collection, processing, stor-
age, use, disclosure and transfer of personal data within the European Union (European Union,
1995), (Bennett & Raab, 2003). The directive was introduced in 1998 in order to pro-
tect the fundamental rights and freedom of people, and in particular their rights to
privacy, in respect to the processing of personal data. It also incorporates numerous
policies and mechanisms that attempt to closely track the flow of information. That is
wherever, (European) personal data flows, there should be adequate legal protection
of that data (Birnhack, 2008).
To standardize the protection of data privacy in Europe, the European Union Data
Protection Directive contains the following requirements:
• Individuals must have access to their personal information and be able to correct
them. There must also be mechanisms to assure compliance with the directive;
recourse for individuals who are affected by non-compliance and consequences
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for organisations when the directive is not followed.
• An organisation must inform individuals about purposes for which it collects and
uses information about them, and types of third parties to which it discloses that
information.
• Corporations and governments are forbidden from using virtually any personal
records for any purpose other than the original one, without explicit permission.
• An organisation must offer individuals an opportunity to opt-out whether their
information can be used for purposes other than the one for which it was pur-
posely gathered. For sensitive information such as medical conditions, racial
or ethnic origin, political opinions and so on, consumers must be given specific
opt-in choice before information is disclosed to third parties.
• Personal data on European Union citizens may only be transferred to countries
outside the 28-nation block that adopt these rules or are deemed to provide
“adequate protection” for such data
Although both HIPAA and European Union Directive were enacted to protect patient
health information, there are striking similarities and differences that exist between the
two. While both legislation recognise that health information belongs to an individual
who is the subject of that information, HIPAA asserts that healthcare provider is
the owner of the information and the law grants some interest and rights over the
information to the patient (Roach, 2006). In Europe, however, this approach is not
plausible since ownership of health information is entirely granted to the patient and
the healthcare unit is designated as either a controller or processor with legal rights,
interests and obligations over the information.
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4.2.1.3 Data Protection in Tanzania
To-date, there is no effective regime on data protection from individuals whose per-
sonal data is subjected to some form of automated processing on both Tanzania main-
land and Zanzibar. The absence of data protection law is, in fact, a heavy loss to
citizens as it exposes them to breaches of privacy, and also pose some great threats on
misuse of information and data. On a positive note, Tanzania is in the initial stages
of drafting new cyber security laws to combat cyber-crimes (Tanzania Online, 2012).
In creating such laws, the Data Protection and Piracy Act will become the main piece
of the legislation and the Computer and System Act and Electronic Transaction Act
will follow (ITNews, 2013). In relation to collection, processing, storage, transfer and
use of electronic patient information, these laws are expected to strengthen the elec-
tronic healthcare regulatory environment and create a foundation for specific electronic
healthcare regulations. Section 4.2.1.4 summarises rules from selected legislation and
regulations designed to govern privacy and security of patient health information.
4.2.1.4 Legislative Rules
This section summarises rules from legislation and regulations designed to ensure
privacy and security of patient health information. They form a first category of the
COIL methodology.
L1. Patients’ medical data should only be collected and processed by healthcare
professionals or individuals who are working on their behalf (known as data
processors in the European Directive on Data Protection).
L2. The purpose(s) of medical data collection and processing should be defined be-
fore any transactions. Any changes in the original purpose should be communi-
cated to a data subject.
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L3. In normal circumstances, healthcare professionals must obtain permission (known
as consent) from patients before undertaking any medical procedures.
L4. An individual patient should be allowed to appoint a representative who will be
allowed to access medical data on his or her behalf. The representative should be
treated in the same way as an individual whose information is being processed.
L5. A patient should be allowed to access their medical data either directly, through
a healthcare professional, or through a representative, as permitted by law.
L6. Patients may request to review and rectify errors concerning their medical data.
L7. In any circumstance, correspondence between patient and a healthcare profes-
sional should remain private.
L8. Access to medical data may be refused, limited or delayed, if restricted by law.
L9. There should be policies, legislation and procedures that restrict, control or
hamper patients access to information and services via the Internet and other
communication media.
L10. Appropriate measures (administrative, technical and physical) should be im-
plemented so as to prevent medical information from unauthorised access and
modification.
L11. To deal with emergency access, which is part of infrequent access requests,
healthcare providers are required to determine types of emergency situation
that would require access to information system or application that contain
Electronic Health Records (EHRs).
L12. Policies and procedures that limit protected health information with minimum
access to achieve the intended purpose should be developed and implemented.
L13. To enforce accountability, a posteriori mechanism should be available in order to
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establish who has accessed the system, what type of medical records have been
accessed and when.
L14. There should also be internal legislation and organisational rules from healthcare
organisations. These rules should govern operations and procedures to protected
medical records.
These fourteen rules were then sent to ten experienced healthcare professionals work-
ing in different healthcare facilities in Tanzania to check for their appropriateness for
the domain. The experts involved in evaluation of legislative rules were recruited us-
ing the snowballing approach and they were asked two questions: The first question
they were required to go through the provided legislative rules (L1 to L14) and specify
whether they are appropriate for the domain or not.
Table 4.1: Evaluation of Legislative Rules by Expert Users
Rule No. EU 1 EU 2 EU 3 EU 4 EU 5 EU 6 EU 7 EU 8 EU 9 EU 10
L1
L2
L3 X X X X X X
L4
L5
L6
L7
L8
L9
L10
L11 X X X X X X
L12 X X X X X X
L13 X X X X X X
L14
EU abbreviation for an Expert User
L1- L14 denotes legislative rules number L1 to L14
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With the second question, users were required to point out legislative rule(s) from
the list provided that they consider appropriate for the domain. While all ten experts
agreed that these legislative rules were appropriate for the domain, six of them pointed
out rules L3, L11, L12 and L13 as the ones to be implemented in a new system, as
shown in Table 4.1. Four of the experts did not comment on their choice of rule(s) for
the implementation in a Tanzania health system. From these results, the following
are considered as appropriate access control requirements that should be adopted in
a Tanzania health care system. These include:
1. Patient Consent: It refers to permission given by a patient to a health care
worker in relation to sharing and accessing the patient’s health information.
2. Emergency Access Procedure: There should be a mechanism to support emer-
gency access procedures (that are part of infrequent access requests), and which
are common in healthcare settings.
3. Minimum Access: In order to support the continuity of care, healthcare profes-
sionals should be given minimum access to protected health information in case
of infrequent access requests
4. Accountability: There should be mechanisms implemented in a system to allow
an enforcement of accountability.
4.2.2 National E-Health Initiatives
In this section, documents from selected national electronic health initiatives are ex-
plored, and privacy and security capabilities are presented. The capabilities from this
section form the second category of the COIL methodology.
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4.2.2.1 National Programme for Information Technology
The United Kingdom National Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT) in
National Health Service (NHS) was a ten-year programme established in 2002, and
presented an unprecedented opportunity to use Information Technology to reform
the way NHS uses information. The NPfIT was estimated to connect more than
100,000 doctors, 380,000 nurses and 50,000 other healthcare professionals and, it was
expected to hold life-long records of fifty million residents in the United Kingdom,
and thus improve healthcare services and quality of care to patients (Granger et al.,
2004), (Becker, 2007).
The core programme in NPfIT was the National Care Record Service (NCRS), which
was aimed to make relevant parts of patient clinical records available to whoever
needed so as to take care of a patient. The NPfIT contained other services includ-
ing: Electronic Appointment Booking, Electronic Transmission of Prescriptions and
NHS network (Brennan, 2009), (National Audit Office, 2009). The NCRS, for in-
stance, was designed to enable each patient’s detailed records to be shared securely
between different parts of the local NHS such as General Practitioners and hospitals.
More importantly, NCRS was expected to allow patients to have summary of their
important information, named Summary Care Records, available to authorised health
professionals at any NHS location.
The capabilities of the NPfIT are discussed in the Spine infrastructure (NHS, 2012),
and they contain the following
• Unique Identifier: The NPfIT uses a single unique NHS number for every patient
to facilitate safe, efficient and accurate sharing of patient information across
organisational and system boundaries, within the NHS.
• Summary Care Record (SCR): It is an electronic record which contains informa-
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tion in a summary form of a patient including medicines that a patient takes.
SCR are useful for healthcare professionals involved in providing care to pa-
tients in an emergency or out-of-hours service with faster access to key clinical
information.
To ensure confidentiality of patient data, NPfIT includes
• Authentication
• Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)- for authorising system functions and data,
• Legitimate Relationships with Audit and Alerts- for authorising user accesses to
patient records as well as,
• Patient consent for sharing personal sensitive information
These services are provided through the application of information governance pro-
cesses (Monitor, 2008), (Tett, 2010).
Despite huge investments (nine years and £11.4 billions), the Department of Health
(DH) has failed to deliver the universal NCRS, and NPfIT has been dismantled
(Parliament, 2011). The DH has, however, adapted an alternative approach whereas
NHS trusts are now expected to develop smaller, regional networks of EHRs that are
compatible with the programme. The implementation of this alternative approach
means different parts of the country will have different systems and hence resulting
in interoperability problems. Similar to issues faced by NPfIT, the implementation of
the alternative approach has already fallen significantly behind schedule and the cost
has escalated.
The House of Commons (2009) lists the following as the problems of NPfIT, among
others
i. Difficulties in gaining acceptance and support from NHS staff and the overall
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public
ii. Lack of cost-benefit analysis of the programme and other mini-programmes
iii. Difficulties in adhering to the project plan and schedules due to continuing delays
and history of missed deadlines
iv. Poor integration of clinicians and other NHS staff into the project, and
v. Disagreement on confidentiality approach, and concerns on data security.
4.2.2.2 National Electronic Health Record - Singapore
In its 2006 report on ageing population, the Singaporean government estimated that
by the year 2030, the country will witness an unprecedented profound age shift
as the number of residents aged sixty five and older will increase from 300,000 to
900,000 (Committee on Ageing Issues, 2006), (Ministry of Health, 2012). In other
words, these statistics reflect that one out of every five residents will be a senior by
the year 2030. To cope with the ageing population, the government established a Na-
tional Electronic Health Record (NEHR) in 2009 with the vision “One Singaporean,
One Health Record”, to allow patients to move seamlessly within an integrated care
system.
The NEHR was established in order to enable electronic patient health records to
be shared across the country’s healthcare system, and thus to reduce waiting times
and to provide better management of quality and cost of healthcare for its 5.1 million
population. Unlike NPfIT initiative which was dismantled after failing to achieve its
intended goal, the first phase of Singapore’s $144 million NEHR system went live in
July 2011, and it was on schedule (Li, 2011), (Accenture, 2012).
The following are the authentication and authorisation capabilities from the NEHR,
as discussed by Accenture (2012):
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• National Health Identification Service (NHIS): NHIS is a patient master index
that enables EHR to match patient records received from across the domain. It
enables healthcare providers to uniquely identify people through a combination
of factors including national identifier, birth date, physical address together with
other demographic information.
• Summary Care Records (SCR): NEHR delivers a SCR of each patient, and it
incorporates a concise overview of most recent clinical activities of an individual
including problem lists, medications and event summaries.
• Privacy and Security: To ensure privacy and security to patient data, NEHR
incorporates role-based access, data sensitivity classification and Break-The-
Glass functions that enables physicians to access patient information outside
normal privacy and security settings.
• Audit and Logging: The system contains full audit logging capabilities that
capture who has accessed what information, when, where and how.
4.2.2.3 HealthConnect - Australia
The National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA) is a not-for-profit organisa-
tion established by the Australian governments (both state and territory) with the
intention to develop “better ways of electronically collecting and securely exchang-
ing” health information (Jalal-Karim & Balachandran, 2008). NEHTA’s fundamental
goal is to develop a standardised, shareable EHR that is readily available and can
be transferred more quickly and securely between healthcare professionals, who are
authorised by the patient to access such information. Australia’s National EHR sys-
tem is known as HealthConnect, previously known as National Health Information
Network (Gunter & Terry, 2005).
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As discussed in NEHTA’s blueprint, HealthConnect includes the following capabilities
(National E-health Transition Authority, 2011):
• National Unique Identifier: This is a single identifier which is used to identify
patients within HealthConnect.
• Summary Care Records: Patients who choose to participate in the system will
have summaries of their health records stored in electronic form in one or more
networked databases.
• Privacy and Security: HealthConnect uses a multi-layered approach to maintain
privacy and security of patient information. There are several technical and non-
technical controls which have been identified in NEHTA’s blueprint, including
(i.) smart cards - to facilitate accurate identification and authentication, (ii.)
Role-Based Access Control policies, and (iii.) audit trails and monitoring access.
• Access to Health Information: HealthConnect enables healthcare providers (with
a support of a patient consent) to access summary care information on all of pa-
tient interactions with the healthcare system. This enables healthcare providers
to search medical records quickly and easily. Similarly, patients are be able to
access their health information from multiple healthcare providers, through a
single HealthConnect access point.
4.2.2.4 National e-Health Strategy - Tanzania
As noted earlier in Section 4.2.1.3, Tanzania has no legislation that controls the collec-
tion, processing, storage, use, and transfer of electronic healthcare information. This
has resulted in a fragmented landscape of ICT pilot projects, and information sys-
tem silos with significant barriers to achieve effective sharing of information between
healthcare participants (MoHSW, 2013c). In addition, the Tanzania health care sys-
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tem faces a risk of continued duplication, ineffective expenditure and creation of new
solutions that cannot be integrated or scaled across the continuum. To address these
issues, the MoHSW decided in 2009 to develop a national e-health strategy (officially
published in 2013) to guide the use of ICT in supporting the transformation of the
healthcare sector (MoHSW, 2013c).
The following capabilities has been specified in the National e-Health Strategy
• Tanzania Health Enterprise Architecture
1. In a strategy document, the MoHSW adopts an Enterprise Architecture
as a framework to guide the development of the National Health Informa-
tion System (NHIS). The NHIS is a collection of interconnected (loosely or
tightly) information systems that support healthcare operations, manage-
ment and decision making in the healthcare sector.
2. Another significant capability specified in the strategy document is the
realisation that integrated NHIS requires a long term plan that builds from
existing solutions. This capability is one of the reasons behind this decision
to extend the traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with
contexts and obligations so as to support the continuity of care.
• Privacy and Security:
1. The implementation and use of e-health solutions must place the highest
importance on protection of patient information to guarantee privacy and
integrity.
2. The strategy points out on the need to establish privacy and regulatory
framework to guarantee that privacy safeguards and consent processes for
access and use of health information are followed by healthcare organisa-
tions.
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3. The strategy document also states that the implementation of a national
e-health strategy should converge on fewer and more reusable, cost effective
ICT systems that are extensible, scalable and manageable.
Similar to electronic health initiatives from other countries, the implementation of a
national e-health strategy in Tanzania is expected to address significant challenges
including the shortage of qualified human resources for health which is the source of
inefficiencies in the overall healthcare system. If the shortage of healthcare workers
is successfully addressed through the use of ICT, the Tanzania’s healthcare system
will be in a position to support the continuity of care to patients. Section 4.2.2.5
summarises capabilities from national e-health initiatives against those considered
appropriate for the Tanzania healthcare system.
4.2.2.5 Capabilities from National E-Health Initiatives
This section summarises privacy and security capabilities extracted from selected na-
tional electronic health initiatives.
The capabilities discussed herein form a second category of the COIL methodology,
and they can be used as a guideline while designing a context-based access control sys-
tem for the domain where infrequent access requests that involve emergency situations
are common. From a summary of capabilities in Table 4.2, the National Electronic
Health Record (NEHR) in Singapore specifies the need for healthcare information
systems to implement authentication mechanisms (using a combination of username
and password, or any other means) to confirm the user requesting access to protected
records is the one specified in the system. For authorisation, Role-Based Access Con-
trol is a preferred approach to specify access rights for health care workers, as well
as other users accessing the system. The Break-The-Glass functions are specified to
provide access for infrequent access requests (which is part of emergency accesses).
122
4.2 Access Control Requirements
While patient consent is required to allow a patient to allow healthcare professionals
to access their health information, auditing and logging is incorporated to enforce
accountability in the system
Table 4.2: The summary of access control requirements from the national e-health initiatives
National e-health initiative
Capability
United
Kingdom
(NPfIT)
Singapore
(NEHR)
Australia
(NEHTA)
Tanzania
(e-Health
Strategy)
Access
Control
Requirement
Proposed in
this Thesis
User
Identification
and Authenti-
cation
Authentication Authentication Identification
and
Authentication
Authentication Identification
and
Authentication
Authorisation Role-Based
Access Control
Role-Based
Access Control
Role-Based
Access Control
Role-Based
Access Control
Role-Based
Access Control
Emergency
Access
Not specified Break-The-
Glass
functions
Not specified Not specified Break-The-
Glass
Auditing Auditing and
Alerts
Auditing and
Logging
Audit Trials
and
Monitoring
Not specified Auditing and
Logging
Patient
Consent
Required Required Required Required Required
From the data collected and observations on how health care workers operate, and
how the current systems are used in a Tanzania healthcare system, this study makes
a number of conclusions in case of privacy and security capabilities for the domain
as shown in the right column of Table 4.2, labelled “Access Control Requirement
Proposed in this Thesis”. First and foremost, this study found that Role-Based Access
Control is an access control mechanism implemented in most healthcare systems in
Tanzania. This fact is well confirmed by a partial list of healthcare information systems
discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4. The Tanzania healthcare system requires an
implementation of functions similar to Break-The-Glass to provide infrequent access
requests (emergency accesses is part of) in healthcare organisations. There should
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also be identification and authentication so as to identify and authenticate users using
the system, as well as auditing and logging procedures. Section 4.2.3 analyses what
context is and categories of context for the healthcare domain.
4.2.3 Contexts
The main aim of this section is to introduce context, which forms the third category
of the COIL methodology. The section begins with a discussion of what context is,
followed by scenarios involving its usage in three different domains. The last part
discusses how and which context will be used in this thesis in order to maintain the
continuity of care by allowing an accountable sharing of personal information.
4.2.3.1 Context: Definition
Context as a concept has been studied by philosophers, linguists and psychologists
(Allen & Shatz, 1983), (Winograd, 2001). In the last few years, however, its use
in Computer Science has grown tremendously, spanning into a wide range of disci-
plines from information retrieval and reasoning in Artificial Intelligence to ontologies
in Knowledge Representation (Bricon-Souf & Newman, 2007). In each such domain,
context has been interpreted in a certain way that is well suited for their goal and thus
making it an elusive concept to define (Henricksen et al., 2002), (Bazire & Bre´zillon,
2005), (Wan, 2009). The main aim of this section is, therefore, to provide a brief
review of what context is based on definitions proposed by researchers from different
domains.
Initially, definitions of context were categorised into two main groups. These are:
definitions that only provide examples of context information to define context, and
those that state what context is, with or without examples. From the first cate-
gory, Schilit & Theimer (1994) enumerate context as location of the user, identities
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of nearby people and objects and changes to those objects over time. This definition
is regarded as the first research work that introduced the term “context-aware”. In
a similar fashion, Brown et al. (1997) ascertain context as location, time of the day,
identities of people around the user, orientation of the device, season of the year and
temperature. Ryan et al. (1998) list user’s location, identity and time. Additionally,
Dey (1998) points out emotional state, focus of attention, location and orientation
of the device, date and time of the day, objects and people in the users environment
as context. Although authors of each of these definitions list context elements or
variables, it is difficult to apply any of them if you need to determine the type of
information not listed is actually a context or not (Dey, 2001).
The second approach towards context definition involves an analysis of selected def-
initions that state what context is, with or without context elements or variables.
Salber et al. (1999) define context as any information that is part of an applica-
tion’s operating environment and such information can be sensed by the application.
Salber et al. (1999) identify location, identity, activity and state of people, groups
and objects, temperature and lightings as context for the buildings and rooms fitted
with sensors. Likewise, Dey (2001) and Abowd et al. (1999) formalise context as “any
information that can be used to characterise the situation of an entity. An entity is a
person, place, or an object that is considered relevant to the interaction between user
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Table 4.3: A Summary of Definitions of Contexts from Literature
No. Author(s) Context and Variables
1. Schilit et al. (1994) User’s location, lighting, noise level, network connectivity, communication
costs, communication bandwidth and social situation (whether you are with
your manager or co worker)
2. Brown et al. (1997) Location, time of the day, identities of the people around the user, orientation
of the device, season of the year and temperature
3. Ryan et al. (1998) User’s location, identity and time
4. Schmidt et al. (1999) Human factors: user, social environment and task
Physical environment: conditions (such as light, pressure, acceleration, audio
and temperature), infrastructure, location and time
5. Chen et al. (2000) User’s profile, user location, time of the day, nearby people and devices and
user activity
6. Satyanarayanan
(2001)
Position, orientation, identities of the people nearby, locally observable ob-
jects and action, emotional and physiological state
7. Ouchi et al. (2002) Health conditions, movements and behaviours
8. Miguel-Garcia et al.
(2003)
User’s location, delivery timing, role reliance and device location and state
(such as temperature reading) and other artifacts (like availability of labora-
tory results)
9. Zhang et al. (2005a) Context has been categorised into five groups.
Personal health context: pulse, blood pressure, weight, glucose level.
Environment context: temperature, light, humidity and noise.
Task context: goals, tasks, actions, activities.
Spatial Temporal context: location and time
Terminal context: screen size, colour, quality of the screen, energy type,
operating system, interface, terminal type and media supported.
10. Varshney (2007) Pulse rate, User’s actions and posture, Electrocardiogram (ECG), respiration
rate, oxygen saturation, transmission of packets over wireless network
11. Jung & Lee (2007) Bio Signal context: ECG, respiration rate, oxygen saturation, blood pressure,
body temperature, body sugar, body fat, weight
Environment context: temperature, relative humidity, oxygen rate, wind
speed and rain gauge
12. Wood et al. (2008) Location, pulse, blood pressure, ECG, room temperature, light levels, dust
and user activities
13. Bardram & Nørskov
(2008)
Patient identification (including ID, name, social security number), allergies,
patient current status and location, and location of the clinicians)
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and application, including user and applications themselves”. From his definition,
Dey (2001) lists location, identity, time and activity as relevant context information
in Ubiquitous Computing.
From their psychological study, Federenko et al. (2004) offer a simple and straight-
forward definition of the term context. They define context as a set of variables that
define a situation. Similarly, Bazire & Bre´zillon (2005) define context as “a set of
situational elements in which an object being processed is included”. From a summary
of definitions of contexts in Table 4.3, some researchers have specified healthcare-
specific contexts. Among others, context variables specified include health conditions,
movements and behaviours by Ouchi et al. (2002), user’s location, delivery timing,
role reliance, and device location and state by Miguel-Garcia et al. (2003).
Zhang et al. (2005a), on the other hand, categorise context into five groups, in-
cluding personal health, environment, task, spatial temporal, and terminal contexts.
Other definitions of context from researchers in healthcare are specified by: Varshney
(2007), Jung & Lee (2007), Wood et al. (2008) and Bardram & Nørskov (2008). From
the two categories of context definitions, this thesis adopts a simpler definition by
Federenko et al. (2004) and categorises contexts in a similar fashion as Zhang et al.
(2005a). The definitions of contexts are summarised in Table 4.3. Through further
analysis of existing literature, more contexts were identified (as summarised in Table
4.4).
Using the categorisation proposed by Zhang et al. (2005a), initially contexts in this
study were grouped into five categories: personal health contexts, terminal contexts,
environment contexts, tasks contexts, and spatial temporal contexts , as shown in
Table 4.4. Since the main aim is to design a new context-based access control model for
infrequent access requests, contexts were then re-categorised to fit with the application
domain. The new four categories of contexts used for the rest of this thesis are:
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Table 4.4: Categorisation of Contexts (Source: Author)
Personal
Health
Context
Terminal
Context
Environment
Context
Task
Context
Spatial
Temporal
Context
- Patient Identifica-
tion including ID,
name, social secu-
rity number
- Patient Allergies
- Pulse Rate
- Blood Pressure
- Body Weight
- Glucose Level
- Respiration Rate
- Oxygen Satura-
tion
-
Electrocardiogram
- Body Tempera-
ture
- Body Sugar
- Body Fat
- Previous Diseases
- Therapies
- Operations
- Current Symp-
toms
- Already Available
Diagnosis
- Behaviours
- Movements
- Health Condi-
tions
- Patient Location
- Patient Current
Status
- Personal Situa-
tion
- Posture
- Patient Activity
- Location of the
Clinicians
- Identities of the
People around the
Patient
- Screen Size
- Colour
- Quality of the
Screen
- Energy Type
- Operating Sys-
tem
- Interface
- Terminal Type
- Media Supported
- Orientation of
the Device
- Location of the
Device
- State of the De-
vice
- Nearby Devices
- Communication
Bandwidth
- Communication
Costs
- Network Connec-
tivity
- Transmission of
the Packets
- Temperature
- Light Levels
- Relative Hu-
midity
- Noise Level
- Oxygen Rate
- Wind Speed
- Rain Gauge
- Dust
- Pressure Accel-
eration
- Season of the
Year
- Goals
- Tasks
- Activities
- Actions
- Location
- Time
subject contexts, object contexts, environment contexts and health-related contexts.
The health-related contexts result from personal health contexts, with inclusion of
contexts extracted from the Tanzania healthcare system.
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4.2.3.2 Contexts: Tanzania Healthcare System
From Chapter 1, the main aim of this thesis has been to design a new context-based
access control model for an infrequent access requests, using Tanzania’s healthcare
system as a case study domain. The proposed model should support the continuity
of care to patients by allowing healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in an
accountable manner. To achieve this, an implementation approach used in this thesis
involves extending the traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with
contexts and obligations. This section, therefore, presents health-related contexts
(resulting from Personal Health Contexts category in Table 4.4, Column 1) extracted
from the Tanzania healthcare system.
The following health-related contexts were collected from healthcare professionals
working in different facilities in the Tanzania’s healthcare system. These contexts
were then verified by checking in a list of crimes and road accidents published by the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2013)
1. Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children
The contexts discussed herein have also been pointed out by the: Ministry of
Community Development, Gender and Children (MCDGC, 2012), Ministry of Ed-
ucation and Vocational Training and Tanzania Law Marriage Act (Parliament,
1971).
(a) Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)
Female genital mutilation or female circumcision is a ritual removal of some or
all external parts of the female genitalia for non-medical reasons. FGM is often
performed with unsterilised razor blades or knives and can lead to bleeding,
infections, and childbirth complications. Since complications are common,
either during, immediately after the procedure or during childbirth, its victims
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are often rushed to district or regional hospitals for medical attention. For
any FGM case admission, the police needs to be informed as female genitalia
cutting is illegal in the country.
(b) Gender Based Violence (GBV)
Similar to many African countries, Gender Based Violence is also common in
Tanzania. The most recent demographic and health survey found that forty
four percent of married women in Tanzania have experienced either physical
or sexual violence from an intimate partner in their lifetime. While GBV may
result in unjustifiable consequences among girls and women; yet these prac-
tices are culturally engrained traditions (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011).
Similar to FGM, any gender based violence requires police intervention before
any treatment from the hospital or other help-seeking channels.
(c) Abortions
With abortion being illegal in Tanzania, most women tend to abort pregnan-
cies themselves or often turn to backstreet clinics run by unskilled providers.
It is estimated that about forty six percent of women in urban and sixty per-
cent in rural Tanzania opt for unsafe abortions (MoHSW, 2008b). In addition
to severe complications associated with unsafe abortions, the majority of the
women who escape death are then transferred from non-registered health fa-
cilities to hospitals for immediate medical care.
2. Ministry of Home Affairs, Police Force
There are several health-related contexts reported by the Ministry of Home Affairs
(MoHA). On the country’s crime report for the 2010, the MoHA identified the
following:
(a) Non-Surgical Amputation of Limbs
In the past seven years, Tanzania has witnessed an increase in the number of
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deaths in people with albinism as well as the number of people with albinism
seeking treatment in public health facilities as a result of non-surgical limb
amputations. All this began when a rumour spread in some parts of the coun-
try that children born without skin pigmentation are imbued with a special
sort of magic. Some witch doctors say if you hack off their arms, steal their
blood, or even take their lives, riches or luck will come your way. This belief
has, in fact, led to the murders of dozens of persons with albinism. Those who
escape death may lose a limb and be doomed to live the rest of their lives with
disability. Up to the writing of this thesis, the MoHA reported about 60 cases
of non-surgical amputations and deaths of people with albinism since 2007.
(b) Throwing Away of Newborn Babies
In Tanzania, throwing away of newborn babies is quite common. From Min-
istry of Home Affair’s crime report, there were 186 cases in 2010 of newborn
babies who were thrown away by their mothers for a number of reasons. This
is an increase of 8.1% from 172 cases in 2009. In the North Eastern part of
the country, majority of the women pointed out some of reasons that led to
their decision to throw away their newborn babies, including pressure from
their prospective fathers that they do not resemble the newborns as well as
an end of a relationship between parents. Usually, when found, these babies
are reported to the police force and then taken to the healthcare facilities for
treatment and care.
(c) Rape
For the year 2012, Tanzania recorded about 828 rape cases across the country.
This is an increase of 48 cases, from 780 cases reported in 2011 (NBS, 2013).
Like amputation of albinos, there are some suggestions that the acts of rape,
sodomising (104 cases in 2011 and 113 cases in 2012) and child abuse (19 cases
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in 2011 and 12 cases in 2012) are also influenced by witch doctors who claim
to make people rich if they fulfil their conditions.
(d) House Burning
Healthcare facilities in Tanzania also treat patients who had fallen victims of
burning down houses or arson cases. As reported in a crime report by Ministry
of Home Affairs, Police Force division, there were a total of 2471 cases in 2012.
This is an increase of about 4% from 2375 cases reported in 2011. Majority of
these cases are reported from pastoralist communities, and are influences by
either theft of the livestock or fighting for land.
(e) Narcotic Drug Use
Tanzania has been used as a transit route for narcotic drugs for abuse between
Asia, Middle East and Europe. In recent years, there has been a high traffic of
narcotic drugs passing airports and ports, and has resulted into a significant
increase in the number of narcotic drug users in the country. Those who have
been affected by narcotic drugs usually receive treatment from special units of
government-owned hospitals or specialised hospitals (as discussed in Chapter
2).
(f) Vigilantes
The Tanzania Police Force is characterised by a high ratio between police of-
ficers and citizens (about 1 police officer is expected to serve 1,294 citizens).
Due to this scarcity, as a country, Tanzania has a high number of offenders
who commit offences without being caught or prosecuted due to a corrupt ju-
dicial system. The frustrations with the judicial system has caused citizens to
take measures in their own hands against offenders by either beating, burning
or even killing them. The offenders who escape death are usually taken to
government-owned hospitals for treatment, under the escort of police officers.
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(g) Road Accidents
Since motorcycles began to be used as a mode of commercial transporta-
tion, the MoHA registered 11,438 road accidents and 431 deaths. These road
accidents result from speeding, negligent drivers, using cellphones while driv-
ing, corrupt traffic police and failure to respect and obey traffic regulations
(Ministry of Home Affairs, 2012). Majority of individuals injured from road
accidents are treated at the Muhimbili Orthopaedic Institute (MOI), which is
within the Muhimbili National Hospital (MNH) as well as other government-
owned hospitals.
(h) Armed Robbery
The Ministry of Home Affairs recorded 1,332 cases of armed robbery in 2010,
which is a 5.5% less than 1,430 cases in 2009. Similar to other cases, victims
of armed robberies seek treatment either in public or private health facilities.
(i) Robberies
Unlike armed robberies, there is a high number of un-armed robberies in the
country. For the year 2010, there were 6,598 reported robberies in Tanzania,
which is an increase of about 10.6% from 7,381 cases in 2009. Additionally,
for the year 2011, 6,577 robberies were reported. The majority of the victims
of this type of robbery mainly suffers from cuts since knives and swords are
commonly used.
(j) Clashes
i. Between Farmers and Pastoralists
For several decades, some parts of the country have observed recurring
conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. It is common for these two
groups to fight for fertile land, since farmers need land to cultivate crops,
and pastoralists require the same piece of fertile land to feed their an-
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imals. In addition to claiming lives of innocent people (mostly women
and children), these conflicts also result in to more burden for healthcare
professionals as those injured will require medical attention.
ii. Between Pastoralist Groups
Between 2010 and 2011, more than 80,000 livestock were reported to be
stolen from pastoralists. The majority of those involved with livestock
stealing were fellow pastoralists. Similar to clashes with farmers, the
clashes between pastoralist groups result into violence whereas a group
with stolen livestock usually hunt for those who stole their livestock, and
if found, violence erupts. In the overall process of livestock recovery,
machetes are used and casualties tend to seek treatment from healthcare
facilities without police involvement.
iii. Clashes of the Clans
Pastoralist communities are also involved with clashes between clans as a
result of a revenge from either livestock theft or slashing of crops. As ar-
rows, machetes and other traditional weapons are commonly used during
these fights, those injured always seek treatment in a nearby health care
facility.
3. Tanzania People’s Defense Force (TPDF)
There are situations that are directly or indirectly handled by the Tanzania People’s
Defense Force, including
(a) Clashes between Political Parties
For the past ten years, the Tanzania’s political scene has been marred with
fatal clashes between political parties, forcing military intervention. These
clashes have resulted in the deaths of dozens of people and leaving others
severely injured and require hospital treatments.
134
4.2 Access Control Requirements
(b) Explosions
In the past two decades, Tanzania has experienced several bomb explosions.
The police force has reported numerous home-made bomb explosions in Zanz-
ibar as a result of religious tensions between Zanzibar Muslims and Tanzania
mainland Christians. In Tanzania mainland, however, almost all explosions
have occurred in army barracks, and thus affecting surrounding citizens. Casu-
alties from these explosions are usually treated in district, regional or military-
based hospitals, and the treatments are free.
4. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
The public healthcare facilities in Tanzania offer their services to the residences of
the United Republic of Tanzania, depending on different situations:
(a) Unidentified Person and Heath Facility
If there is an unconscious individual being spotted in a public area, citizens of
the United Republic of Tanzania are commanded to report such a person to
the police force. It is common for those in a general public who are unaware
of this requirement to make a decision to take such an unconscious individual
directly to the health care facilities without involving the police force. In
this case, a patient will receive necessary emergency treatment(s) that the
healthcare professional sees fit and the healthcare facility is obliged to report
such an individual to the police force. The payment for such treatment will
be issued to the patient later.
(b) Payment Type
Since healthcare services in public healthcare facilities in Tanzania are not for
free, when a patient visits a healthcare facility, a responsible staff is required to
evaluate whether treatment for such a patient is free or not. Among those who
receives free treatment in government-owned healthcare facilities are pregnant
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women, people suffering from chronic diseases and children under five years
of age. In addition to cash payments, another form of acceptable payment is
through medical cards.
(c) Police Form Three (PF3)
If there is a medical situation that requires police involvement, public hospitals
under the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) have to check on
whether such a patient was supposed to be referred by the police force or not.
If the referral is by the police force, either a police officer would accompany
a patient to the healthcare facility or a patient has a Police Form 3 (PF3)
from the Police Station. If PF3 is missing, patient would receive emergency
treatment (as a healthcare professional sees fit) and a healthcare facility would
direct the patient to the police station to report the situation.
Table 4.5 summarises health-related contexts extracted from the Tanzania healthcare
system. Although payment and Police Form Three (PF3) have been discussed as
contexts on their own rights, in this thesis, they are considered as second level of
contexts (column 2 and 3, Table 4.5), which means they can be applied on first level
contexts (column 1, Table 4.5). Consider how a victim of rape, which is a first level
context, is handled upon arriving to the healthcare facility in Tanzania. Normally,
upon arrival to the healthcare facility, a responsible staff is expected to evaluate
whether the patient has reported to the police force and thus has a PF3 form or
not. With this example, contexts can, therefore, be grouped into levels. More health-
related contexts from the Tanzania healthcare system are in Appendix D. Section
4.2.4 presents a summary of organisational rules listed by system administrators in
the Tanzania’s healthcare system.
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Table 4.5: The health-related contexts from the Tanzania healthcare system (Source: Author)
Health-related Contexts PF3 [Yes or No] Payment [Yes or No]
1. Female Genital Mutilation
2. Gender Based Violence
3. Unsafe Abortion
4. Amputation of Albino
5. Throwing away of Newborns
6. Rape
7. Burning Down Houses
8. Narcotic Drug Use
9. Citizen Against Offenders
10. Road Accidents
11. Armed Robbery
12. Robberies
Clashes between
• 13. Farmers and Pastoralists
• 14. Between Pastoralists
• 15. Clans
• 16. Political Parties
17. Explosions
18. Unidentified Person
4.2.4 Organisational Rules from Tanzania Healthcare System
In addition to legislative rules, privacy and security capabilities from national e-health
initiatives and contexts (including health-related contexts from the Tanzania health-
care system presented in Table 4.5), the proposed COIL methodology also comprises
of internal organisational rules established by the healthcare facilities to govern proce-
dures and operations. The following rules were collected from system administrators
working in ten healthcare institutions in Tanzania
O.1 Medical doctors do not need to sign confidentiality agreement with patients as
they are bounded by the healthcare professionals’ code of conduct (also known
as Hippocratic oath which states “Whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course
of my dealings with men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will
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never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets” (Anderson, 1996)).
O.2 A system administrator is allowed to delete medical information of the patient.
This access right is, however, restricted since legislation require medical records
to be retained for a certain period of time after the patient has left the healthcare
facility or die. Most legislation state that, no one is allowed to delete the medical
records of the patient until the appropriate data has expired.
O.3 A surgeon consultant is allowed to view theatre schedules and make appointment
for his or her patients. A surgeon consultant is also allowed to read patient
laboratory results, send laboratory requests and access Picture Archiving and
Communication System (PACS) images of the patient.
O.4 A medical doctor is allowed to access medical information of his or her patients.
A medical doctor can add and append to it entries to his or her patients’ medical
records.
O.5 A medical doctor can add private notes about a patient. On the basis of patient-
doctor confidentiality which is guided by the Hippocratic oath, these notes can
only be accessed by respective doctors.
O.6 Medical doctors are allowed to read patients’ laboratory results, radiology images
and send patients’ laboratory requests.
O.7 A medical doctor is allowed to order prescription if a patient is inpatient and
the location where request was generated is a clinic area.
O.8 A nurse is only allowed to view diagnosis of inpatients under his or her care. A
nurse is not allowed to view diagnosis of outpatients while visiting a clinic.
O.9 A registered nurse is allowed to view the diagnosis of an inpatient if a nurse is
located in the same hospital unit as the patient. That is, a paediatric nurse is
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allowed to view medical records of patients receiving treatments in paediatric
ward.
O.10 Radiologists are allowed to view information of their respective patients based
on their level of work and assigned privileges.
O.11 Pharmacists are allowed to view prescriptions, to access pharmacy store databases
as well as to check pharmaceutical stock.
O.12 Registered pharmacists are allowed to view the pharmacy database as well as
stock information based on the grants provided at their levels.
O.13 A system administrator cannot add medical entries to healthcare information
system of the hospital. A system administrator can, however, set-up and main-
tain user accounts, maintain system and monitor performance of the system,
among others.
O.14 A system administrator cannot view private notes written by doctors for their
patients, and also they cannot sign legal agreement on behalf of patients.
O.15 A system administrator is allowed to add a new patient to the system and start
or update the care plan of the patient. This is only possible after consultation
with the patient or the patient’s representative (as permitted by law).
O.16 To address the scarcity of healthcare professionals in the Tanzania’s healthcare
sector, it is common to find professionals providing healthcare services to pa-
tients with whom they do not have a doctor-patient relationship. This access
rule is supported in this thesis by extending role based access control with con-
texts and obligations to allow healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in
an accountable manner.
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Based on the examination of legislation, national electronic health initiatives, contexts
and organisational rules, this chapter aims to develop a new methodology for gathering
comprehensive access control requirements for the healthcare domain, named COIL.
The COIL methodology, is discussed in Section 4.3, and includes four main elements,
i. contexts (as discussed in Section 4.2.3) ii. organisational rules (in Section 4.2.4) iii.
e-health initiatives (in Section 4.2.2) and, iv. legislative rules (in Section 4.2.1).
4.3 The COIL Methodology
To devise comprehensive access control requirements that are appropriate in a Tan-
zania healthcare system, this research began by examining legislation and national
e-health initiatives from selected countries, including United Kingdom, Singapore,
Australia and Tanzania. This research also extracted specific contexts from the Tan-
zania healthcare system and also gathered access rules from its healthcare organi-
sations. The specifications from these four parts were then combined to develop a
new methodology for gathering access control requirements named COIL (that is,
Contexts,
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Table 4.6: The components of the new COIL methodology (Source: Author)
CONTEXTS
1. Subject Contexts
2. Object Contexts
3. Environment Contexts
• Location
• Time
4. Health-related Contexts
• Female Genital Mutilation
• Gender Based Violence
• Abortion
• Non-Surgical Amputation of Limbs on People
with Albinism
• Throwing away of Newborns
• Raping
• House Burning
• Narcotic Drug Use
• Vigilantes
• Road Accidents
• Armed Robbery
• Clashes between Farmers and Pastoralists
• Clashes between Between Pastoralists
• Clashes between Clans
• Clashes between Political Parties
• Explosions
• Unidentified Person
ORGANISATIONAL RULES
1. A system administrator is allowed to delete medical
information of the patient. This access right is, how-
ever, restricted since legislation require medical records
to be retained for a certain period of time after the
patient has left the healthcare facility or die. Most
legislation state that, no one is allowed to delete the
medical records of the patient until the appropriate
data has expired.
2. A surgeon consultant is allowed to view theatre sched-
ules and make appointment for his or her patients. A
surgeon consultant is also allowed to read patient labo-
ratory results, send laboratory requests and access Pic-
ture Archiving and Communication System (PACS)
images of the patient.
3. A medical doctor is allowed to access medical informa-
tion of his or her patients. A medical doctor can add
and append to it entries to his or her patients’ medical
records.
4. Medical doctors are allowed to read patients’ labora-
tory results, radiology images and send patients’ labo-
ratory requests.
5. A medical doctor is allowed to order prescription if a
patient is inpatient and the location where request was
generated is a clinic area.
6. A nurse is only allowed to view diagnosis of inpatients
under his or her care. A nurse is not allowed to view
diagnosis of outpatient while visiting a clinic.
7. A registered nurse is allowed to view diagnosis of inpa-
tient if a nurse is located in the same hospital unit as
the patient. That is, a paediatric nurse is allowed to
view medical records of patients receiving treatments
in paediatric ward.
10. A system administrator can not add medical entries to
the healthcare information system of the hospital. A
system administrator can, however, set-up and main-
tain user accounts, maintain the system and monitor
the system performance, among others.
11. A system administrators can not view private notes
written by the doctors for their patients, and also they
can not sign legal agreement on behalf of patients.
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TANZANIA LEGISLATIVE RULES
1. Patients medical data should only be obtained from a
data subject (patient).
2. Patients medical data should only be collected and pro-
cessed by healthcare professionals or individuals who
are working on their behalf (known as data processors
in the European Directive on Data Protection).
3. The purpose(s) of medical data collection and process-
ing should be defined before any transactions. Any
changes in the original purpose should be communi-
cated to a data subject.
4. Healthcare professionals must obtain permission
(known as consent) from patient before undertaking
any medical procedures. The intended consent can be
verbal, non-verbal (such as raising a hand to agree) or
in writing, by signing a consent form.
5. An individual patient should be allowed to appoint a
representative who will be allowed to access medical
data on his or her behalf. The representative should
be treated in the same way as an individual whose
information is being processed.
6. Every person should be allowed to access their medical
data either directly, through a healthcare professional
or even through a representative as permitted by law.
7. Patients may request to review and rectify errors con-
cerning their medical data.
8. In any circumstance, correspondence between patient
and a healthcare professional should remain private.
9. Access to medical data may be refused, limited or de-
layed, if restricted by law.
10. There should be policies, legislation and procedures
that restrict, control or hamper patients access to in-
formation and services via the Internet and other com-
munication media.
11. Appropriate measures (administrative, technical and
physical) should be implemented so as to prevent med-
ical information from unauthorised access and modifi-
cation.
12. To deal with emergency accesses, which are common in
healthcare, healthcare providers are required to deter-
mine types of emergency situations that would require
access to information system or application that con-
tain Electronic Health Records (EHRs).
e-health INITIATIVES
1. User identification and authentication
2. Authorisation (Role-Based Access Control is com-
monly used in the domain)
3. Emergency Access Procedure
4. Auditing and Alerts
5. Patient Consent
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Organisational rules, national e-health Initiatives and Legislation). In case of con-
texts, health-related contexts were collected as part of a three-month observation
survey conducted at the Muhimbili National Hospital, and later verified by official
documents from ministries and agencies. The documents from the following ministries
and agencies were used: Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children
(MCDGC), Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW), Ministry of Home Af-
fairs (MoHA) and Surface and Marine Transport Regulatory Authority (SUMATRA).
Figure 4.1: COIL: A comprehensive access control requirements in healthcare (Source: Author)
The proposed COIL methodology, presented in Table 4.6 and its components sum-
marised in Figure 4.1, is a result of desk research and observation survey. It comprises
of legislative rules, from e-health legislation, and organisational rules that were set
out by the surveyed healthcare organisations to govern internal procedures and oper-
ations. While contexts results from an observation survey conducted in the year 2012
in the Tanzania healthcare system, the privacy and security capabilities came from an
analysis of national e-health initiatives. Based on where elements of these four main
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components came from, legislative rules and privacy and security capabilities can be
adopted by others conducting research in access control requirements in healthcare,
while contexts (particularly, health-related contexts) and organisational rules could
be specified based on domain-specific information.
Table 4.7: Gathering access control requirements using COIL methodology (Source: Author)
Component Item(s) Yes [X], No [×]
Contexts
Privacy and Security
Capabilities
User identification
and authentication
Authorisation
Emergency access
procedure
Auditing and alerts
Legislative rules
Organisational rules
Contrary to the research work by Beznosov (1998) and Alhaqbani & Fidge (2007)
where only organisational access rules have been identified and used in to the design
of their access control models for the healthcare domain, this thesis presents a new
methodological methodology named COIL for gathering comprehensive access con-
trol requirements. The COIL methodology supports the continuity of care through
enforcement of accountable sharing of electronic health records. The access control
requirements discussed in this section can also be used as a guideline to evaluate the
design of an access control system (using a check list as shown in Table 4.7).
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Table 4.8: Access control requirements for the Tanzania healthcare system, using COIL Methodology
No.
COIL
contexts privacy and
security
capabilities
legislative
rules
organisational
rules
1. × X × X
2. X X X X
3. X X X X
4. X × X X
5. X X × X
6. X X × X
7. X × × X
8. × X X –
9. × × X X
10. × X X X
To test the validity of the four elements of the proposed COIL methodology, system
administrators (labelled with numbers 1 to 10 in Table 4.8) from ten distinct hospitals
in Tanzania were asked to evaluate the proposed methodology by choosing either a
tick or an x in what they considered as either appropriate or inappropriate category
for access control requirements in the healthcare domain. As shown in a summary of
results of its evaluation presented in Table 4.8, organisational rules was selected by
most of the respondents (90 percent). While 70 percent of the respondents indicated
privacy and security capabilities from national e-health initiatives as more relevant,
60 percent selected contexts. Furthermore, 60 percent of the respondents selected
legislative rules.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter has discussed the development of a new methodology, named COIL,
for gathering comprehensive access control requirements for the healthcare domain.
The newly developed COIL methodology is a combination of four different areas of
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research that might affect access to electronic health records. These include: contexts,
privacy and security capabilities, legislation as well as rules that govern procedures
and operation within the healthcare organisation. The chapter began with an analysis
of legislation from United States of America, Europe and, at last, Tanzania that have
been designed to control access to electronic healthcare information. From this first
set of the review, it was found out that Tanzania is in a process of establishing three
cyber security laws (that is, Data Protection and Piracy Act, Computer Crime and
Cybercrime, and Electronic Transactions) that will strengthen electronic healthcare
adoption and create a foundation for specific electronic healthcare regulations in the
country.
Further investigation on national electronic health initiatives yielded several privacy
and security capabilities purposely proposed to control access to electronic healthcare
information. These are user identification and authentication, authorisation (espe-
cially, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model which has been widely adopted and
used in the domain), an implementation of functions for emergency access procedure,
auditing and alerts together with patient consent. To test its validity and to show
how the developed COIL methodology could be used, the chapter also contains results
of the evaluation of the proposed methodology. From the list of privacy and security
capabilities addressed in this chapter, Chapter 5 develops a new context-based access
control model, called Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) which sup-
ports the continuity of care through enforcement of an accountable sharing of medical
records.
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Chapter 5
The RoC-BAC Model
This chapter presents a new access control model called Role and Context-Based Ac-
cess Control (RoC-BAC), which enables access to patient information in the healthcare
domain with consideration of changes in contexts. The proposed model is an extension
of the traditional Role-Based Access Control model with contexts and obligations, and
thus it provides fine grained and flexible access for both frequent and infrequent access
requests. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the
chapter. Section 5.2 presents the new RoC-BAC model, where its components and
relations are discussed followed by its formal definition using mathematical notations.
Section 5.3 presents a descriptive example of how RoC-BAC can be used in a Tanzania
healthcare system and Section 5.4 concludes the chapter.
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5.1 Introduction
Many access decisions in critical emergency systems are usually influenced by indi-
vidual characteristics and choices. The highly dynamic nature of some environments
has, however, introduced new challenges to protected resources. Privacy and security
is one of the main issues in critical emergency systems as sensitive information can be
accessed or acquired without proper authorisation. As pointed out in Chapter 1, Sec-
tion 1.3.2 , the main aim of this thesis is to design a new context-based access control
model that allows healthcare workers to bypass access rules in an accountable man-
ner in case of unexpected (emergency) situation. The proposed RoC-BAC model is
an extension of the conventional, policy-neutral, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
model with contexts and obligations. In addition to being fine-grained, RoC-BAC
model is dynamic, flexible and scalable and incorporates procedures for emergency
access requests.
The reason behind a decision to incorporate health-related contexts into RBAC lies
on accumulating evidence available on the existing literature. Many researchers in
Ubiquitous Computing, where context has been thoroughly studied, point out that,
when context is appropriately incorporated into an existing access control solution, the
resulting model may improve security in critical applications. Consider the significance
of context in a military base as an example of improvement in security. Normally in
a military base, a user is allowed to fire a missile if that user is assigned a certain
role (for example, a top secret commander) and a user is in a specific high security
location at a certain time only. Consequently, a missile can be fired only when it is
in a certain location at a certain time. By adding location and temporal constraints
in access decision, additional verification checks are henceforth included that must be
satisfied before an individual user is granted access to fire a missile.
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Break-The-Glass (BTG) procedure is a significant approach for extending access priv-
ileges for a user who does not have access to certain information so as to gain access
when necessary (Brucker & Petritsch, 2009). The procedure draws its name from
breaking the glass to activate a fire alarm. The healthcare systems that contains
primary source data (information) for treatment must therefore develop, document,
implement and test BTG procedures that would be used in the event when healthcare
professionals require unexpected (emergency) access to those records. These systems
must have a clearly stated and widely understood procedure for allowing access using
an alternate or manual method. It should be noted that, the usage of emergency ac-
cess rights facilitated by BTG approach needs to be documented for later audits and
reviews. As discussed by National Electrical Manufacturers Association et al. (2004),
examples of infrequent situations that may require BTG and logging could be
i When user experiences account problems such as forgotten username or password
or both (after an extended absence or vacation), locked password (as a result of
mistyping many times) and even no user account (e.g. a clinician from another
organisation or a new clinician is assisting in facility during an emergency)
ii. When there is an authentication problem including failure of the Central Au-
thentication System server, smart card or biometrics reader failure (that is, when
a smart card reader or biometric is damaged), and
iii. When there are authorisation problems, including an emergency situation which
thrusts an individual user into a role where he or she lacks sufficient access rights
(for example, an administrative assistant is entering orders during emergency).
As acclaimed by Ferreira et al. (2009), another reason for an implementation of BTG
procedure in healthcare is that access control policies are defined with “maximum free-
dom of access” and “maximum user responsibility” in order to ensure that nothing
interferes with the delivery of care. To guarantee maximum freedom of access, infor-
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mation systems in healthcare must provide mechanisms for users to access requested
information any time, whenever the need arises. With maximum responsibility, sys-
tems in healthcare must provide a mechanism that offers additional information such
as an alert making users requesting access to be aware that, the user is trying to access
unauthorised information under normal healthcare settings or even through a call for
help from other qualified people. Abstractly, this makes an individual user requesting
such access to information responsible for what user is doing and may subsequently
be held accountable. The system must also provide a mechanism that automatically
notifies all responsible parties in relation to that access so that user’s actions can be
justified afterwards.
To address this and other significant access control requirements for the healthcare
domain as discussed in Chapter 4, this Chapter discusses a new context-based access
control model called Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC), that allows
healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in an accountable manner in case of
unexpected (emergency) requests. With the proposed model, a new concept called
health-related contexts is introduced. Section 5.2 discusses a new Role and Context-
Based Access Controll (RoC-BAC) model.
5.2 RoC-BAC Model
The Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) model is an extension of the
traditional Role-Based Access Control model with the notion of health-related con-
texts and obligations. The model has been designed to allow healthcare professionals
to bypass access rules in an accountable manner in case of unexpected (emergency)
requests.
This section is organised as follows: Section 5.2.1 defines components and relations
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that make up a RoC-BAC model, and Section 5.2.2 presents operation types in RoC-
BAC. Section 5.2.3 presents its formal definition and Section 5.2.4 discusses an aug-
mentation of obligations into the model.
5.2.1 RoC-BAC: Definition of Components and Relations
This section defines components as well as relations in RoC-BAC model. To allow
context-based access in healthcare, the RoC-BAC model incorporates health-related
contexts in its access decisions so as to allow healthcare professionals to bypass access
rules, and hence to support the continuity of care.
RoC-BAC model comprises of the following components:
• Users (U) denote entities requesting access to objects. They may include human beings, pro-
cesses, machines, networks or autonomous agents. Mathematically, U = { u1, u2, . . . , ui} de-
notes a set of users.
• Roles (R) represent organisational job functions with clear definition of inherent responsibility
and authority. The concept of roles, as is used in this thesis, is adopted from the RBAC model
where users are assigned to roles (user roles) and roles are associated with permissions (per-
mission roles). In RoC-BAC, however, roles represent a combination of user roles (UR) and
context roles (CR), as such R ⊆ 2(UR× CR)
• An object (OBJ) is a passive entity that contains or receives information. A set of objects
(OBJ) is represented mathematically as, OBJ= {obj1, obj2, . . . , objj},
• An operation (OPS) is an execution of a program-specific function that is invoked by the user.
OPS = {ops1, ops2, . . . , opsk}, denotes a set of operations recognised by the system.
• Context (C) is defined as a set of variables that define a situation (Federenko et al., 2004).
Contrary to traditional access control models that do not take into account contexts in de-
termining whether access should be allowed or not, RoC-BAC offers a context-centric access
control solution, that allow system administrators to define permissions based on the relevant
contexts. Mathematically, C = {c1, c2, . . . , cx}. For access control purposes, contexts in this
thesis are categorised in four groups:
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1. Subject Contexts (SC): define contexts that must be exercised by the subject in order
to obtain access rights to an object or resource. In RoC-BAC, subject contexts are used
to determine access rights for an entity requesting access privileges. They may include
the subject’s role, identity, credentials, name, organisation that the subject is affiliated
with, activity, location, and task (Omary et al., 2011).
2. Object Contexts (OC): An object is a passive entity that is acted upon by a subject.
Similar to subjects, objects contain contexts that can be used to control their accesses.
Object Contexts (OC) refer any object-related information that can be used to char-
acterise the situation in which the protected object was created and its current status,
which is relevant for making an access control decision.
3. Environment Contexts (EC): Environment Contexts describe operational, technical, and
even situational contexts at the time a transaction takes place. They may include current
date and time, temperature, network’s security level, air quality, light level, noise level.
These factors are neither associated with a subject nor a resource, but may nevertheless
be relevant in controlling access (Omary et al., 2011).
4. Health-related Contexts (HC): define the healthcare domain specific contexts that would
be evaluated by an access control system during access decision. From a list provided
in Chapter 4, some of the health-related contexts from the Tanzania healthcare system
include Gender-Based Violence (GBV), Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), non-surgical
amputation of limbs for people with albinism, clashes between: pastoralist groups, pas-
toralist and farmers, among others. Even though the main aim of this thesis is to extend
the traditional RBAC model with health-related contexts; these four groups can further
be used to define context roles in RoC-BAC, and thus extending the traditional RBAC
model with contexts.
• User Roles (UR) represent a set of user roles. User role is similar to “role” or “subject role”
as used in a traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model.
• Context Roles (CR) describe a set of context roles. It is used to capture relevant contexts
that can be used in RoC-BAC policies. In addition to health-related context roles, RoC-BAC
also contains time-based context roles, location-based context role and location and time-based
context roles, which are part of environment contexts. Typically, CR ⊆ UR
• Permission (P) is an approval to perform an operation on one or more objects. Permission (P)
= {p1, p2, . . . , pw}, is a set of permissions in a system such that P = 2OPS×OBJ . PermOp-
eration: ops(p : P ) → {ops ⊆ OPS}, is a permission-to-operation mapping which gives a set
of operations associated with a permission p. PermObject: Obj(p : P ) → {obj ⊆ OBJ}, a
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permission-to-object mapping which gives a set of objects associated with permission p.
• Session (S) represents a set of sessions. Usually, a role is activated for a user during each
session. Activated Role (AR) is a mapping between user roles (UR) and Context Roles (CR).
The RoC-BAC model consists of several relations, including User Assignment (UA),
Permission Assignment (PA) and Context Role Assignment (CRA). These relations
define associations between users, user roles, permission roles and context roles.
• User Assignment (UA): UA ⊆ U × R, a many-to-many mapping that assigns a user role to a
user.
• Context Role Assignment (CRA) is a mapping that assigns context to a user role, such that
CRA ⊆ UR× C
• Permission Assignment (PA): PA ⊆ P ×R, a many-to-many mapping that assigns permissions
to a role.
• assigned users(ur : UR) → 2U , mapping of user role “ur” onto a set of users. Formally:
assigned users(ur) = { u ∈ U | (u, ur) ∈ UA}
• assigned permissions(r : R) → 2P , mapping of role “r” onto a set of permissions. Formally:
assigned permissions = { p ∈ PRMS | (p, r) ∈ PA}
• User Sessions: user sessions(u : U) → 2S , is a mapping of user u onto a set of sessions.
• Session Roles: session roles (s : S) → 2R, is a mapping of session “s” onto a set of roles.
Formally: session roles(si) ={r ∈ R | (user sessions(si), r) ∈ UA}
• avail session perms(s : S) → 2P , denotes permissions available to a user in a session =⋃
r∈session roles(s)
assigned permissions(r)
5.2.2 RoC-BAC Operations
There are several types of operation that can be performed on RoC-BAC components.
Some of the important operation types are presented in Table 5.1.
For the users of the system, three operations (create, update and delete) can be per-
formed during either registration to use the system, profile update and in case of user
quitting his or her job as part of the organisation. Similarly, roles can be created,
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Table 5.1: RoC-BAC Operation Types
Component Operation Types Remarks
User create, read, update,
delete
These operations can be performed on users
of the system either during user registration,
profile update or even in case of user quitting
Role create, read, update,
delete
A role is a job function or job title within the
organisation. They can be created, read,
updated and deleted on request
Location create, read, update,
delete
Location is regarded as part of environment
context, and are independent of subjects and
objects contexts . Location is, however,
associated with both subjects and objects.
Timing create, read, update,
delete
Similar to location, timing is part of
environment context where both subjects and
objects can be manipulated
Health-related
Context
create, read, update,
delete
A health-related context is a type of context
that allows specification of a health-related
reason in an access control policy.
Health-related contexts allow healthcare
professionals to bypass access rules in an
accountable manner thus ensure the
continuity of care. They can be created,
updated or deleted
Permission create, read, update,
delete
A permission on patient records in a
RoC-BAC model can be manipulated using
four operations: create, read, update and
delete
Session define, detect,
permission right
A session is defined beforehand, permission
rights are detected for a session and finally
patient information can be obtained and
returned
updated or deleted on request. In case of health-related contexts, users of the system
are allowed to specify (create) a health-related reason while trying to bypass access
rules. These contexts may also be updated or deleted by the system administrator.
Contrary to other categories of context, health-related contexts together with obliga-
tions help ensure the continuity of care while at the same time enforcing accountability
to healthcare professionals.
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5.2.3 Formal Definition
Figure 5.1: RoC-BAC: Role and Context-Based Access Control model (Source: Author)
The RoC-BAC model, shown in Figure 5.1, has the following components:
• U, R, C, UR, CR, OPS, OBJ, P and S (represents users, roles, context, user roles, context
roles, operations, objects, permissions and sessions respectively).
• UA ⊆ U ×R, many-to-many mapping of user onto user role assignment relation.
• assigned users(ur : UR) → 2U , the mapping of user role “ur” onto a set of users. Formally:
assigned users(ur) = { u ∈ U | (u, ur) ∈ UA}
• R ⊆ 2(UR× CR), set of roles
• PA ⊆ P ×R, many-to-many permission-to-role assignment relation.
- assigned permissions(r : R) → 2P , mapping of role “r” onto a set of permissions. Formally:
assigned permissions = { p ∈ PRMS | (p, r) ∈ PA}
• user sessions(u : U) → 2S , mapping of user “u” onto a set of sessions.
• session roles (s : S)→ 2R, mapping of session “s” onto a set of roles. Formally: session roles(si) =
{r ∈ R | (user sessions(si), r) ∈ UA}
Definition 1. Context Role (CR) = { L CR, T CR, Hr CR}
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CR represents a set of Context Roles. They are used to capture context-relevant information for
RoC-BAC access policies. In addition to health-related context roles, which introduced in this the-
sis through a notion of health-related contexts, RoC-BAC model also supports the specification of
location-based context roles ( L CR) and time-based context roles (T CR). The context roles share
similar characteristics with user roles, which are defined in a traditional RBAC model, such as role
activation and deactivation.
• Definition 1.1. L CR (Location-based Context Roles)
Location-based Context Roles L CR) is a pair (r, l) where r denotes a user role name and l is
the current position of a user role.
• Definition 1.2. T CR (Time-based Context Roles)
Similar to location, Time-based Context Roles is a pair (r, time) where r is a user role name
and t is the current time of a user role.
• Definition 1.3. Hr CR (Health-related Context Roles)
A Health-related Context Role (Hr CR) is a pair (r, hr) where r is a user role name and hr rep-
resents a patient’s current health condition which requires healthcare professionals’ attention,
thus referred as a health-related reason for access.
Definition 2: Authorisations
Location-based authorisations are policies that define accesses that users may have over certain lo-
cations. While temporal authorisations limit periods of time during which an authorisation is valid,
health-related authorisations define accesses that users may have in case of an unexpected emergency.
Formally, they are defined as follows:
• Definition 2.1: L-Auth (Location Authorisation)
A location authorisation is a pair ((s, r), l) where
– s denotes a subject who requests authorisation
– l is a location
– r is a role that subject s can be assigned when in location l
A location authorisation ((s, r), l) means that subject s is authorised to gain role r when in
location l. ((Anne, Nurse), Ward) denotes that Anne has a role Nurse when she is in a hospital
ward.
• Definition 2.2: Ti Auth (Temporal Authorisation)
A temporal authorisation is a quadruple ((s, r), t ((tis, t
i
e], (t
o
s,t
o
e]), n) where
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– Time interval [tis, t
i
e] is an entry duration during which a subject can gain role r to access
object o
– Time interval [tos,t
o
e] denotes an exit duration during which a subject s will revoke a role,
such that tos ≥ tis and toe ≥ tie
– n is the number of accesses that a subject can exercise n ∈ [1,∞)
A temporal authorisation ((Anne, Nurse), (8, 17], (17, 8], 50) means Anne is allowed to acti-
vate role Nurse between (8:00, 17:00) and a role will be revoked fifty times during (17:00, 8:00)
interval.
• Definition 2.3: LoT Auth (Spatial Temporal Authorisation)
RoC-BAC also specifies spatial temporal authorisation where policies contain both location
and time-related information. A spatial temporal authorisation is defined as ((s, r), ops, obj,
t ((tis, t
i
e], (t
o
s,t
o
e]), l) where
– s, r, ops and obj represent subject, role, operation and object respectively
– l is a location
A spatial temporal authorisation ((s, r), ops, obj, ftime, etime, l) semantically means a subject
s with role r can perform operation ops on object obj under temporal condition ftime and etime
and location condition l.
• Definition 2.4: Hr Auth (Health-related Authorisations)
A health-related authorisation is a pair ((s, r), hr) where
– s represents a subject who requests an authorisation and
– r represents a role which s can activate
– hr is a health-related context that subject s can specify to access records of the patient
A health-related authorisation ((Anne, Nurse), FGM) means Anne has a role Nurse but can
also activate contextual role FGM when there is a new case to be attended in a respective
health facility.
Definition 3: RoC-BACA (RoC-BAC Authorisation)
RoC-BAC authorisation is defined as RoC-BACA (Hr Auth (L Auth (T Auth))) where
• L Auth denotes location authorisation
• T Auth denotes temporal authorisation
• Hr Auth denotes health-related authorisation.
Definition 4: RoC-BAC Authorisation rule
The RoC-BAC authorisation rule is defined by the tetrad (s, R Auth, obj, m)
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• s denotes a subject (user) requesting access
• R Auth is a RoC-BAC authorisation
• obj is an authorised object
• m represents an access mode which can either be read or write.
Using the formal definition of Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC)
model presented in this Section; to allow easy understanding of the model, a descriptive
example on how RoC-BAC can be used is presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.2.4
discusses an augmentation of obligations in RoC-BAC model.
5.2.4 Augmenting Obligations
One limitation of traditional access control mechanisms is their inability to provide
users with obligations as a result of executing permitted action. This major weakness
may result in the compromise of integrity or security of the system as system integrity,
for instance, requires that certain actions performed in a system should always be fol-
lowed by other action(s) within a limited time frame (Minsky & Lockman, 1985). The
RoC-BAC model is, therefore, augmented with obligations that are often imposed by
either operational rules, modern corporation regulations or privacy laws. Obligations
specify actions that must be fulfilled in conjunction with an authorisation decision
(permit or deny) when an access rule is triggered to maintain accountability. Fig-
ure 5.2 presents a RoC-BAC model augmented with obligations in order to maintain
accountability in the system.
The following four enhancements has been applied to the formal RoC-BAC model
1. A new basic element called OBGS representing a set of valid obligations is
introduced. In this thesis, obligation is defined as tasks that must be fulfilled by
the system, and they are associated with permissions allocated to roles. They
are categorised as pre-obligations, post-obligations, conditional obligations or
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Figure 5.2: An augumentation of RoC-BAC model with obligations
repeating obligations. In this regard, the RoC-BAC model is augmented with
post-obligations so as to allow healthcare professionals to access medical records
in time, and thus ensure the continuity of care.
2. A new relation called Obligation Permission (OPRMS) is introduced. It rep-
resents a relation between permissions (P) and obligations (OBGS), such that
OPRMS ⊆ P×2OBG. For oprms = (prms, obgs) ∈ OPRMS, means oprm is an
obligation augmented permission which specifies if permission prm is exercised,
a set of obligations obg should be fulfilled.
3. Permission Assignment (PA) relation is modified and a new relation called
Permission-Obligation Assignment (POA) is defined. Formally, POA ⊆ ROLES×
OPRMS . For p = (r, oprms) ∈ PA, it means role r is allocated with obligation
augmented permission oprm.
4. To retrieve obligations with authorisation decisions, CheckAccess function is
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modified into (Zhao et al., 2007)
CheckAccess : SESSIONS,OPS,OBJ → BOOL× 2OBG
The possible combination between authorisation elements and results from Check-
Access function are as follows:
• (FALSE, φ)→ DENY access to a resource
• (FALSE,2OBG) → DENY access to a resource AND perform obligations on DENY
• (TRUE, φ)→ GRANT access to a resource
• (TRUE, 2OBG) → GRANT access to a resource and perform obligations on GRANT
5.3 Use Case
Using the formal definition of the RoC-BAC model presented Section 5.2.3 (sum-
marised in Figure 5.1), a descriptive example of its usage in a Tanzania healthcare
system is discussed herein. This descriptive use case is written in order to allow an
easy understanding of the model, and how it can be used in case of an infrequent
access request.
1. Taking into consideration that an electronic healthcare information system used in this example
processes patient information, and for each patient, the system stores three fields: name, age
and Blood Group (BG) type. Mathematically, each patient is presented as
Patient(Name, Age, Blood Group (BG))
2. Components:
• Users (U) = {Anne, Bob, John}
• Contexts (C) = { Location (L), Time (T), Health-related (Hr) } C = { L={Operating
Room (OR), Ward, Intensive Care Unit (ICU)}, T= {Day, Evening, Night }, Hr=
{Ebola, Explosion, FGM, GBV} }
Since healthcare is a 24-hour service in almost every aspect, time is therefore divided
into three intervals to allow allocation of shifts to healthcare professionals. These are:
day shift (from 8:00 a.m to 2:00 p.m), evening shift (from 2:01 p.m. to 10:00 p.m) and
a night shift (from 10:01 p.m to 7:59 a.m.). These intervals specify different times a role
can be activated. That is, different roles in the same time interval would own different
access rights, and the same role in different time intervals would be authorised different
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access rights.
• In RoC-BAC, a role is associated with contexts, and thus, role is a combination of user
roles and context roles. Mathematically, R = {UR ∪ CR}
• User Role (UR) = {Nurse, Clinical Assistant (CA), Doctor}
• Context (C) = {Operating Room (OR), Intensive Care Unit (ICU), Ebola, Explosion,
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)}
• Context Role (CR) = {(OR, Nurse), (ICU, Nurse), (Ebola, Nurse), (Explosion, Nurse),
(FGM, Nurse), (OR, CA), (ICU, CA), (Ebola, CA), (Explosion, CA), (FGM, CA), (OR,
Doctor), (ICU, Doctor), (Ebola, Doctor), (Explosion, Doctor), (FGM, Doctor)}
• R = {Nurse, Clinical Assistant (CA), Doctor, (OR, Nurse), (ICU, Nurse), (Ebola,
Nurse), (Explosion, Nurse), (FGM, Nurse), (OR, CA), (ICU, CA), (Ebola, CA), (Ex-
plosion, CA), (FGM, CA), (OR, Doctor), (ICU, Doctor), (Ebola, Doctor), (Explosion,
Doctor), (FGM, Doctor)}
• Operation (OPS) = {read, update}
• Object (OBJ) = {Name, Age, Blood Group (BG)}
• Permission (P)= {read-Name, read-Age, read-BG, update-Name, update-Age, update-
BG}
• Session = {s1}
3. Session Assignment
• user (s1) = {Anne}
• session role = {(Ebola, Nurse)}
4. Other Assignments
• User Assignment (UA) = {Anne, (Ebola, Nurse)}
• Permission Assignment (PA) = {(read-Name, Nurse), (read-Age, Nurse), (read-Blood
Group, Doctor)}
• Context Role Assignment (CRA) = {(FGM, Nurse), (FGM, Doctor), (GBV, Nurse),
(Explosion, Nurse), (Ebola, Nurse)}
5. Assignment Process
Step 1: Role of the User: From Anne’s role, Nurse, a set of permission rights to access patient
information are identified
Step 2: Specification of Context: If the user needs further roles that are associated with context,
a new window is displayed requesting the user to specify Context (referred as reasons for access
in a Context- Enhanced Access in a Tanzania Healthcare (CEATH) system).
Step 3: When context is specified, the system checks on whether that user is allowed to activate
such a context role in that object.
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5.4 Conclusions
Information systems that assure accountable sharing of personal information are re-
quired in numerous domains, ranging from academic institutions, medical treatment,
air traffic control to disaster situations. Privacy and security in these domains depend
not only on user discretion or a role that user plays within an organisation, but also on
variables that define a situation (referred in this thesis as contexts). This chapter has
discussed a new context-based access control model, called Role and Context-Based
Access Control (RoC-BAC). The RoC-BAC model is an extension of the conventional
RBAC model with health-related contexts and obligations, and has been designed to
allow healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in an accountable manner so as
to ensure the continuity of care.
To address the inability of traditional access control mechanisms to provide users of
the system with obligations as a result of an execution of permitted action, RoC-
BAC model is further augmented with obligations where new elements and relations
are introduced. Particularly, a new basic element called obligations that represents
action(s) that must be fulfilled in conjunction with an authorisation decision is in-
troduced, together with a new relation called obligation permissions that represents
a relation between permissions and obligations. For easy understanding of the pro-
posed model, a descriptive example of its usage in a Tanzania healthcare system was
discussed in Section 5.3. Chapter 6 discusses prototype implementation of RoC-BAC
and RBAC models.
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Implementation of a Prototype
This chapter discusses an implementation of a prototype, named CEATH (Context-
Enhanced Access in a Tanzania Healthcare system), which implements the RoC-BAC
model. Although RoC-BAC model has already been explained and formally defined
in Chapter 5, this chapter addresses it in terms of technical software requirements
aimed at developing its prototype. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows.
Section 6.1 introduces the chapter with a thorough review on CEATH’s objective and
research methods. Section 6.2 discusses its architecture followed by data design models
in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 discusses CEATH’s implementation. The conclusion of the
chapter in Section 6.5.
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6.1 Introduction
This first section of the chapter presents the realisation of Role and Context-Based
Access Control (RoC-BAC) model in terms of prototype implementation. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 5, the proposed RoC-BAC model is an extension of the traditional
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with the notion of health-related contexts.
Particularly, health-related contexts are integrated into the traditional Role-Based
Access Control model to allow healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in an
accountable manner in case of infrequent access requests so as to ensure the continu-
ity of care. The prototype discussed in this chapter was implemented to demonstrate
the applicability of RoC-BAC model and also to measure overheads in execution time
introduced by different relations and assignments.
Objectives
As pointed in Chapter 1, in this thesis, a prototype has been implemented in order to
achieve two main objectives. These are:
• To experiment and verify that the proposed RoC-BAC model is practical
• To evaluate overheads introduced in execution time by different relations and as-
signments
Software Methodology
In this research, two software development methodologies were adopted for the imple-
mentation of Context-Enhanced Access in a Tanzania Healthcare (CEATH) system.
These are: incremental software development methodology, which involves an im-
plementation of a prototype divided into small sections so as to make manageable
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changes required during the development process, and prototyping. Since acceptance
of any information system depends on the involvement of its users during the software
development process, a prototyping method was then adopted for its implementa-
tion.Healthcare professionals from selected healthcare facilities in Tanzania, both pri-
vate and public, were involved during the requirements gathering stage. The following
steps were carried out in an incremental software development methodology:
• Requirements gathering,
• Analysis and design,
• Implementation,
• Testing,
• Deployment, and
• Evaluation
In addition to the researcher’s competency in using incremental software development
methodology in system development, the nature of this work also makes it more
promising for the chosen methodology.
To address challenges as well as deficiencies identified in a Tanzania healthcare sys-
tem that affect the continuity of care, the following generic research methods were
employed in this study:
• Interviews with healthcare professionals and system administrators at the Muhimbili
National Hospital (MNH) to gain an understanding of how electronic healthcare
systems are deployed and used in Tanzania. This part of the research work also
involved a survey questionnaire to identify current electronic healthcare systems
implemented in Tanzania mainland together with their access control mechanisms.
These methods were discussed in Chapter 2.
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• A review of literature on best practices concerning access control for different do-
mains (including healthcare), as discussed in Chapter 3.
• Analysis of selected legislative and national e-health initiative documents which are
relevant in terms of controlling access to EHRs. Among others, this investigation
included an analysis of legislative documents from Europe, United States of America
(USA) and Tanzania. The review also covered national e-health initiatives from
United Kingdom, Singapore, Australia and Tanzania. This analysis is in Chapter
4.
• Revision and experimentation of open-source EHR systems with the purpose of gain-
ing an in-depth understanding of what the CEATH system should be like, what it
should do, and how it should perform. Chapter 7, therefore, discusses an evaluation
of the CEATH system, which implements RoC-BAC model (discussed in Chap-
ter 5), against a EMR-RBAC system that implements Role-Based Access Control
model. The CEATH system is based on appropriate access control requirements for
the healthcare domain discussed in Chapter 4.
6.2 Architecture of CEATH
In this section an architecture for Context-Enhanced Access in a Tanzania Health-
care (CEATH) system is discussed. This section is divided into two parts: Section
6.2.1 discusses the overall design goals and Section 6.2.2 discusses its architectural
components.
6.2.1 Design Goals
The core design goal for CEATH system is to keep its architecture as general as
possible and thus to address access control requirements identified in Chapter 4. The
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inclusion of authentication and context-based authorisation are the two design goals
defined for CEATH architecture design.
1. Authentication: Authentication is a prerequisite when designing an information
system that tries to establish access to protected resources (Evered & Bo¨geholz,
2004). To fulfil this requirement, an information system should contain a procedure
to verify that a person requesting access to a protected resource is the one who
she or he claims to be (Mercuri, 2004). However, despite its significance, it is
common for researchers in access control to make an assumption that a proper
authentication mechanism is already in place and thus shift their focus to just
authorisation. With the design of the CEATH system, a simple authentication
system that uses a combination of username and password was implemented in
order to authenticate users before accessing protected records.
2. Context-Based Authorisation: As pointed out in Chapter 3 and 4 in relation
to access control requirements for a healthcare system, such a system should be
able to grant or deny access based on available contexts pertaining to the time of
request. Since the main aim of this thesis is to design and develop a context-based
access control model that allows healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in
an accountable manner in case of infrequent (emergency) situations, health-related
contexts and obligations were incorporated in to the traditional RBAC model, to
make it fine-grained and flexible for dynamic environments. The incorporation
of health-related contexts in electronic healthcare system is expected to open up
the system and to allow it to cope with infrequent (emergency) health situations.
The health-related contexts used in this thesis were extracted from the Tanzania
healthcare system, which is used as a case study domain for this research.
In addition to authentication and context-based authorisation, this research also
addresses a number of access requirements that are specific to the healthcare do-
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main. These requirements have been identified by researchers in academia and
documented in various legislation, as discussed in Chapter 4.
• Emergency Handling: The healthcare domain follows the “care comes first
principle” where a patient’s health needs are to be put first before anything else.
With this principle in place, an access control system in a healthcare organisation
should be designed in such a way that critical emergency situations are handled
by overriding existing access rules. If there is a patient who was injured as a
result of a road accident, for instance; the nearest qualified healthcare profes-
sional should be able to access the patient’s basic electronic medical records and
provide appropriate care as seen appropriate. This act should be possible even
if it violates Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) or any traditional mechanism
implemented.
• Logging and Alerts: To keep track of all transactions in the system, all
access and access attempts to electronic medical records should be logged. While
health-related contexts open up the system, the logging and alerts feature would
enforce accountability to healthcare professionals by logging all transactions and
alert users with senior roles when a transaction with health-related contexts is
specified. In CEATH, logging is accomplished using an alerts module where
alerts are sent to either a system administrator or any pre-defined healthcare
professional with a senior role on any attempt(s) of healthcare workers to access
information beyond their specified rights.
• Legislation: To address legal and interoperability issues, an access control
system designed for any healthcare domain should comply with statutory and
technical standards. The proposed laws in Tanzania ( that is, Cyber Crime Laws,
which is a combination of Data Protection and Piracy Act, Computer Crime and
Cybercrime Act and Electronic Transaction Act), are expected to govern personal
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data protection (ITNews, 2013). These Acts, especially the Data Protection
and Piracy Act, are expected to be a motivation towards adoption and use of
electronic healthcare in Tanzania. The needs identified in these proposed laws in
Tanzania are also addressed in the proposed RoC-BAC model, and implemented
in the CEATH system.
6.2.2 Architectural Components
An architecture for the CEATH system (shown in Figure 6.1) is divided into three
parts, namely:
• Users layer
• Access Control layer and,
• Resources layer
The following is a step by step procedure to access medical records [numbered between
1-11 in Figure 6.1]
1. The user authenticates using a combination of username and password by sub-
mitting them in to an authentication system
2. The authentication system sends user identification information to the role man-
ager
3. The role manager sends the respective user’s role to the authentication system
4. The authentication system verifies the user’s identification information against
records stored in an authentication information database
5. After successful authentication, the role manager retrieves the respective user’s
role from the user/role permissions database
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Figure 6.1: A system architecture of the CEATH system (Source: Author)
6. If the user has requested to access medical records, an access request together
with the user’s role are sent to the authorisation engine
7. The access request is evaluated against a role-based authorisation policy at first,
and if such an access is allowed then access is granted. If not,
8. An authorisation engine sends a role to a context constraints database, and
9. Context constraints database sends context constraints information for the role
to an authorisation engine
10. An authorisation engine checks access rules in a Role and Context Based access
rules database
11. The authorisation engine retrieves requested medical records by requesting them
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from patients’ electronic medical records database
12. The requested medical records are sent to the user
The main components of the architecture are:
1. Authentication System: This system obtains user identification information
explicitly by user logging in to a system using provided username and password.
The system verifies the information submitted by the user against information
stored in an authentication information database, as shown in Figure 6.1. If au-
thentication information is valid, the system then allows an individual user to
request access to medical records through an Authorisation Engine. However, if
the information provided is wrong, an individual user will be prompted to enter
this information again for verification.
2. Authorisation Engine: An Authorisation Engine is the core component of
CEATH system which controls access to protected medical records. When a user
requests access to medical records, an authorisation engine has to perform several
tasks before issuing an access decision.
• At first, an Authorisation Engine obtains an access request and the user’s at-
tributes including authentication information for a user who wishes to perform a
transaction. It also requests dynamic context attributes associated with such a
user, including current location and current time of access, together with context
of the resource to be accessed. As shown in the architecture, this is performed
against a Context Constraints database
• An Authorisation Engine then checks with User/Role (also known as authori-
sation) database for any permissions that were defined for that user. To do
so, an authorisation engine checks to see whether the current user is autho-
rised to perform the requested action, by obtaining role and attributes-based
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access control rules. The engine then verifies constraints against information in
patients’ records. The authorisation engine is, henceforth, a component that
decides whether to grant or deny users of the system access to protected medical
records.
3. Resources: The resources layer contains databases that form the core part of
any electronic healthcare system. A database is defined as a software program that
permits storage and retrieval of information. There are various databases that store
different information in CEATH system. These include:
• Authentication Information: As its name suggests, an authentication in-
formation database stores users’ information used to verify whether the user
requesting access to the CEATH system is the one who they claim to be. In
fact, when a user requests to use CEATH system, by either creating, updat-
ing, reading or editing patient information, an individual user has to submit a
combination of pre-assigned username and password, that are verified using in-
formation stored in this database. Among others, this database contains user
identification, username, password and electronic mail address.
• User-Role Permissions: This database is also referred to as an authorisation
database, and it stores all permissible assignments of users to roles or activities
in CEATH system. The permissions to a role in a system are usually assigned
by the system administrator.
• Context Constraints: This database stores both users’ and objects’ attributes
that must be considered for authorisation purposes. Each context attribute in
a database consists of a “key-value” pair, such as “role = nurse”. The four
groups of contexts specified in RoC-BAC model are subject contexts, object
contexts, environment contexts (including location and time) and health-related
contexts. Some of the contexts that may be used with RoC-BAC model include
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user identification (user ID) that uniquely identifies the user, and is part of
subject contexts, role(s) and department to which user belongs which also belong
to subject contexts.
• Role and Context-Based (RoC-BAC) access rules: This database inter-
acts with an authorisation engine and stores access rules that are primarily used
to limit access to sensitive patients’ electronic medical records. When an autho-
risation engine receives an access request from the user, it then requests for all
access rules that are appropriate for such a request from Role and Context-Based
(RoC-BAC) access rules database. These access rules are administered by the
system administrator.
• Patients’ Electronic Medical Records: This is a database that contains
sensitive patients’ electronic medical records. In a complete system, this database
may include chart notes, laboratory results, medication lists and diagnosis-related
information lists. Similar to the RoC-BAC access rules, this database also com-
municates with an authorisation engine in order to allow the user access to re-
quested medical records.
6.3 Data Design
For an implementation of CEATH, three levels of system design were considered, using
models. These are: conceptual, logical and physical (involving the implementation of
the data model) model design. Since the complexity of design increases from logical
to physical, the design of CEATH began with the conceptual model (shown in Figure
6.2) so as to understand at high level different entities in the system and how they
relate to one another.
After a conceptual design, a logical model was designed so as to understand the details
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Figure 6.2: A conceptual design model for the CEATH system (Source: Author)
of the data without worrying about how they will actually be implemented (shown in
Figure 6.3).
Figure 6.3: A logical design model for the CEATH system (Source: Author)
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Its logical model contains twenty four entities and twenty six relations between entities
(numbered from 1 to 26). Lastly, a physical model was designed for the implementation
of the data model in a database. The entities and business assertions for the physical
design model are thoroughly discussed in Section 6.4.
6.4 Implementation
This section discusses the implementation of CEATH system, based on access control
requirements defined in Chapter 4 and a proposed context-based RoC-BAC model
formalised in Chapter 5.
6.4.1 Business Assertions
The following are business assertions in CEATH system.
Table 6.1: User table (Source: Author)
Field Type Null Key Default Extra
user id int(5) NO PRI NULL auto increment
username varchar(20) NO NULL
password varchar(30) NO NULL
full name varchar(50) NO NULL
email varchar(50) NO NULL
contact no bigint(15) NO NULL
role id int(2) NO MUL NULL
dept id int(2) NO MUL NULL
timing id int(2) NO MUL NULL
location id int(2) NO MUL NULL
parent user id int(5) NO NULL
allow override tinyint(1) YES NULL
1. First and foremost, the system needs to store data about users. For each user,
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it needs to store the user’s identification (id), username, password, full name
(full name), email address, telephone number, role identification, user’s depart-
ment, user’s shift where a user is allowed to access medical records in a system,
user’s allocated location and an identification of a senior user (in terms of a role).
The value of user identification (user id) is uniquely used to identify each user, as
shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.2: Department (Source: Author)
Field Type Null Key Default Extra
dept id int(2) NO PRI NULL auto increment
dept name varchar(30) NO UNI NULL
2. Since healthcare professionals work under departments, there is also a need for a
system to store information about each department in the healthcare organisation.
For each department, dept id is used to uniquely identify the department, and
department name (dept name), stores the full name of the department, as shown
in Table 6.2.
Table 6.3: Role (Source: Author)
Field Type Null Key Default Extra
role id int(2) NO PRI NULL auto increment
role name varchar(30) NO UNI NULL
3. As users are assigned to roles and roles (both user roles and context roles) are
associated with permissions, there is a need for a system to store information
about each role defined in a system. For each role, there is a role id which uniquely
identifies the role, and role name that stores the name given to a role.
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Table 6.4: Location (Source: Author)
Field Type Null Key Default Extra
location id int(3) NO PRI NULL auto increment
location name varchar(30) NO MUL NULL
loc ip address varchar(20) NO NULL
4. To control access within a health care facility using the proposed RoC-BAC model,
the system needs to store information about location. This entity is associated with
both user and permission. For each location, information stored includes location id
which uniquely identifies the location, location name and assigned ip-address.
Table 6.5: Timing (Source: Author)
Field Type Null Key Default Extra
timing id int(2) NO PRI NULL auto increment
timing name varchar(20) NO UNI NULL
start time time NO NULL
end time time NO NULL
5. For each timing specified in the CEATH system, the system needs to store unique
timing identification (timing id), timing name (assigned attribute for timing name),
the beginning (start time) and ending (end time).
Table 6.6: Operation (Source: Author)
Field Type Null Key Default Extra
operation id int(2) NO PRI NULL auto increment
operation name varchar(20) NO UNI NULL
6. The system is also required to store information about operations supported in
the system. For each operation, there is an operation identification (operation id)
which uniquely identifies each operation and an operation name which stores full
name of each operation.
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Table 6.7: Record Type (Source: Author)
Field Type Null Key Default Extra
record type id int(2) NO PRI NULL auto increment
record type name varchar(30) NO NULL
7. There are numerous types of records that can be stored in a single patient’s elec-
tronic medical record. The system, therefore, needs to store information in relation
to different record types. As shown in Table 6.7, a record type in CEATH was de-
fined using two attributes: record type id which uniquely identifies the record type
and record type name to store the name for each record type.
Table 6.8: Reason (Source: Author)
Field Type Null Key Default Extra
reason id int(2) NO PRI NULL auto increment
reason name varchar(30) NO NULL
8. To support the continuity of care in an accountable manner, this thesis proposes a
new Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) model by extending the
traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model using health-related con-
texts. To be able to use health-related contexts, the system needs to store informa-
tion about each health-related context (a reason is used to represent health-related
context) as specified by the use. For each reason, there is a reason name (rea-
son name) which stores the name for each health-related context condition and a
reason identification (reason id) which stores a unique value for each reason.
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Table 6.9: Permission (Source: Author)
Field Type Null Key Default Extra
permission id int(3) NO PRI NULL auto increment
role id int(3) NO MUL NULL
location id int(3) NO MUL NULL
timing id int(2) NO MUL NULL
operation id int(2) NO MUL NULL
record type id int(2) NO NULL
reason id int(2) NO NULL
is allowed tinyint(1) NO NULL
9. For each permission, the system needs to know each and every role requesting
access (role id), location from which access is requested (location id), time of access
(timing id), operation requested (operation id), type of record where its access
is requested (record type id) and health-related context condition through which
access is requested (reason id ). Permission identification (permission id) is used
to uniquely identify each permission.
Table 6.10: Notification (Source: Author)
Field Type Null Key Default Extra
notify id int(5) NO PRI NULL auto increment
from id int(5) NO NULL
to id int(5) NO NULL
record id int(5) NO NULL
record type id int(2) NO NULL
reason id int(2) NO NULL
other reason varchar(50) YES NULL
notify time datetime NO NULL
location id int(3) NO MUL NULL
10. For a healthcare professional who has accessed medical records of a patient who is
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not assigned access to (for instance when attending an emergency situation), the
system needs to be able to notify the user with a senior role (or anyone as assigned in
the system) such access in order to enforce accountability. The information stored
are presented in Table 6.10, and each notification contains identification of the user
who accessed the records (from id), parent user (to id) identification of the user
where such access is reported, record accessed (record id), type of record(s) accessed
(record type id), reason for access (reason id), time of notification (notify time)
and location of access (location id). The notify id is used to uniquely identify each
notification.
11. CEATH system was designed from the proposed RoC-BAC model which allows
healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in an accountable manner in case
of infrequent (emergency) situation. In this thesis, electronic healthcare has been
used as a study domain, and thus the system needs to store patients’ electronic
health records. For each patient, the system needs to store patient name, address,
contact telephone number (contact no), patient’s current doctor (curr doctor id),
patient’s previous doctor (prev doctor id), record types that are available in pa-
tient’s electronic health records (identified by the record type id), date for patient’s
last check up (last checkup date), as shown in Table 6.11. Each patient is uniquely
identified by patient identification number (patient id).
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Table 6.11: Patient (Source: Author)
Field Type Null Key Default Extra
patient id int(5) NO PRI NULL auto increment
patient name varchar(50) NO NULL
address varchar(250) NO NULL
contact no bigint(15) NO NULL
email varchar(50) YES NULL
curr doctor id int(5) NO MUL NULL
prev doctor id int(5) YES MUL NULL
record type id int(2) NO MUL NULL
last checkup date date YES NULL
Considering that CEATH implements Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-
BAC) model, which is an extension of the traditional Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) model with health-related contexts and obligations, its evaluation involves a
comparative performance analysis with a access control system built from a conven-
tional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model. As part of its design, Figure 6.4
presents the logical model for the EMR-RBAC model which implements the
Figure 6.4: Logical model for EMR-RBAC system which implements RBAC model
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traditional RBAC model, * indicates a many relationship.
6.4.2 The Prototype
A working prototype was developed using Java as a client side technology and PHP
as a server side technology. Some of the steps defined to pursue its development are
as follows:
• Creation of a dynamic website prototype with several web pages, including a specific
web page for system administrators, healthcare professionals and patients. Access
to each these pages is protected by authorisation policies.
• Add a health-related context page that is displayed to healthcare professionals when
an initial attempt to access medical records is rejected. The control over who is
entitled to specify health-related contexts during an access request is specified in
an authorisation policy. After a healthcare professional has successful specified an
allowed health-related context from an existing list in the system, patient’s medical
records should be displayed. The value of a health-related context needs to be
passed to an authorisation engine in each access decision, and any such transaction
is logged for accountability.
• Add patients electronic medical records in to the chosen MySQL database. The
dummy records were created using the dummy patients data obtained from the
Muhimbili National Hospital in Tanzania.
• Add a post obligation policy to health-related context operation. When a user with
medical doctor role has agreed to access protected records through the specification
of health-related context, an obligation should be set and activated whenever user
requests to access records that he or she is not normally authorised.
• An evaluation of CEATH system which implements RoC-BAC model against EMR-
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RBAC system which implements RBAC model.
6.4.3 Experimental Results
For implementation and evaluation, the two prototypes were deployed in a local server.
For the CEATH system, the deployed prototype contained the following:
Figure 6.5: Login page of the CEATH System
• The first publicly accessible page allows users to log in to the system. When a user
selects the home page button, a login screen shown in Figure 6.5 is presented. Each
user of the system needs to authenticate first using a combination of username and
password before accessing any records. The valid username, password together with
a role associated with each user will trigger an Authorisation Engine to check if such
a user can access requested patient records. After successful login, the logged in
user is then directed to either system administrator’s page (shown in Figure 6.6) or
healthcare professionals page.
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Figure 6.6: System administrator’s page in CEATH System
For users who have successfully logged in to the system, they are redirected to their
appropriate pages depending on their role category. This can either be system ad-
ministrator’s page, healthcare professional’s page or patient’s page. Offering patients’
access to their health records is out of scope of this thesis, and thus only two pages
are shown.
• If a user is restricted to access the requested medical records, a health-related
context page is returned. Consider, as an example, when an authenticated user
named Linda with a physiotherapist role, based in a physiotherapy department,
at the Amana hospital tries to access patient’s records from another department.
In this scenario, a context specific page, shown in Figure 6.7, will be displayed
and the user is required to select a reason behind request to access restricted
medical records. If the user is not allowed to access records with specification of
health-related context, a rejection page will be returned.
• If a user carries out access by accepting accountability to what he or she has
requested to access by specifying a health-related context (named reason), as
shown in Figure 6.8, CEATH’s Authorisation Engine is then asked to confirm
if such a user can specify health-related context on a specified resource. If the
answer is GRANT, a set of obligations is returned and a page with confidential
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Figure 6.7: Access with health-related context specification
medical records is displayed.
Figure 6.8: Obligation Confirmation
To enforce accountability, CEATH system maintains an access log with infor-
mation on who has accessed patient records, as shown in Figure 6.9.
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Figure 6.9: Access log from CEATH
To make sure that healthcare professionals and other healthcare workers are held
accountable for their decisions to access medical records, it is necessary for notifications
to be sent to a senior role when an individual user requests to access protected records
through health-related context specification. The number of context specific accesses
in the system are logged, and system administrators can then learn from them so as to
improve the system and also to reduce the number of infrequent accesses in future by
creating and implementing access rules for them. Figure 6.10 presents a notification
page from CEATH system.
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Figure 6.10: Notifications
6.4.4 Health-related Context Variable
Two tables were created and stored in a database to hold information about users of
the system and patients’ medical records. The users’ table holds information about
the user including a user’s assigned unique id, username, password, contact no, email,
role(s) assigned to a user, department to which user belongs, assigned location, timing
as well as a user with a senior role. The patients’ table holds information about the
patient. This includes patient unique identification, patient name, address, contact
number, email, identification of the current and previous doctor(s), type of records in
EHR and patient’s last check-up date.
187
6.4 Implementation
Figure 6.11: Permissions
To allow healthcare professionals to be able to bypass access rules, a context variable
named “allowed” was created. This variable has NULL as a default value and can be
specified by a system administrator. To be able to set or reset the context boolean
variable state for users of the system, an administrative interface was created that
allowed a system user with a system administrator role to set or reset the variable
manually to either TRUE or FALSE, as shown in Figure 6.11.
6.4.5 EMR-RBAC
To provide complete management of authorisation data in the EMR-RBAC system,
which implements Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Yii’s Role-Based Manager
(RBAM) was used. RBAM contains an authorisation item (auth item, shown in
Figure 6.12), which is a fundamental concept behind the implementation of Role-
Based Access Control via a browser interface. Generally, the RBAC model in RBAM
is implemented in terms of roles, tasks and operations. A role is a collection of tasks,
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operations and other roles. An operation is a single action on an object, and a task
is a collection of operations. Through authorisation items, a system administrator in
an EMR-RBAC can create a role, a task or an operation.
Figure 6.12: Yii’s authorisation item
Figure 6.13 shows role assignment page for the EMR-RBAC system through a Role-
Based Manager (RBAM) module.
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter has discussed a successful implementation of a prototype for the proposed
Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) model. Mainly, the prototype
has been implemented in order to demonstrate how the RoC-BAC model can be
implemented. Contrary to traditional access control mechanisms which use identity
of its users to control access, CEATH evaluates contexts in its access decision to allow
healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in an accountable manner in case of an
infrequent access so as to support the continuity of care.
189
6.5 Conclusions
Figure 6.13: Role assignment in EMR-RBAC system
To support this significant principle in healthcare, especially for an environment with
limited human resources for health, this thesis extends the traditional Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) model with health-related contexts and obligations. This chap-
ter discusses implementations of two prototypes, named CEATH and EMR-RBAC,
which implements RoC-BAC and RBAC models respectively. With the definition of
health-related contexts that pertains to contexts associated with specific area of an
application, RoC-BAC can henceforth be adopted and used in other domains that suf-
fer from limited human resources. Chapter 7 discusses different aspects of evaluation
of RoC-BAC model, which is implemented through the CEATH system.
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Evaluation
This chapter presents the results of an evaluation of the Context-Enhanced Access in
a Tanzania Healthcare (CEATH) system, discussed in Chapter 6. The chapter begins
with a review of criteria proposed by NIST that can be used to evaluate access control
systems in Section 7.1. Section 7.2 examines access control mechanisms, including
RoC-BAC, with respect to criteria discussed earlier. Section 7.3 evaluates the effect
of various elements and relations in CEATH by comparing its performance against that
of a pure RBAC system. Section 7.4 discusses expert user evaluation of the CEATH
system. Section 7.5 presents an analysis and discussion followed by the conclusion of
the chapter in Section 7.6.
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7.1 Evaluation Criteria
In this section, criteria for evaluating access control systems are discussed. These crite-
ria have been proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
and can be used to evaluate access control systems (Hu et al., 2006), (Hu & Scarfone,
2012). The evaluation criteria discussed include granularity of control, dynamicity,
flexibility and adaptability, scalability, user mobility, reliability and performance.
1. Granularity of control
Granularity is an extent to which a system can be broken down into small parts,
either the system itself, its description or observation. It can either refer to the
extent to which a larger entity is subdivided, or the extent to which groups of
smaller entities have been joined together to become larger distinguishable entities.
Granularity is defined as “a relative size, scale, level of detail or depth of penetration
that characterises an object or activity” (TechTarget, 2005). As a simple example
in measurements, a yard broken into inches has finer granularity than a yard broken
into feet.
There are two levels of granularity when describing an access control system, that
is fine-grained and course-grained. While course-grained description of a system is
associated with larger subcomponents, a fine-grained description regards smaller
subcomponents of which larger ones are composed. Section 4.2.8 of the NIST
document (Hu & Scarfone, 2012) explains this characteristic that enables privacy
control of the same information with different classification of data fields in a record.
In some instances in access control, a fine-grained access does not refer to charac-
teristics of a data object or resource but rather to refer to conditions that apply
during access. These may include time of the day, location of access, organisational
assignment and clearance level (Axiomatics, 2013). Taking this notion into con-
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sideration, the higher the number of contexts allow for finer granularity of access
control, and since RoC-BAC was purposely designed for a healthcare domain, and
it supports the specification of many contexts as discussed in Chapter 5, this thesis
has therefore shown that RoC-BAC is fine-grained.
2. Dynamicity
The healthcare environment is constantly changing since health care workers are
in constant movement,
As a result of health care workers being in constant movements, the healthcare
environment is characterised as being dynamic with constantly changing scenarios.
With these characteristics, support for dynamicity is therefore considered as an
important feature for any access control mechanism which can be used in an envi-
ronment that evaluates dynamic context information while making access decisions
(Hu et al., 2006). Through its support of the four categories of contexts, the newly
proposed RoC-BAC model is considered to support dynamicity.
3. Flexibility and Adaptability
This criterion is addressed in Section 4.2.10 of the NIST document by Hu & Scarfone
(2012). The section contains two questions that could be used to evaluate an access
control system. These are:
• Is the access control system capable of dynamically interposing access control
rules based on system states?
• Is the access control system capable of handling the evolution of the organi-
sation’s future access control policy changes?
Since a typical healthcare system witnesses a large number of varying scenarios
and unforeseen events, this criterion is used to evaluate an ability of access control
mechanism to adapt to those scenarios and events. To cope with these changes,
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an access control mechanism for the healthcare domain should be both flexible
and adaptable. Since the main aim of this study was to design a context-based
access control model that allows health care workers to bypass access rules in an
accountable manner using contexts and obligations, the proposed RoC-BAC is both
flexible and adaptable.
4. Scalability
Scalability is defined as “an ability of a computer application or product (both
hardware and software) to continue to function well as it is changed in size or
volume to meet user needs” (TechTarget, 2006). A healthcare system crosses the
boundary of a single healthcare institution and even that of the healthcare service
as a whole. Thus, the number of eventual users of the system and ways of its
usage is likely to be unpredictable. Consequently, scalability of an access control
mechanism is a significant factor in healthcare.
5. Support for user mobility
Providing for user mobility in access control will result in an enhanced system
that allows high priority users, such as doctors, to access patient data with high
priority situations from different places in a healthcare institution, from different
institutions and even from home. This criterion will, therefore, enable such users
not to be constrained by locations while trying to offer health care services to
patients.
6. Reliability
In a distributed computerised system with a large number of components, the
failure of one or more components at any time is inevitable. In a healthcare system
which needs to be always available, the access control system should be highly
reliable in spite of the failure of components.
7. Emergency Access
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For emergency situations, an access control system should allow healthcare pro-
fessionals to bypass the access policy (access rules). To address this, healthcare
providers are required to determine the type of situations that would require ac-
cess to an information system or application that contain EHRs. Section 4.2.2 of
the document by Hu & Scarfone (2012) contains an evaluation item for this crite-
rion: “ Is the access control system capable of bypassing access rules for critical
access decisions?”. The metric for this will either be Yes or No depending on the
capability of the system. RoC-BAC was designed to allow health care profession-
als to bypass access rules in an accountable manner by extending the traditional
Role-Based Access Control with contexts and obligations.
8. Performance
Section 4.3 of the document by Hu & Scarfone (2012) lists four functions that may
be considered to evaluate the performance of an access control system, including:
response time, policy repository and retrieval, policy distribution and an integration
with an authentication function. This thesis considers only two (response time and
integration with an authentication function) out of the four criteria to evaluate
performance.
(a) Response time: As discussed in Section 4.3.1 of the document by Hu & Scarfone
(2012), three items may be used to evaluate the performance of an access con-
trol system in relation to response time. These include:
• Does the response time of granting an access request meet the organisa-
tion’s requirement?
• Does the response time for the maximum number of access requests in an
expected time frame meet the organisation’s requirement?
• Does the response time for activating and revoking access rules meet the
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organisation’s requirements?
However robust an access control mechanism may be, user acceptability of a
system depends highly on its response time. With the high volume of data
processed, stored and transferred in healthcare systems, special care has to
be taken to ensure that the right trade-off between performance and other
properties of an access control system.
(b) Authentication function: Section 4.3.4 of the document by Hu & Scarfone
(2012) points out this feature with an item that evaluates on whether an
access control system is integrated with authentication function or not. Usu-
ally, there are different types of users who request access to information in
a healthcare system, and thus different authentication mechanisms need to
be implemented in order to provide the right type of access to its users. In
addition, different authentication mechanisms may be required for different
access levels. In CEATH system, a simple authentication system that uses
a combination of username and passwords was implemented. Table 7.1 sum-
marises each criterion by incorporating its corresponding item that could be
used to evaluate the access control mechanism.
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Table 7.1: Evaluation criteria and their associated questions (Source: Author)
Evaluation
criteria
Item(s) to evaluate
Granularity of
control
Does an access control system allow configuration of granularity of controlled objects?
The metric for this will either be course-grained (if the mechanism supports single or
no context at all) of fine-grained if multiple contexts are supported
Dynamicity Is the management of authorisation in an access control system static (such as in
RBAC, where permissions are administratively associated with roles and users are
administratively made members of appropriate roles) or dynamic (where access deci-
sion depends on availability of contexts and other factors)?
Flexibility and
Adaptability • Is the access control system capable of dynamically interposing access control
rules based on system states?
• Is the access control system capable of handling the evolution of the organisa-
tion’s future access control policy changes?
Scalability How scalable is the access control system?
The metric for this criterion is either low, middle or high, depending on the number
of roles or responsibilities that can be associated with the permission
Support for
User mobility
Does the access control system allow users to access resources from different places
within the healthcare organisation, from different institutions of even from home?
Reliability How reliable is an access control system based on permission administration?
In case of reliability, RBAC is considered to be more reliable as permissions are
administratively associated with roles and users are made members of appropriate
roles. On the contrary, any system that evaluates contexts before making an access
decision is considered as less reliable since any compromise into context data will lead
to wrong evaluation of context conditions and thus incorrect role assignment results
in access permission that affect the security of the system
Emergency
Access
Is access control system capable of bypassing access rules for critical access decisions?
Performance Response time:
• Does the response time of granting an access request meet the organisation’s
requirement?
• Does the response time for the maximum number of access requests in an
expected time frame meet the organisation’s requirement?
• Does the response time for activating and revoking access rules meet the or-
ganisation’s requirements?
Authentication function:
• Can the access control system be integrated with or support identification
authentication system?
For response time, the metrics were assigned the following numbers: Low =1 , Mod-
erate = 2 and High = 3
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This section examines the characteristics of access control mechanisms based on cri-
teria discussed in Section 7.1, and summarised in Table 7.1. It can be inferred from
the results presented in Table 7.2 that, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a reli-
able model that greatly simplifies security management for system administrators and
complex security policies can be applied more easily. On the flip side, RBAC uses
static security mechanisms, the model is less flexible, provides no support for user
mobility and does not contain a procedure for emergency access requests.
Table 7.2: Evaluation of Access Control Mechanisms
Mechanism Granularity
of control
Dynamicity Flexibility
& Adapt-
ability
Scalability Support
for user
mobility
Reliability Emergency
Access
Performance
(response
time)
RBAC course-
grained
Static Low Low No High No High
DRBAC fine-
grained
Dynamic Moderate Moderate Yes Moderate No Moderate
CBAC fine-
grained
Dynamic High High Yes Moderate No Moderate
PBAC fine-
grained
Dynamic Moderate Moderate Yes Low No Low
TBAC fine-
grained
Dynamic High High No High No Not known
TMAC fine-
grained
Dynamic High High No High No Not known
RoC-BAC fine-
grained
Dynamic High Moderate Yes Moderate Yes Moderate
KEY:
RBAC – Role-Based Access Control (Sandhu et al., 1996)
DRBAC – Dynamic Role-Based Access Control (Zhang & Parashar, 2003)
CBAC– Context-Based Access Control (Covington et al., 2001)
PBAC – Proximity-Based Access Control (Ardagna et al., 2006)
TBAC – Task-Based Access Control (by (Thomas & Sandhu, 1998)
TMAC – TeaM-based Access Control (Thomas & Sandhu, 1993)
RoC-BAC – Role and Context Based Access Control (Omary, PhD Thesis 2014)
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The Dynamic Role-Based Access Control (DRBAC) is an extension of the traditional
RBAC model designed to addresses access control requirements for pervasive grid
applications (Zhang & Parashar, 2003). These include: fine-grained access control,
support for dynamic, seamless and secure interactions between participating entities.
Furthermore, access privileges of an entity should depend on credentials, context or
current state. With these requirements implemented, DRBAC model was therefore
regarded as a fine-grained, and dynamic access control mechanism that supports user
mobility. In comparison to a traditional RBAC model, DRBAC is also less flexible,
does not scale well, less reliable, performs less as it incorporates an evaluation of
contexts in access decisions, and it does not contain procedures to allow its users to
bypass access rules in case of an emergency.
Covington et al. (2001) introduced Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) in Ubiqui-
tous Computing to show how a well-developed notion of roles can be used to capture
security-relevant context of the environment in which access requests are made. The
authors introduced environment roles to create a uniform access framework that can be
used to secure context-aware applications. Ardagna et al. (2006) proposed a mecha-
nism called Proximity-Based Access Control (PBAC) for providing automated access
to resources in a hospital emergency department environment. The PBAC model
makes access decisions based on the proximity of the user to a particular resource
such that when the user arrives in the proximity of the resource, access with the ap-
propriate privileges is automatically granted. The user mobility in PBAC is highly
supported using different proximity zones (Ardagna et al., 2006).
Task-Based Access Control (TBAC) is a flexible access control mechanism, which
has been widely implemented in workflow management systems (Thomas & Sandhu,
1998). In TBAC, permissions are assigned to tasks and users can only obtain the
permissions during the execution of tasks. Unlike RBAC, TBAC supports type-based
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and usage-based instances of tasks to control access to resources (Sandhu & Park,
2003), (Lu et al., 2008). TeaM-based Access Control (TMAC) is an approach for
applying role-based access control in collaborative environments where access per-
missions are specified on a “team” of collaborating users acting on various roles
(Thomas & Sandhu, 1993). TMAC preserves the advantage of simpler security ad-
ministration that RBAC-style models provide, and it also offers the flexibility to ac-
tivate permissions for individual users and objects. The model, however, lacks the
self-administration of assignment relations between entities.
Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) model was designed to address
generic access control requirements for healthcare environments while at the same
time supporting the continuity of care. In particular, RoC-BAC model was designed
to allow health care workers to bypass access rules in an accountable manner in case
of unexpected (or emergency) access requests. Among others, important access con-
trol requirements in a healthcare environment include support for emergency access
procedure, auditing and alerting of accesses. Henceforth, the RoC-BAC model ex-
tends the traditional RBAC model with contexts and obligations, and a notion of
health-related contexts is introduced. Permissions in RoC-BAC are assigned to roles,
which are grouped into user roles and context roles. The subsections below present
an evaluation of different access control mechanisms with respect to criteria discussed
in Section 7.1.
1. Granularity of control: RBAC makes use of roles as the only context infor-
mation in making access decision, hence it is considered a course-grained access
control model. Dynamic Role-Based Access Control (DRBAC), on the other hand,
uses multiple context information to monitor the context of different subjects or
users. Context constraints are applied before assigning roles to the subject or user.
In Context-Based Access Control (CBAC), access privileges are assigned dynam-
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ically when the context (such as location, time, role, authentication trust level
and types of information accessed) changes (DuraiPandian et al., 2006). Similar
to CBAC, the PBAC model is highly dependent on the context of the system to
track dynamic changes. The context information in PBAC are grouped into three
categories: user context (which may include location of the user (proximity) and
user’s capabilities), resource context (for example, capability of the resource and
current load on the resource) as well as environmental context (such as, number of
users in proximity of a resource at a given time) (Gupta et al., 2006).
Furthermore, the TBAC model takes into consideration subject information, object
information, time of use, usage count and executing tasks as appropriate context
information before making access decisions. TMAC makes use of several context
information, such as time, shift and location, while modeling access control policies.
Like PBAC, contexts in Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) model
is grouped into four: subject contexts, object contexts, environment contexts and
health-related contexts. Based on the number of contexts supported in each access
control model, only RBAC is considered to be course-grained while the remaining
access control models are fine-grained.
2. Dynamicity: RBAC model is mostly static as users are assigned to specific roles
and this assignment can only be modified by the system administrator. However,
in the highly dynamic and heterogeneous environment, the access privileges of an
entity depends not only on a role but also on its credential, context and current
state. The Dynamic Role-Based Access Control (DRBAC) fulfils these require-
ments by adding dynamicity to the role assignment. The degree of dynamicity in
this model is, however, not clearly defined as it depends on context sensing and
processing capabilities in an application scenario (Zhang & Parashar, 2003). The
CBAC is also considered as a dynamic model since different set of access rules are
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applied when context changes. It provides dynamic binding of resources, that is,
when a user moves from one domain to another, different sets of access rules will
be executed before granting access to the resource.
PBAC, TBAC and TMAC are also dynamic models. In PBAC, specific permissions
will be granted at run time when an individual user approaches a resource physically
in a proximity zone, depending on the load and capability of the resource and the
number of users in proximity of that resource at that particular time (Gupta et al.,
2006). The TBAC model allows for trustee sets and protection states to be mod-
ified dynamically (Chou & Wu, 2004). To illustrate its use, Aljareh & Rossiter
(2002) showed how TBAC can be used in collaboration networks and argues that
a person executing a task can be changed on the fly if required. Furthermore,
TMAC provides fine-grained control over permission activation to individual users
and objects. It is an active model of access control as permissions are activated
at run-time, based on the context (Thomas, 1997). RoC-BAC is a dynamic model
that allows health care workers to specify context (referred as reason throughout
Chapter 6) and thus creating new access rule to allow an access to patient data
and thus maintain the continuity of care.
3. Flexibility and Adaptability: RBAC model has low flexibility as it makes
use of a single context information in its access decision. Compared to RBAC, the
DRBAC model is more flexible as complex context-aware authorisation policies
can be specified at design time. Context type definition and implementation are
independent of the specification of access rules, and this makes DRBAC flexible and
extensible. Like DRBAC, PBAC couples an access control solution with context
information. It defines a set of access control policies that can easily be adopted
to different contexts which makes the model flexible.
In CBAC, the dynamic binding of resources when new scenarios arise makes the
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scheme flexible. It provides a policy adaptation mechanism to ensure smooth
flow of operations in new scenarios as well as rules to adopt to unforeseen events
(Toninelli et al., 2009). TBAC is flexible in the sense that, it allows a single activity
or group of activities to share the same policy, and any member of a trustee set can
be granted access. TMAC is a hybrid access control model that incorporates the
advantages of a broad role-based permission assignment and administration across
object types as in RBAC and yet it provides the flexibility for the fine-grained
activation of permissions for individual users on individual object instances. The
RoC-BAC model on the other hand has been integrated with contexts (in par-
ticular subject contexts, object contexts, environment contexts and health-related
contexts) to allow users to specify health-related reasons behind their request to
access patient’s data that they are unauthorised in normal accesses. This capabil-
ity makes RoC-BAC more flexible and adaptable than the traditional Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) model.
4. Scalability: RBAC is not highly scalable as access permission to information
is limited to the number of responsibilities or roles assigned to a user. Besides,
according to Karp et al. (2009) when the number of roles and permissions go be-
yond the order of thousands, there is a degradation of performance and the overall
management of RBAC becomes difficult to handle. The concept of role hierarchy
is included in DRBAC model such that new role can be created and extended from
existing ones. The DRBAC system has a limitation, since it is role-scalable down
the hierarchy. But with very large number of users, having dynamic roles, the
DRBAC model will be resource greedy in terms of memory and processing. The
PBAC model can be made scalable by using n-tier proximity zones around the
resource instead of a single proximity zone (Gupta et al., 2006). Different access
privileges will then be given in different zones. Increasing the capabilities of the
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resources also helps to accommodate more users in the proximity zones.
The CBAC model can be scalable assuming the infrastructure built is based on
modular components which can be fully integrated in a broader pervasive architec-
ture. Moreover, DuraiPandian et al. (2006) proposes an application of an Educa-
tional system for its architecture which can be easily extended. TeaM-based Access
Control (TMAC) is a model proposed by Thomas (1997). Its advantage over other
access control models such as RBAC is that, it is able to leverage the scalable
security administration benefits of role-based permission assignment and yet able
to provide fine-grained permission activation and deactivation to individual users
and object instances. As an example, the system can assign and administer broad
permissions for doctors on object types based on some role definitions and yet ac-
tivate doctor’s permissions to a patient’s records (object instances) only when a
doctor is taking care of the patient.
The work by Thomas & Sandhu (1993) discusses the usage of authorization sub-
tasks where a subtask is assigned to a single transient object. This makes TBAC
scalable in two ways. The first is that TBAC can handle increased workload. As
the workload increases, an authorisation step can spawn authorisation subtasks
taking care of various requests for authorisation. The second way is that, TBAC
can handle increasing complexity of the authorisation steps. In Thomas & Sandhu
(1998) a family of TBAC models is presented with a basic model used to build
composite ones with additional constraints.
5. User mobility: Since the only context information for the RBAC model stems
from the user, a change in user location will not cause any change in role assignment.
RBAC has, therefore, no support for user mobility. The DRBAC model supports
user mobility since the user’s role can change with different context conditions.
The PBAC scheme supports user mobility only when an individual user moves in
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a specific zone. Access privileges are removed as soon as the user moves out of the
zone (Gupta et al., 2006). In certain circumstances, this behaviour of PBAC can
be beneficial especially when people are in a hurry and move out from an ongoing
session or even forget to logout (Bardram, 2004).
In CBAC, resources are integrated with context information under which they
should operate. Support for user mobility is applicable in boundaries where con-
text rules have been attached to resources. TBAC and TMAC, which are a special
configuration of RBAC model, have no support for user mobility since access con-
trols are restricted to tasks and teams respectively. The RoC-BAC model, on the
other hand, allows specification of location-based and temporal-based access rules
and thus supports moderate user mobility by evaluating dynamic context informa-
tion while making access decision.
6. Reliability: In RBAC, access permissions are administratively associated with
roles and users are made members of appropriate roles. Thus, the management
of authorisation in RBAC is quite simple and static, making RBAC reliable. In
DRBAC, the reliability of context information security is a key issue. Corrupted
contextual data will lead to wrong evaluation of context conditions, thus incorrect
role assignment results in access permissions that affect the security of the system.
While the reliability of the PBAC scheme is tied to the accuracy of the positioning
system used, this accuracy depends on electromagnetic environment and varies over
time. PBAC can make use of error contour maps around the proximity zone to
compensate for errors of the positioning system (Gupta et al., 2006).
For other models like CBAC, reliability is still an issue. When there is a new
scenario where the policy adaptation mechanism will be triggered, there is no
guarantee that the new access rules applied are most optimal or correct. TBAC
dynamically manages permissions as authorisations progress to completion. Au-
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thorisations in TBAC have strict usage, validity and expiration characteristics that
may be tracked at runtime, thus making the model more reliable. TMAC, on the
other hand, can be used to restrict access to information and functionality in the
shared environment to those trusted. It can be used to help coordination by provid-
ing only those functions to team members that are currently needed to fulfil their
roles. However, managing access permissions assigned to members of dynamic and
emerging teams with frequently changing processes raise significant issues. The
reliability of TMAC, therefore, depends on how dynamic the teams and processes
are. Similar to other context-based models, RoC-BAC model is less reliable than
the traditional RBAC model since access permission depends on context and cor-
ruption of context data or even wrong specification of health-related contexts (or
reasons) will result into wrong authorisation.
7. Emergency Access: The healthcare domain follows the “care comes first prin-
ciple” where patient’s health care needs are to be put first before anything else.
With this principle in place, an access control system in the healthcare organisation
should be designed in such a way that infrequent access requests involving emer-
gency situations are handled by overriding existing access rules. If there is a patient
who was injured as a result of a road accident, for instance, the nearest qualified
healthcare professional should be able to access the patient’s basic medical data
and provide appropriate care as seen appropriate. This should be possible even if
a healthcare professional is not directly associated with the patient. Out of seven
access control models discussed herein, this significant access control requirement
for the healthcare domain is only enforced by the Role and Context-Based Ac-
cess Control (RoC-BAC). The proposed RoC-BAC model extends the traditional
Role-Based Access Control model with contexts and obligations to allow healthcare
workers to bypass access rules in case of unexpected (emergency) access requests
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so as to ensure the continuity of care.
8. Performance: The fact that RBAC uses only one context information, allows
the scheme perform better than its counterparts. DRBAC, for instance, depends
on several factors, such as number of roles assigned, number of permissions allo-
cated to each role, rate at which transitions occur between roles and frequency of
context changes. The performance overhead of DRBAC has been experimentally
evaluated in Zhang & Parashar (2003), and its implementation in an application
shows higher operational complexity. Similarly, the performance of PBAC scheme
varies with the system context, including: capability of the resource, the load of the
resource and the number of users in the proximity zone. Gupta et al. (2006) define
a parameter termed “window-of-opportunity” that defines the maximum delay that
can be allowed to take corrective action. This delay can be used to evaluate the
performance of PBAC with varying context information.
In CBAC model, fast response time is one of its basic requirements. With different
filtering levels and a set of rules which need to be executed, performance issues can
arise and different means have to be devised to optimise search. Pigeot et al. (2007)
introduce one way to increase performance through the implementation of a history
module which acts as a cache. Currently, only limited performance and complexity
evaluations have been carried out on access control models like TBAC and TMAC.
Section 7.3 presents the results of performance evaluation, by analysing overheads
introduced by different entities and relations in a CEATH system (implementing
Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC)) against those of EMR-RBAC
system (implementing Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)).
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This section presents the results of performance evaluation, performed on both CEATH
and EMR-RBAC systems. These experiments were carried out to identify the effect of
new elements and relations introduced on RoC-BAC from a traditional RBAC model.
This Section is divided into two: Section 7.3.1 discusses experimental set up and
Section 7.3.2 analyses the results from the experiments.
7.3.1 Experimental Set up
For the experiments, the number of patients medical records used in both systems
were 95,141. There were also a total of 50 scenarios collected from the Tanzania
healthcare system to test the effect of new elements and relations introduced in RoC-
BAC model against that of the traditional RBAC approach. The scenarios were also
used to evaluate the accuracy of the system.
To begin with, the following were considered as the cause of delay during execution
in RoC-BAC:
• Number of roles assigned to a subject or object
• Number of permissions assigned to a role
• Number of context(s) to be evaluated
Each of these factors have been discussed in detail in Section 7.3.2.
7.3.2 Experimental Results and Analysis
This section presents the results of the performance analysis conducted on two pro-
totypes, EMR-RBAC and CEATH, which implements RBAC and RoC-BAC respec-
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tively.
1. Number of Roles:
In this experiment, response time in relation to a number of roles assigned to a
subject or object are measured. This experiment was conducted in order to iden-
tify if there is any effect introduced by the access control model’s mapping. In this
experiment, each user of the system was assigned five roles and these roles were
associated with permissions. The role with highest privileges had five permissions.
The analysis from this experiment indicates that, response time increases as the
number of roles assigned to a user increases. Between the two access control mod-
els, it takes three times as much time to execute an access request in RoC-BAC
compared to an execution in RBAC. The indicative performance results on the
number of roles assigned to a subject for the four selected users in both RBAC and
RoC-BAC are summarised in Table 7.3 and 7.4, and also presented in Figure 7.1
and 7.2.
No. of roles
Response Time (ms.)
RBAC RoC-BAC
1 0.02640 0.08596
2 0.02440 0.06597
3 0.02625 0.07125
4 0.02107 0.06656
5 0.02560 0.06406
No. of roles
Response Time (ms.)
RBAC RoC-BAC
1 0.02294 0.07317
2 0.02336 0.06442
3 0.02467 0.08356
4 0.02093 0.07160
5 0.02444 0.08418
Table 7.3: Response times for the first user (left) and second user(right)
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Figure 7.1: The performance results on the number of roles assigned to a subject for the first two
users
No. of roles
Response Time (ms.)
RBAC RoC-BAC
1 0.02694 0.06422
2 0.02385 0.06789
3 0.02570 0.06899
4 0.02760 0.07571
5 0.02623 0.06519
No. of roles
Response Time (ms.)
RBAC RoC-BAC
1 0.02040 0.06419
2 0.02170 0.06833
3 0.02200 0.07606
4 0.02347 0.07016
5 0.02360 0.07139
Table 7.4: Response times for the third user (left) and fourth user(right)
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Figure 7.2: The performance results on the number of roles assigned to a subject for the third user
(left) and the fourth user (right)
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2. Number of Permissions: In this second set of experiments, each user had a
state machine with five roles, and a role with highest privileges was set to be an
active role. The number of permissions assigned to an active role were varied. The
response times for different number of permissions are in Table and Figure 7.3.
No. of Permissions
Response Time (s.)
RBAC RoC-BAC
0 2300 8440
5 2500 8400
6 2602 7766
7 2698 8405
8 2804 8631
9 2912 8733 0 2 4 6 8
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
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Figure 7.3: Number of permissions assigned to a role
3. Performance against Location and Time: In this third set of experiments,
the performance of CEATH was evaluated when an access rule contains both loca-
tion and timing constraints. An example of such access rule is: “Doctor John Doe
requests to access Bob’s medical records from his office at 11:40 a.m”. To find the
mean response time, five scenarios with varying location and timing information
were defined, and each scenario was executed ten times. The average response time
for each access request sent was measured at 0.0368614 ms. Figure 7.4 depicts re-
sponse time in CEATH system when an access policy contains location and timing
information.
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Figure 7.4: The effect of location and timing on performance of the CEATH system
The following is a list of five scenarios used in this experiment
(a) scenario 1: a nurse from physiotherapy department is requesting to access
patient A’s medical records from the front desk
(b) scenario 2: a user with role doctor is requesting to access patient C’s medical
records from his office within the hospital at 1:00 p.m.
(c) scenario 3: a user with a role physiotherapy doctor is requesting to access
patient C’s medical medical records from his home office (outside the hospital)
on Saturday afternoon at 12:30 p.m.
(d) scenario 4: a senior nurse who is in the same ward as the patient is requesting
to access patient X’s medical records during the morning working shift
(e) scenario 5: a consultant surgeon is requesting to access patient E’s medical
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Table 7.5: Response time for access policies with health-related contexts
Frequency
SCENARIO [time in ms.]
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
1 0.03877 0.0382 0.03698 0.03339 0.02849
2 0.32687 0.03734 0.03778 0.03258 0.0285
3 0.03255 0.03947 0.03783 0.03059 0.02808
4 0.03791 0.03589 0.03897 0.02701 0.03484
5 0.03083 0.03713 0.03808 0.0274 0.03164
6 0.03108 0.03656 0.03727 0.02676 0.02664
7 0.03133 0.03164 0.03743 0.03172 0.02698
8 0.0396 0.03886 0.0386 0.02804 0.02845
9 0.02798 0.03593 0.03796 0.02685 0.02717
10 0.02658 0.03801 0.02654 0.02699 0.02926
records from a clinic which is outside the hospital environment.
4. Performance with Health-Related Contexts: To make sure that healthcare
professionals’ are able to access medical records during unexpected (emergency)
situations, this thesis introduces a new concept called health-related contexts into
its access control decisions. The health-related contexts are integrated into Role-
Based Access Control model so as to make RoC-BAC model flexible and fine-
grained for the healthcare domain. To measure performance overhead introduced
by health-related contexts, this section presents the results from Role and Context-
Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) mechanism, which was implemented in CEATH
system.
Moreover, different context-based access rules were used during this experiment.
The average response time for five scenarios, with each being executed ten times
is 0.038827 ms. Table 7.5 presents the response times for five scenarios executed
ten times. It is also worth noting that, the response time when an access request
contains location, time and health-related context is higher compared to an av-
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erage time when an access request contains only location and timing information
(shown in Figure 7.4). This is due to the fact that the usage of more contexts in an
access request involves longer access evaluation. This thesis, therefore, shows that,
the more contexts specified in an access request, the longer it takes for an access
control system to execute. Although the proposed role and context-based system
is slower compared to pure role-based system, functional trade-off between perfor-
mance and proper access for the domain were considered, and thus RoC-BAC is
regarded as a more appropriate mechanism for the healthcare environment. Figure
7.5 summarises the impact of location, time and health-related contexts on the
performance of RoC-BAC.
Figure 7.5: Impact of location, time and health-related context in performance
The following is a list of scenarios used to measure the performance of the CEATH
system when health-related contexts are specified in an access request. More sce-
narios collected for evaluation of the systems are listed in Appendix C.
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(a) A consultant requests to access patient A’s medical records after being admit-
ted to the hospital following an accident in the mines
(b) A nurse requests to access medical records of a woman who has been attacked
by her live-in partner in a gender-based violence instance.
(c) In rural Tanzania, a midwife is requesting to access medical records of a fifteen
years old girl who is having complications in during labor and delivery
(d) A clinical assistant is requesting to access medical records of a girl who is in
critical condition following non-surgical cutting of her female genitalia
(e) A senior nurse is requesting to access medical records of a high school stu-
dent who is in critical condition following attempted abortion by unskilled
abortionist.
Furthermore, in relation to specification and evaluation of access rules between the
two systems (that is, CEATH which implements RoC-BAC and EMR-RBAC which
implements traditional RBAC approach), CEATH would be able to accommodate
more rules than the traditional role-based system. In case of fifty (50) access requests
listed in Appendix C with 28 of them containing dynamic context information (in
Appendix C.2) and the remaining 22 with no context information (in Appendix C.1),
CEATH system would be able to accommodate all fifty cases as the model itself is
an extension of the traditional RBAC model and hence allows the usage of role-based
access rules. The EMR-RBAC would, however, accommodate only 22 requests.
7.4 Expert User Evaluation
The aim of this third and final phase of the evaluation was to evaluate the usability
of the Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) system prototype named
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CEATH (Context-Enhanced Access in a Tanzania Healthcare) and to carry out heuris-
tic or guideline-based evaluation of the system. The main objective was to identify
general problems with the newly proposed Role and Context-Based Access Control
(RoC-BAC) model and also to identify specific usability problems associated with the
CEATH system.
7.4.1 Apparatus
All tests were carried out in a closed environment, a room within a hospital. The room
was fitted with one machine running our prototype and another running a system that
implements a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model.
7.4.2 Participants
Eight users were recruited from three large hospitals in the United Republic of Tan-
zania. Five of the experts were from the Muhimbili National Hospital (MNH), two
from the Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre(KCMC) and one from the Bugando
Medical Centre. For the analysis, users were divided into two groups: two were ama-
teurs with up to three years of experience and the remaining six contained of semi and
full professionals with up to thirty years of knowledge in the healthcare domain. The
latter group included expert users who gave expert opinions on aspects of the system.
7.4.3 Test Description
A prototype was designed and implemented and test scenarios were designed, based
on typical tasks the system was intended to perform, that is normal accesses and
infrequent accesses involving emergency situation. Users were asked to comment, ask
questions, or ask for help freely at any stage of the evaluation.
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7.4.4 Scenarios and Questions
The CEATH’s evaluation consisted of two scenarios followed by questions specific to
the CEATH system. The first scenario required the user to step through a normal
access request task using the browser-based interface of the system. The task involved
requesting access to medical records of the patient that a healthcare professional
has defined relationship using normal access procedure, implemented using the Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC). The second scenario involved specifying health-related
contexts to access medical records of a patient that a healthcare professional has no
prior relationship with. Timings for each scenario was collected, and the user was asked
to rate the usability of each system and specific questions related to the representation
of information and data in CEATH system.
7.4.5 Results and Discussion
The evaluation showed that the usability of the CEATH system as a whole is good.
As shown in Figure 7.6, a System Usability Scale with ten item questionnaire with
5 response options (1 for strongly disagree and 5 for strongly agree) was used to
evaluate the usability of the CEATH system (Brooke, 1996). Out of ten questionnaire
items listed below, nine items are normally used to evaluate general usability and
one (number ten item) is used to evaluate learning. Figure 7.7 shows a graphical
representation comparing the overall usability of CEATH, which implements RoC-
BAC, and EMR-RBAC which implements the RBAC model. The ratings given by
each user for each question were added, giving the overall impression of the distribution
of ratings for each system.
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Figure 7.6: Usability of the CEATH system using System Usability Scale
1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex
3. I thought the system was easy to use
4. I think I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this
system
5. I found the various functions in the system were well integrated
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system
7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly
8. I found this system very cumbersome to use
9. I felt very confident using the system
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system
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Figure 7.7: Usability Evaluation of the EMR-RBAC and CEATH systems
The CEATH system was favoured by the users over the traditional approach imple-
mented in EMR-RBAC system. Users rated the system as easier to user, easier to
understand and also appropriate for the domain. On the negative side, users felt the
system would involve some performance issues as a result RoC-BAC’s support for n
contexts that can be evaluated by the system. This concern is, however, not consid-
ered as a significant issue since the majority of the users trusted the system to achieve
its goal of using different access mechanisms for different access requests.
Valuable user feedback was gathered through comments and suggestions and these
will inform design decisions for future versions of the CEATH system, and may in-
clude addressing issues in relation to user interaction, evaluation of contexts using
the machine learning to make the system context-aware and also visualisation of the
underlying processes. In summary, the evaluation showed that CEATH represents an
important step towards a system in the healthcare domain that could help healthcare
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professionals to access medical records of the patients in an accountable manner, and
thus ensure the continuity of care in the domain where shortage of human resources
for health is common.
7.5 Analysis and Discussion
The criteria for evaluating access control systems proposed by Hu & Scarfone (2012)
from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) were used to analyse
the capabilities of access control mechanisms. The criteria used in this thesis include
granularity of control, dynamicity, flexibility and adaptability, scalability, support
for user mobility, reliability, support for emergency access procedure, as well as per-
formance. Based on these criteria, the proposed RoC-BAC model is regarded as a
fine-grained, flexible and dynamic access control model that moderately supports user
mobility and also allows health care professionals to bypass access rules in case of an
unexpected (infrequent) situation.
The second part of the evaluation involved comparative analysis in relation to the
performance of two access control models, RBAC and RoC-BAC. The results in this
part indicate that the integration of contexts into RoC-BAC introduces some perfor-
mance overheads due to the fact that access decisions in a system implementing the
proposed RoC-BAC approach involves more evaluation factors in terms of contexts
than that of a traditional RBAC model. Even though RoC-BAC seems to introduce
trivial performance overhead, the overall approach was designed based on access con-
trol requirements gathered from the healthcare domain and thus its approach is more
appropriate than the traditional RBAC.
Another significant finding from performance evaluation of the RoC-BAC approach
is that, delays during access to medical records were due to various factors including:
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number of roles assigned to subjects and objects, number of permissions in an active
role as well as frequency of events. Additionally, it was noted that the more contexts
integrated into the RBAC forming RoC-BAC, the more performance overhead the
system experiences, and the better the system becomes in terms of access control for
the healthcare domain. The validity of this statement can be verified by performance
evaluation results of the RoC-BAC model while evaluating access rules containing
location and time information (with an average of 0.0368614 ms) which is slightly
lower than response time for an access request that contains location, time and health-
related contexts (an average of 0.038827 ms). The expert user evaluation was the third
and final part of the evaluation. The results obtained indicate that CEATH which
implements RoC-BAC model is favoured due to its ability to provide access in two
different levels (both normal and for infrequent access requests) than the traditional
RBAC approach.
7.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, experimental results for evaluating the proposed Role and Context-
Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) model are presented and discussed. Two pro-
totypes, namely EMR-RBAC and CEATH (that is, Context-Enhanced Access in a
Tanzania Healthcare) which have been designed and implemented in Chapter 6, were
used for evaluation. The chapter began with a review of criteria proposed by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) that can be used to evaluate
access control systems. The evaluation criteria used in this thesis include granular-
ity of control, dynamicity, flexibility and adaptability, scalability, support for user
mobility, reliability, emergency access and performance.
As the proposed Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) extends the
traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with multiple contexts into its
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access decision and obligations, the model is therefore characterised as fine-grained,
flexible and adaptable. The model also moderately supports user mobility and con-
tains a procedure for infrequent (emergency) access requests. On the contrary to
a pure role-based system, a role and context-based system supports the continuity
of care by allowing healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in an accountable
manner by specifying health-related contexts in case of an infrequent access request
associated with an emergency situation. From an analysis of the performance of the
two systems, this thesis has shown that RoC-BAC introduces trivial performance over-
head than a pure role-based system since its access decision involves an evaluation of
multiple contexts. Chapter 8 concludes this thesis.
222
Chapter 8
Conclusions & Future Work
This chapter concludes the thesis. A summary of research is presented in Section 8.1,
and suggestions for future research directions are in Section 8.2.
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8.1 Research Summary
Access control is an important aspect of any information system. It is a way of
ensuring that authenticated users can access only what they are authorised to and
no more. In other words, it grants authenticated users access to resources based on
organisation policies and permission levels assigned to each user or user group. As a
research area, access control has been extensively studied in academia and in industry,
and thus a wide range of access control models, mechanisms and systems have been
proposed. However, despite its success, specific access control requirements for the
dynamic and collaborative environments like healthcare that needs to support the
continuity of care to patients have not been addressed. This results in a wide gap
between what is required and what is actually practised in the domain. As a result of
this gap, access control policies implemented in the healthcare domain are considered
to be too restrictive and affect the continuity of care to patients in case of a shortage
in healthcare professionals.
To address diverse access control requirements, current solutions to this problem have
been built on traditional access control models such as Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC). These models contain numerous limitations for their use in electronic health-
care information systems to support the continuity of care. As an example of a tra-
ditional access control mechanism, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model is a
powerful tool for specifying and enforcing organisational policy in a way that seam-
lessly maps to an enterprise structure. It is a policy neutral authorisation approach
suited for large-scale enterprises. On the negative side, RBAC is static, since it makes
access control decisions based on users’ attributes such as identities and it does not
take into account contexts while determining whether access to a resource should be
allowed or not.
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From the proposed Contexts, Organisational rules, e-health Initiatives and Legislative
rules (COIL) methodology for gathering access control requirements for the healthcare
domain, this thesis argues that an access control system designed for the healthcare
domain should contain contexts, privacy and security capabilities, and organisational
and legislative rules. The designed access control model for domain should also be
fine-grained and flexible enough to allow healthcare professionals to bypass access
rules in an accountable manner in case of unexpected emergencies.
8.1.1 Summary of the Main Conclusions
This thesis has focused on the development of a new context-based access control
model that addresses access control requirements for the healthcare domain. This
section summarises the main conclusions. The introductory Chapters 1 and 2 are
excluded from the discussion, because they do not contain any new research materials.
Chapter 3 dealt with an analysis of existing access control models and mechanisms for
the modern electronic healthcare environment. The suitability of traditional access
control models for the healthcare environment was analysed, and in this analysis
Discretionary Access Control, Mandatory Access Control, Role-Based Access Control
and Attribute-Based Access Control were evaluated. From the existing literature it
was noted that discretionary access control, for instance, is not suitable for the modern
electronic healthcare environment since the model is static , it lacks proper control
of information flow and the owner of a particular object can pass access rights on
that object to any other subject without any restrictions. Based on the limitations
of existing access control models, the Chapter concluded with a proposal to design a
context-based access control model for the healthcare domain, and the model should
address appropriate access control requirements.
Prior to designing of a new access control model, this research focused on gathering
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access control requirements for the domain. Chapter 4, therefore, discusses the devel-
opment of a new approach named COIL for gathering comprehensive access control
requirements for the healthcare domain. The COIL approach is a combination of four
different areas of research that affect access to electronic medical records. The areas
researched, which also form the COIL approach are contexts for a fine-grained access
control model, privacy and security capabilities from national electronic health initia-
tives, organisational rules as well as legislative rules from selected legislations. Several
privacy and security capabilities were proposed, and also included as part of the COIL
approach. These include: user identification and authentication, authorisation, im-
plementation of function for emergency access procedures, auditing and alerts, and
patient consent. To test its validity and to show how the developed COIL approach
could be used, the chapter also contains results of its evaluation.
Chapter 5 discusses the development of a new context-based access control model
for the healthcare domain. The proposed model is named Role and Context-Based
Access Control (RoC-BAC), and it is an extension of the traditional Role-Based Access
Control model with health-related contexts and obligations. In addition to the new
category of contexts, the proposed model also supports the specification of subjects
contexts, objects contexts and environments contexts. This chapter also introduces
a new concept of health-related contexts, that define healthcare domain’s specific
contexts that could be evaluated in an access control decision of a modern healthcare
information system. Its evaluation in an access decision is expected to support the
continuity of care by allowing healthcare professionals to bypass access rules in an
accountable manner.
Chapter 6 discusses the development of two prototypes namely: CEATH, that imple-
ments Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC) model, and EMR-RBAC
that implements Role-Based Access Control. These prototype were designed and im-
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plemented in order to achieve two main objectives. First and foremost, to demonstrate
that the proposed Role and Context-Based Access Control model is practical and also
to evaluate performance overheads introduced by new entities and relations. The later
objective is achieved by comparing the performance of CEATH with the performance
of EMR-RBAC. The system was also implemented to allow for expert user evaluations
of the system
Chapter 7 discusses the results of an evaluation of CEATH system against that of
EMR-RBAC. The chapter began by reviewing a list of criteria proposed by the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) that could be used to evaluate
access control systems. The criteria used include granularity of control, dynamicity,
flexibility and adaptability, scalability, support for user mobility, reliability, emergency
access functions and performance. From the first seven criteria, the proposed RoC-
BAC model was concluded to be fine-grained, flexible, dynamic, provides support for
user mobility, and implements emergency access function. For the comparative analy-
sis on performance of CEATH against that of EMR-RBAC, it was noted that CEATH
takes as much as three times to execute an access request compared to the time spent
by the EMR-RBAC. However, despite the overheads, the system’s ability to allow
healthcare professionals to access to records in an unexpected emergency situations
and thus ensure the continuity of care far outweighs any performance concerns. That
being said, RoC-BAC model is considered to be appropriate solution for the domain
that the conventional RBAC model. Chapter 8 summarises the thesis and points out
areas for future research directions.
8.1.2 Contributions
The following are the contributions of this thesis to the body of knowledge:
1. A new approach for gathering comprehensive set of access control requirements
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in a healthcare domain has been developed. In this research work, access control
requirements for the healthcare domain were categorised into four main groups
that have an impact on access to medical records. The access control requirements
arose from legislations, privacy and security capabilities from national electronic
health initiatives as well as rules that govern operations within the healthcare
organisation and rules from the legislation. The COIL approach describes a step-
by-step approach for specifying a comprehensive set of access control requirements
for the domain.
2. A taxonomy of access control models was has been designed, and various access con-
trol models and mechanisms were classified against the proposed Role and Context-
Based Access Control model.
3. To support the continuity of care by allowing healthcare professionals to bypass
access rules in an accountable manner, this thesis proposes a context-based access
control model called Role and Context-Based Access Control (RoC-BAC). The
RoC-BAC model builds upon a traditional Role-Based Access Control by extending
it with health-related contexts and obligations. In addition to the introduction of
health-related contexts, RoC-BAC also supports subject contexts, object contexts
and environment contexts.
4. With the proposed RoC-BAC model, a new concept of health-related contexts is
also introduced. It represents specific contexts from the healthcare domain that
should be evaluated by an access control system in order to support the continuity
of care.
5. To demonstrate that the proposed RoC-BAC model is doable and also to evaluate
the performance performance of CEATH, two prototypes (one implementing Role
and Context-Based Access Control model and the other implementing Role-Based
Access Control model) were implemented. From the performance analysis of the
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two systems, this thesis argues that, even though RoC-BAC takes longer to exe-
cute access requests compared to that of RBAC model, provision of care is way
more important in healthcare performance, and thus RoC-BAC is regarded as an
appropriate approach for the domain which needs to ensure the continuity of care.
8.2 Future Work
In this thesis, an evaluation strategy for the proposed context-based access control
model involved the usage of scenarios from Tanzania healthcare environment. This
section discusses more work that can be carried out in the future.
1. Automation of scenario generation: To test the scalability of the scenar-
ios generated for the domain, a system that contains four parts of the COIL ap-
proach can be developed as a future work. Such a system should contain contexts
(subdivided further into its four main groups as proposed in this thesis: subject
contexts, object contexts, environment contexts and health-related contexts). The
three other parts of the system are: privacy and security capabilities from national
electronic health initiatives, legislative rules as well as organisational rules.
2. Automatic Evaluation: The integration of a rule engine into the access control
solution is another aspect of future work. Since the current prototype (that is,
CEATH system) allows healthcare professionals to manually specify health-related
contexts so as to bypass access rules, an automatic evaluation of context conditions
can be carried out through an integration of a rule engine in to the overall access
decision. The proposed engine should be able to evaluate access rules automatically
and provide access without users’ intervention. Additionally, machine learning
approaches can be investigated and its solution be integrated into the system so as
to learn and evaluate any new access scenario against a database of existing ones.
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3. Appropriate Help to Healthcare Professionals: Since the proposed Role
and Context-Based Access Control model allows healthcare professionals to bypass
access rules in an accountable manner in case of an unexpected emergency situation,
the system should also be able to offer healthcare professionals who have bypassed
access rules appropriate help to complete their job. For certain circumstances in a
Tanzania healthcare system where there is high shortage of healthcare professionals,
it is common to find less skilled professionals seeking a change in access rights so
as they could act as skilled professionals and hence provide basic services to the
patients. As a future work, different types of help (such as a phone call from another
healthcare professional or a guidance manual) to healthcare professionals should be
identified against different categories of healthcare professionals, and those helps
should be integrated into the system.
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SECTION I: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
1. Professional category 
☐ Consultant 
☐ Doctor 
☐ Nurse 
☐ Pharmacist 
☐ System Administrator 
☐ Other, specify  
 
2. Department   
 
3. Type of healthcare institution (please tick only one) 
 ☐Government-owned 
☐Parastatal 
☐Faith-based 
☐Private 
4. It is a  
☐Referral hospital 
☐Regional hospital 
☐District hospital 
☐Health centre 
☐Dispensary 
5. Which region does your healthcare facility serve? 
☐Arusha 
☐Dar es Salaam 
☐Kilimanjaro 
☐Mbeya 
☐Mwanza 
☐Other, specify  
6. For the purpose of controlling responses, please provide the name of the institution that you are affiliated 
with 
 
7. Experience (in years) 
☐0-5  
☐6-10 
☐11-15 
☐16-20 
☐More than 20 
8. Academic proficiency 
☐Bachelor Degree 
☐Masters 
 
 
 
 
☐PhD 
☐Other, specify  
9. Gender 
☐Female 
☐Male 
SECTION II: ELECTRONIC HEALTHCARE  
10. Do you understand what electronic healthcare is? 
☐Yes 
☐No  
11. How do you rate your level of understanding of electronic healthcare? 
☐Excellent 
☐Very Good 
☐Good 
☐Fair 
☐Poor 
12. Do you have electronic healthcare information system in your organisation? 
☐Yes 
☐No, go to question 16 
13. Which health care information system is being used in your organisation? (please tick all appropriate 
systems available) 
☐Electronic Medical Record System 
☐Laboratory Information System 
☐Radiology Information system 
☐Pharmacy Information System 
☐Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS) 
☐Other, specify  
 
14. What triggered the adoption and use of electronic healthcare information system(s) in your organisation? 
(Choose appropriate) 
☐Better coordinated care 
☐Reducing patients waiting time 
☐Less paperwork 
☐Other, specify 
15. Do you think training provided to healthcare professionals while adopting electronic healthcare information 
systems in your organisations enough? 
☐Yes 
☐No 
 
 
 
16. What are the challenges facing Tanzania healthcare system that could benefit from the adoption of 
electronic medical record systems? 
☐Lack of enough workforces 
☐Health inequalities 
☐Low productivity of staff, who are present 
☐Other, specify  
 
SECTION III: ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORD 
17. Have you ever used either electronic medical record or electronic health record system? 
☐Yes 
☐No, go to question 21 
18. For how long have you been using these systems? 
☐0-3 years 
☐4-6 years 
☐7-10 years 
☐Other , specify  
19. What are the main reasons of using electronic medical record system in your organisation? 
☐Data input 
☐Decision support 
☐Prescription 
☐Emergency data access 
☐Don’t know 
☐Other, specify  
20. Do you think medical records processed by electronic medical record systems are 
☐Indispensable 
☐Important for my work 
☐Not useful 
☐Other, specify  
21. What do you think are the problems of electronic medical record systems? 
☐It is a waste of time 
☐They affect patient/doctor relationship 
☐They are not secure 
☐They require education 
☐Other, specify  
 
SECTION IV: ACCESS CONTROL 
22. What mechanism do you normally use to access electronic medical records? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
☐Login/password 
☐Biometrics 
☐Using someone else’s credentials 
☐Other, specify  
23. If you use login/password to access medical records, what are their associated challenges? (choose all 
appropriate reasons) 
☐You may forget it, many times 
☐You can share your password 
☐You can access records easily 
☐Other, specify  
24. Do you think access to electronic medical records must be controlled using roles (such as nurse, doctor etc.) 
established in the organisation? 
☐Yes,  
☐Only roles are enough, go to question 26 
☐Role with other information, go to question 25 
☐No 
25. In addition to roles, what other information do you consider necessary for controlling access to electronic 
medical record? 
☐Location 
☐Time 
☐Purpose of access 
☐Other, specify  
26. Do you think patients should be given access to their medical records? 
☐Yes 
☐No, explain why 
 
27. Should there be any mechanisms to allow healthcare professional to access patient’s medical records in case 
of an emergency? 
☐Yes 
☐Everybody should have access 
☐Only certain roles should be granted access  
☐Depending on the emergency 
☐No 
 
SECTION V: ACCESS TO MEDICAL RECORDS: SITUATIONS 
This section intends to collect situations involved in access to medical records. The situations collected may 
include the following information 
 
 
 
 
 Who (in terms of role) requests to access medical records? 
 What type of data is disclosed? 
 What type of task is carried out? 
 Any other conditions involved such as location, time etc. 
 
Sample situation: As a registered nurse, I am allowed to view diagnosis of inpatient if he is located in 
the pediatrics unit and my workspace is the pediatrics unit 
 
28. Describe situations involving your daily  access to sensitive medical data 
 
 
29. Unusual data disclosure situations: 
i. Have you ever been involved in a situation where patient’s data, which seems to be not relevant to a 
certain role at the beginning, become relevant under certain circumstances? 
☐Yes 
☐No 
ii. Have you ever been involved in unusual situations that were differently conducted in comparison to 
regular routines? 
☐Yes, go to iii 
☐No 
iii. If  Yes, list those situations here 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you in Advance! 
 
 
Appendices C
Access Rules
C.1 role-based
1. Alice, with a role consultant surgeon, requested to read medical records of patient
2. A medical doctor named Bob requested to access electronic health records of patient
3. A receptionist named Anne requested to read medical records of a patient
4. A specialist consultant requested to access billing information of a patient
5. A system administrator requested to delete medical records of a patient
6. A senior system administrator sent an access request to create medical records of a patient
7. A surgeon doctor requested to access medical records of a patient who is scheduled for an open
heart surgery
8. A medical doctor requested to access medical records of an out patient
9. A specialist consultant requested to access billing information of a patient.
10. A nurse working in a diabetic ward in a public clinic within a hospital requested to access medical
records of a patient who is currently not receiving any treatment from the hospital.
11. A registered nurse requested to create medical records of a newborn baby found in a dumping site
12. A clinical assistant requested to read medical records of a patient who is a primary school student
13. A social worker requested to access medical records of a newborn baby
14. A receptionist requested to read billing information of a patient from the front desk
15. A system administrator requested to delete medical records of a patient from system administra-
tors’ office.
16. An enrolled nurse sent an access request to read medical records of a patient
17. A registered nurse requested to create medical records of a newborn baby
18. A clinical assistant requested to read medical records of a patient suffering from third degree burns
from a house fire
19. A cardiologist named Bob attempted three times to access medical records of a patient from the
cardiology department.
20. A surgeon doctor requested to access medical records of a patient who is scheduled for an open
heart surgery
21. A registered nurse requested to access medical records of a woman in critical condition
22. An intern medical doctor is requesting to access medical records of a patient
C.2 context-based
1. On a night shift, a surgeon consultant has requested to access medical records of a patient with
albinism whose limbs has been amputated non-surgically
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C.2 context-based
2. A surgeon consultant requested to access medical records of a patient injured from bomb explosion.
An access request was sent from an operating room during a day shift.
3. A medical doctor requested to access medical records of a patient from an Intensive Care Unit
(ICU) while attending an emergency situation on an unidentified individual who was brought in
by the police officer.
4. As a result of wrong permissions specified in a system that restricted access to medical records of
a patient from a ward, a medical doctor requested to access electronic health records of a patient
from the front desk.
5. A cardiologist named Bob attempted three times to access medical records of a patient from the
cardiology department.
6. A surgeon doctor requested to access medical records of a patient who is scheduled for an open
heart surgery as a result of a cardiogenic embolic stroke.
7. A medical doctor requested to access medical records of an out patient from his office during a
night shift.
8. A specialist consultant requested to access billing information of a patient from a ward.
9. A specialist doctor requested to read patient’s personal information from the front desk of a hospital
during a night shift.
10. A receptionist requested to access medical records of a patient with no specific reason. An access
request was sent from the front desk at 5:40 p.m.
11. While working in a night shift in a physiotherapy department, a medical doctor requested to read
billing records of a patient suffering from diabetes mellitus.
12. A clinical assistant is requesting to read medical records of a patient suffering from third degree
burns from a house fire. An access request was sent from the same ward where the patient is
located, during a day shift
13. In a district hospital, a registered nurse requested to access medical records of a woman who was
stabbed by her husband. An access request was sent from the ICU during a night shift.
14. In a dispensary, a nurse requested to access medical records of a patient injured from a bomb
explosion.
15. A nurse working in a diabetic ward in a public clinic in a hospital requested to access billing
information of a patient suffering from diabetes mellitus
16. A nurse working in a diabetic ward in a public clinic within a hospital requested to access medical
records of a patient who is currently not receiving any treatment from the hospital.
17. A registered nurse requested to create medical records of a newborn baby found in a dumping site,
and was brought to the hospital by a police officer during a day shift.
18. A clinical assistant requested to read medical records of a primary school girl who was abused by
unidentified individual while walking home from school. This access request was sent during a
night shift.
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C.2 context-based
19. A social worker requested to access medical records of a newborn baby who was brought in the
hospital by police officers after being found in a dumping site.
20. A social worker requested to read medical records of a child who suffers from malnutrition. Such
a request was sent from the childrens’ ward during a day shift.
21. A social worker requested to access medical records of a child suffering from both malnutrition
and child abuse from childrens’ ward at 8:30 p.m. The child who has a disability was deliberately
starved by his parents.
22. A social worker sent two access requests from outside the hospital. One access request was sent
during the day and another during the night shift, and the social worker was requesting to access
medical records of a three years old boy who has broken ribs while he is at his mother’s care.
23. A receptionist requested to read billing information of a patient from the front desk during a day
shift
24. A pharmacist requested to read billing information of a patient from the pharmacy, which is part
of a hospital, during a night shift
25. A pharmacist sent an access request from a front desk to read medical records of a twelve years
old girl who is pregnant, and is having complications during labour and delivery.
26. An enrolled nurse sent an access request to read medical records of a patient from the ward during
a night shift [that is, 18:00 - 6:00 p.m.]
27. A system administrator is requesting to delete medical records of a patient from system adminis-
trators’ office.
28. A senior system administrator sent an access request to create medical records of a new patient.
The records to be created are for a woman who was assaulted by her husband in gender-based
violence situation. The request was sent during a day shift
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Appendices D
Health-related Contexts
1. Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children
(a) Widow Cleansing and Inheritance
Widow cleansing and inheritance is a practice performed to women of certain tribes in Tan-
zania after the death of their husbands. Typically, a widowed woman is expected to have
unprotected sex with men from her husband’s family which will then allow her to keep her
assets. This act introduces women to assaults and in worst case, they might end up get-
ting infected with sexually transmitted diseases. As reported by the Human Right Watch
on Domestic Abuse and HIV infection, widow inheritance goes hand in hand with diseases
(MCDGC, 2012).
(b) Marriage by Abduction
This act involves unlawful carrying away of a girl or young woman, usually by force, for
the intention of getting married. Typically an abductor arranges a group of intimate friends
and relatives to kidnap a girl or young woman (in rare cases) without informing her family,
relatives or friends. And in some cases, abduction is followed by rape. The public blames
the Tanzania education system for abductions in young girls since it does not provide enough
security for them. In rural areas, for instance, school children walk long distances to and from
school, which exposes them to risks of rape or abduction into marriages.
(c) Pregnancy in Adolescent Girls
Tanzania laws, especially the Tanzania Law Marriage Act, do not criminalise anti-girl prac-
tices such as early marriage (Parliament, 1971). In some parts of the country, it is common for
girls as young as eleven years old to be withdrawn from school for the sake of getting married.
In health related matters, this practice is dangerous as sexual organ tissues of young girls
are delicate and thus prone to rupture during sexual intercourse, which in turn creates entry
points for HIV and other diseases (MCDGC, 2012).
(d) Child Labour
Although the government of the United Republic of Tanzania have made moderate advance-
ment in efforts to eliminate child labour by launching National Costed Plan of Action for
Most Vulnerable Children II (2013 - 17), the Human Rights Watch reports that children as
young as eight years old are still working in small-scale gold mines in some regions of the
country (HRW, 2013), (MoHSW, 2013a). In addition to mining, other forms of child labour
involves dangerous activities in agriculture and fishing. Majority of these activities usually
expose children to diseases.
(e) Street Children
Tanzania, as a country, also suffers from high number of street children in its developed
regions, including Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and Arusha. Street children are highly vulnerable
to illnesses such as fever, skin diseases, respiratory infections as well as injuries. In addition
to these common diseases, majority of street children also engage in high-risk behaviours
like unsafe sex and use of narcotic drugs, which increase their risk of contacting sexually
transmitted diseases.
2. Surface and Marine Regulatory Authority (SUMATRA)
(a) Marine Accidents
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As a result of poor marine regulations, Tanzania suffers from severe marine accidents. It has
been reported by SUMATRA that, between July 2012 and June 2013, 19 marine accidents
involving 625 people were recorded in Tanzania (Mhagama, 2013). Out of 625 people involved,
380 were rescued and needed treatment from health care facilities across the country and the
remaining died. These accidents reduces the number of available healthcare professionals
further.
3. Ministry of Energy and Minerals
(a) Invasion of the Mines
The discovery of minerals in various parts of the country have also affected country’s health-
care system. With controlled mining activities, companies are provided with a deed from
the government that allows them to legally mine in respective areas. Since majority of the
citizens who live in close proximity to the mining areas are poor, it is common for them to
invade and rob the mining areas while armed with knives and (sometimes) guns. In addition,
it is a constant battle for the owners of the mining sites to stop illegal miners who usually
attempt to steal mining resources, including rocks. Similar to other situations discussed so
far, these battle between mining sites and citizens result into injuries and even deaths.
(b) Mining Accidents and Health Risks
The Ministry of Energy and Minerals in Tanzania has reported several cases of miners being
covered by rubble while searching for pebble and other valuable minerals. The collapse of
mine shafts, poor ventilation and lighting, poor mining methods and exposure to mercury and
other hazardous substances are among the reasons for mining accidents and health risks in
Tanzania. When these cases occur, healthcare facilities around the area and other specialised
hospitals have to provide care services to the victims.
4. Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW)
(a) Malnutrition
Due to social circumstances, children in Tanzania suffer from both under and over nutrition
(Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre, 2013). While over nutrition is experienced by well-off
families, under nutrition is a challenge for poor families. In any case where a child suffers
from mostly under nutrition, a social worker might be involved.
(b) Low birth weight
The higher degree of poverty results into low birth weight to many newborn babies in Tanza-
nia. Among other reasons for low birth weight include illiteracy for expecting mothers, lack of
antenatal care, pregnancy of adolescent girls (who may deliver low birth weight babies) and
also pre-term delivery. Tanzania is positioned at number fifty five (55) in the world rankings.
(c) Obstetric Fistula
It is a condition where a hole is formed between vagina and bladder or vagina and rectum of a
girl or woman during difficult child birth (MoHSW, 2001). This condition is common among
girls and women who give birth at home because they are too poor to attend health clinics.
On average, there are 3,000 new cases of obstetric fistula in Tanzania every year (CCBRT,
2011).
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(d) Eclampsia
Eclampsia is one of the common problems facing majority of pregnant women in Tanzania
(MoHSW, 2012). Majority of the women suffering from either pre-eclampsia or severe eclamp-
sia have been caught up in several life endangering situations, including: falling down while
walking, falling while they are alone at home or even falling while getting out of a car. When
taken to a health care facility, and in particular public healthcare facilities, these patients are
expected to receive all the treatment as required and payment should be issued later.
(e) Diabetes
Diabetes is now ranked as one of the major health challenges in the country, with an estimate
of 1,706,930 cases (as of 2013). For any diabetic patient, they can choose to either attend
public or private clinic. Although in both cases, patients are expected to pay after treatment,
the cost is higher in private clinic compared to its public counterpart.
(f) Human Rabies
Tanzania healthcare system also suffers from cases of human rabies. Even though majority
of these cases go unreported, on its February 2014 report, the MoHSW reported 512 cases of
human rabies in the country compiled from twenty four regions (MoHSW, 2014).
Other context are as follows:
(a) Injuries at Work
The health care facilities in Tanzania also treat patients who were injured from their day to
day jobs. In these situations, a patient will usually receive all the treatments required and
then a healthcare facility will seek payment either from the patient, his employer or health
insurance company, such as National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF).
(b) Surfing Injuries
As discussed in Chapter 2, Tanzania mainland is bordered by the long coast of an Indian
ocean to the east. The healthcare facilities in Tanzania also attend individuals who may seek
treatment due to injuries inflicted during surfing. Since healthcare facilities’ main focus is
saving lives, any patient with surfing injuries will receive treatment as any other case discussed
earlier and a healthcare facility will seek payment later.
(c) Collapse of the Buildings
In Tanzania, there have been an increase in the number of building that are collapsing as a
result of bad designing, faulty construction, foundation failure or even extraordinary loads.
In addition to destroying the reputation of the construction industry, the collapse of the
buildings also result into body injuries and even deaths. Those injured seek treatment from
various healthcare facilities.
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governments in developed countries to reserve huge amount of money for stimulating its adoption.  Unfortunately, there are 
many challenges affecting e-healthcare adoption in developing countries. In this paper we investigate and analyse challenges 
that hinder electronic healthcare adoption in developing countries and Tanzania in particular, and propose cost-effective 
solutions to them. The proposed solutions will help the Tanzanian government in its design and implementation of electronic 
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1. Introduction
Healthcare, either in paper-based or digital format, is an information-intensive industry as for the industry to operate; it de-
pends on the existence of patient health information (PHI) that is collected whenever a patient visits a healthcare centre.  The 
collection of PHI for paper-based or traditional healthcare setup is different from the collection when records are in digital 
form.  The latter is also referred to as e-healthcare.  Contrary to paper-based healthcare setup where PHI is collected every 
time a patient visits a healthcare centre, in e-healthcare physicians collect Personal Identifiable Information (PII) only once 
and frequently update its related medical records.  In general term, e-healthcare is related to computerisation of electronic 
healthcare services.
Many developed countries such as Singapore, Canada, United States of America and United Kingdom have invested huge 
amount of money for stimulating e-healthcare adoption while developing countries are still dependent over the traditional 
healthcare setup.  This huge investment by developed countries is motivated by the problems associated with the traditional 
healthcare setup such as duplication in patient’s records, time wastage while preparing new records and increase in cost of 
delivering care due to duplication of tests and procedures.  Such problems associated with the traditional healthcare setup 
can result in a PHI which is inaccurate, incomplete, outdated and irrelevant to physicians priority tasks and thus not helpful 
in healthcare management decision making (Igira et al., 2007). 
Although many countries, both developed and developing, understand the potential benefits of embracing e-healthcare, there are 
many challenges to be addressed prior to its adoption.  These challenges which differ between countries include lack of patient 
unique identifier, lack of funds, low rate of Internet penetration and low bandwidth, lack of healthcare policies, lack of accept-
able global standards and privacy, confidentiality and security concerns.  In this paper we investigate and analyse challenges 
affecting e-healthcare adoption in developing countries and Tanzania in particular, and propose cost-effective solutions to them. 
The proposed solutions will help the Tanzanian government in its design and implementation of e-healthcare projects.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: in section 2 the background of electronic healthcare, that is a review of its defi-
nitions and services offered, is provided.  In section 3, benefits related to e-healthcare adoption are presented followed by the 
challenges facing e-healthcare adoption in Tanzania in section 4.  Section 5 presents the proposed solutions to the challenges 
highlighted in section 4.  Discussion is provided in section 6 followed by the conclusion and future work in section 7.
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2. E-healthcare: Definition
The term e-healthcare or e-health came into use in the year 2000 and ever since has been broadly and vaguely defined (Pagliari 
et al., 2005).  The term has also been used as a synonym for health informatics, telemedicine, consumer health informatics 
and e-business.  According to the research done by Pagliari et.al’s (2005), e-healthcare definition varies with respect to its 
specified functions, stakeholder focus and specified technologies.  In this section, we review and evaluate selected definitions 
based on the three categories and propose an appropriate definition that will be adopted for the rest of this paper.
Definition Strength/ Weakness
“Healthcare delivery is being transformed by advances in e-health and 
computer-literate public.  Ready to become partners in their own health 
and to take advantage of online processes, health portals and physician 
web pages and e-mail, this new breed of consumer is slowly redefining 
physician/patient relationship.  Such changes can effect positive results 
like improved clinical decision making, increased efficiency and 
strengthened communication between physicians and patients” (Ball & 
Lillis, 2001)
This definition clearly identifies the source of transformation to 
e-healthcare and provides function that is offered through its adoption.  
However, based on the identified function we argue on the negative 
effects of exposing medical information with complex terminologies 
and descriptions to people with little or no medical training through 
the use of health portals.  Its exposition may result into an increase in 
patient’s anxiety and self harm from self diagnosis and treatment.  Due 
to this biasness, this definition is considered inappropriate
“the use of  the Internet for health purposes” (Provost et al., 2003) This definition identifies Internet as the only technology to be used in 
e-healthcare.  From research literature, there are different technologies 
related to the Internet that may be used, hence this definition is 
considered inappropriate
“E-health includes use of the internet or other electronic media to 
disseminate health related information or service” (Gustafson & Whyatt, 
2004 May 15).
This definition is specific on a single function offered by e-healthcare 
that is dissemination of information.  Other functions include storage 
and exchange of clinical data, computer based support, patient-provider 
interaction and many others (Pagliari et al., 2005).
“the use of emerging information and communication technologies, 
especially the Internet, to improve or enable health and health care” (Eng, 
2001).
This is one among the general definitions that has been adapted by 
many researchers from the early emergence of the field.  It provides the 
general functions that can be offered and technologies that may be used.
“An emerging field in the intersection of medical informatics, public health 
and business, referring to health services and information delivered or 
enhanced through the Internet and related technologies.  In a broader sense, 
the term characterizes not only a technical development, but also a state-of-
mind, a way of thinking, an attitude, and a commitment for networked, global 
thinking, to improve health care locally, regionally, and worldwide by using 
information and communication technology” (Eysenbach, 2001 June 18).
It is also a general definition that has been adapted by many researchers 
such as Pagliari et.al’s (2005).  It indicates the originality of 
e-healthcare, functions offered together with technologies that may be 
used.  As this definition is broadly defined, it is considered appropriate 
for this paper
“E-healthcare is an emerging field of medical informatics, referring to 
the organisation and delivery of health services and information using the 
Internet and related technologies.  In broader sense, the term characterizes 
not only a technical development, but also a new way of working, an 
attitude, and a commitment for a networked, global thinking to improve 
health care locally, regionally, and worldwide by using information and 
communication technology” (Pagliari et al., 2005).
This definition has been adapted from Eysenbach (2001 June 18).  From 
the original definition, authors have removed public health and business 
as the other two areas forming e-health. This indicates authors favour 
medical informatics and it is considered inappropriate.
Table 1. Selected Definitions of E-healthcare
From the evaluation of the selected definitions, as indicated in table 1, in this paper we adapt a generic definition from Ey-
senbach (2001 June 18) which was then adapted by many researchers (Pagliari et al., 2005). 
Currently, the term e-healthcare, which is also referred to as the 21st century healthcare, has been identified to offer various 
services such as hospital information systems (HIS), Electronic Health Records (EHR) and telemedicine (Ouma & Hersel-
man, 2008). However, EHR has been identified as the core application; as it provides electronic patients records which are 
input to other e-healthcare services (Grimson et al., June 2000).  Therefore in this paper our main focus will be on EHR and 
only a brief discussion will be provided on other e- healthcare services.
2.1 Hospital Information Systems (HIS)
Information systems (ISs) are usually designed to serve specific purpose in a specific industry or organisation where they 
are designated (Reichertz, 2006).  From ISs definition and depiction in figure 1, HIS can be defined as an information sys-
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tem designed to manage tasks in a hospital.   According to Weber-Jahnke (2008), HIS is a comprehensive and integrated 
information system designed to manage administrative, financial and clinical aspects of a hospital.  HISs can be composed 
of one or more software components with specialty-specific extensions as well as various subsystems in medical fields such 
as laboratory information systems. 
2.2 Telemedicine
Telemedicine means the use of ICT for medical diagnosis and patient care when the healthcare provider and patient are geo-
graphically separated (Perednia & Allen, 1995).  In e-healthcare settings, telemedicine can be as simple as two healthcare 
professionals discussing a case over the telephone or as complex as using satellite technology and video conferencing equip-
ment to conduct a real-time consultation.  Telemedicine has the potential to revolutionalise the way healthcare is delivered 
as it can reach into areas such as rural areas and in wars where traditional healthcare is difficult (Ouma & Herselman, 2008). 
Orlando (2007) argues that the adoption of telemedicine in developing countries is appropriate for addressing the problems 
that exist. These problems include high mortality and mordibility rates, high population and poor communication infrastruc-
tures. Despite its appropriateness, telemedicine is still not used in most developing countries due to insufficient requirements 
such as technologies that are required before its adoption
2.3 Electronic Health Records
Many researchers define and refer to EHR using different terms, such as computer-based patient records (CPR), comput-
erised medical records (CMR), patient carried medical records (PMR) electronic patient records (EPR), electronic medical 
records (EMR), personal health records (PHR) and digital medical record (DMR).   However, this paper adopts the definition 
provided by the Institute of Medicine, IOM, (2003) and Grimson (2001)  which identifies EHR as the longitudinal collec-
tion of electronic patient records for and about patients where health information is pertaining to the health of an individual. 
Included in EHR is the information relating to a patient demographics, past medical history, progress reports, problems that 
the patient was or is facing, medication, laboratory data and radiology reports.  These records have the ability to generate a 
complete record of a patient from cradle-to-grave (Grimson, 2001; IOM, 2003; Ouma & Herselman, 2008). 
3. Benefits to e-healthcare adoption
The adoption and use of ICT has transformed several industries in the world (Wickramasinghe et al., 2005). One among in-
dustries that has been transformed is healthcare, result into e-healthcare.  There are various perceived benefits, to individuals 
and governments, associated with e-healthcare adoption.  These benefits include reduction in medical errors, an improvement 
on physician efficiency, and improvement in physician-patient relationship and cost involved in delivering care.  This sec-
tion provides a discussion of these benefits followed by challenges to e-healthcare adoption in Tanzania in the next section.
3.1 Improvement in physician efficiency
In 2001, Eysenbach (2001 June 18) in his article “What is e-health?” highlights 10 promissory e’s in e-health. Efficiency is 
one among those promises; other e’s stand for enhancing quality of care, evidence-based, empowerment, encouragement, 
education, enabling, extending, ethics and equity.  Theoretically, with the adoption of e-healthcare where patient’s EHRs 
are readily available anytime in e-healthcare information systems, physicians will be able to attend more patients compared 
Figure 1. Hospital Information System by Authors
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to the physician working in a traditional healthcare setup.  However, physicians do not generally agree on this benefit, they 
consider the whole process of obtaining patients records from a range of computer applications as not a clinical skill and 
wastage of time hence resisting their adoption. 
3.2 Improvement in the quality of care
There are two ways that the adoption of e-healthcare can improve the quality of care to patients.  The first way is through 
patients’ and physicians’ use of health web portals. With the presence of health web portals, patients can search for medical 
and related information hence improving their knowledge regarding healthy lifestyles, health and self-treatment.  Addition-
ally, physicians can search for health information on the web for education and research. An Irish citizen, for instance, can 
go online and find almost everything they need to know about health.  The second way that e-healthcare adoption improves 
the quality of care of the patients is through collaboration between physician’s located in different areas within the country 
while delivering care.  This collaboration can be done through video conferencing where physicians in different areas can 
discuss issues pertaining to a patient.  However, this knowledge sharing is difficult due to nature of their work, technological 
concerns and privacy, security and confidentiality concerns. 
3.3 Improvement in Patient- Physician relationship
With its capacity to allow inexpensively retrieval of information anywhere, anytime, Internet is already creating strong 
physician-patient relationship. In fact even the word patient as used in traditional healthcare is now being replaced with con-
sumer in e-healthcare.  In developed countries for example, this strong relationship is influenced by the amount of sensitive 
patient information that is shared between these two groups; as physicians know all about health information of their patients 
from patient’s body to the state of the health (Sharma et al., 20 March 2005).
4. Cost saving
With e-healthcare, there is an existence of digital imaging services that can virtually eliminate the need for films and x-rays. 
Nowadays, radiology department for example, in healthcare centres which have adopted e-healthcare can send digital x-
ray films to healthcare providers’ notebooks and handheld devices as well as mounting devices hence reducing costs.  Cost 
can also be reduced through cutting back unnecessary tests and treatments. In the United States of America for example, a 
Congressional Budget Office report indicates that health information technology (IT) provisions of the federal economic 
stimulus package could help the federal government reduce Medicaid and Medicare costs by more than $ 12 billion over the 
next 10 years which is nearly $ 1.2 billion a year.  The saved money can be used in other sectors and hence contributing to 
the economy of the country. 
Due the presence of these benefits, several countries around the globe especially developed countries are investing huge 
amount of money for e-healthcare adoption.  Contrary to developed countries, developing countries are still dependent over 
the traditional healthcare setup.  In the next section we investigate and analyse challenges that hinder e-healthcare adoption 
in developing countries and cases from Tanzania will be presented.
5. Challenges to e-healthcare adoption: case of Tanzania
While the integration of ICT and healthcare has brought a lot of potential benefits, there are many challenges which affect 
its adoption.  In 2004, the World Health Organisation (WHO) (2004) presented challenges that developing countries face in 
adopting e-healthcare, and EHR in particular.  Likewise, many researchers have also identified challenges associated with 
e-healthcare adoption in developing countries (Androuchko, 2004; Sharma et al., 2006; Sood et al., 2008; WHO, 2006b). 
However, these challenges are not tailored to a specific country. In this section challenges to e-healthcare adoption in devel-
oping countries with cases from Tanzania will be discussed. Solutions to these challenges will be provided in section 5. The 
section begins with an overview of the healthcare sector in Tanzania.
6. Tanzania Healthcare Sector
Tanzania is administratively divided into 2, Tanzania Mainland which consist of 21 regions and Tanzania Island also known 
as Zanzibar which consists of 2 regions.  Among the 21 regions in Tanzania mainland consist of Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, 
Rukwa, Morogoro, Arusha, and many others.  Tanzania Island consists of Unguja and Pemba.  The regions are further divided 
into districts. 
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The population distribution in Tanzania is extremely uneven as more than 80 percent of the population live rural areas leav-
ing 20 percent for urban and other residing in foreign countries.  Tanzania has more than 130 ethnic groups but the national 
language is Swahili, which is a Bantu language, with strong Arabic and English borrowings. The other official language is 
English. 
The health infrastructure and healthcare services are provided through three main levels, namely, primary care level com-
prising of the first and second line healthcare units and primary healthcare centres, secondary level which consist of district 
hospitals and tertiary level consisting of specialised hospitals such as Muhimbili and Mnazi Mmoja in Tanzania mainland 
and Tanzania island respectively (Igira et al., 2007).  The healthcare setup is traditionally based and is faced with a number 
of problems from compiling, analysing, and reporting to the management of healthcare data.   With these challenges, it is of 
importance to examine challenges that hinder e-healthcare adoption in developing countries and Tanzania in particular. 
6.1. Lack of Patient’s Unique Identifier
Johns (2002) defines Patient Unique Identifier (PUI) as a single unique number assigned to each patient within a hospital that 
distinguishes one patient and his or her records from all others.  Therefore, since EHR contains sensitive patient records from 
cradle to grave, it is necessary to have PUI to differentiate patient’s records.  However, due to cost involved in its generation, 
only few countries are using PUIs. The majority opt for alternative solutions such as citizen unique identifiers. 
Unfortunately, things are not the same in Tanzania.  Although there have been efforts to establish National Identity Cards 
(NIC) since 1968, which can be used as a citizens’ unique identifier, this has not yet occurred due to a number of reasons. 
It is only recently, in 2007, that the government of Tanzania has agreed on the establishment of a NIC scheme under the 
National Identification Authority (NIDA). 
6.2. Lack of funds
The lack of funds is one of the major problems facing e-healthcare adoption in many developing countries.  As a result of the 
lack of funds to control their own projects, many developing countries largely depend on foreign aids. For Tanzania, these 
foreign aids from developed countries are even controlling the whole economy of the country by looking on the percentage of 
budgets dependence.  The Tanzania’s budget in the year 2007 depended on foreign aid by 42 percent and the expectation was 
to reduce the dependence rate to 34 percent in 2008 (Mkulo, 2008). As a result of ongoing dependency on foreign aids that 
is, monetary and through resources, many e-healthcare projects which are funded by developed countries, is often directed 
to certain diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Therefore, e-healthcare adoption in developing countries is limited to certain diseases 
and is not available generally within the country.
6.3. Low rate of internet penetration and low bandwidth
According to the International Telecommunication Union, ITU, (2007), by the year 2006, the Internet penetration in Tanzania 
was 1 percent of the population compared to 6.0, 7.9 and 10.5 percent of the population in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa 
respectively.  The low rate of Internet penetration and low bandwidth are among the challenges to e-healthcare adoption 
in Tanzania.  Due to the poor ICT infrastructure, the majority of areas in the country cannot support Internet deployment, 
which in turn, hampers e-healthcare adoption.  In urban areas, where there is considerable Internet penetration, there is low 
bandwidth which again hampers its utilisation.  The slow adoption to ICT in developing countries is influenced by several 
factors such as the perception of its leaders as it is a misallocation of resources, politics and ICT not being a priority of the 
country.  Therefore, since EHRs need to be shared between physicians located in different healthcare centres, these factors 
subsequently hinder its adoption and use.  Other factors apart from low rate of Internet penetration that hinder EHR sharing 
include technological concerns, privacy, and security and confidentiality concerns. 
6.4. Lack of healthcare policies
Policy, as defined in Oxford English Dictionary (OED, 1989), is a purposeful plan of action to guide decisions and achieve 
rational outcomes.  In the context of the healthcare industry, healthcare policies are responsible for providing evidence-based, 
peer reviewed policy guidance and resources to support advocacy decision making at the local level.  Additionally, health-
care policy creates a framework to provide necessary conditions for the implementation of health promotion activities, and 
interventions by using particular tools such as laws, policy measures, policy documents and agreements.  The lack of these 
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policies will pose another challenge in e-healthcare since those responsible for making decisions will make them without 
guidance.  Most developed countries and some developing countries such as South Africa have healthcare policies in place 
to guide the deliverance of electronic healthcare services; however in Tanzania there is no healthcare policy related to the 
delivery of e-healthcare services.
6.5. Lack of acceptable standards
For future processing of EHRs, chosen computer systems should be able to identify data in one system and associate them 
with data located in other systems (Wickramasinghe et al., 2005).  This is accomplished by the existence of standards for 
different uses. In developed countries such as United Kingdom and United States of America, there is a huge amount of 
research institutions trying to establish standards for different uses. 
Among the established standards is Healthcare Level 7 (HL7) for transmission of e-healthcare information, SNOMED CT 
(Systematised Nomenclature for Medicine Clinical Terms) developed by the College of American Pathologists and National 
Health Service (NHS) in England (SNOMED-International, 2009) and CEN 13606 for the exchange of shared EHR. However, 
there are no acceptable standards agreed to be used globally in e-healthcare.  Politics at an international level which involve 
companies and organisations that develop e-healthcare standards is one among the reasons for the lack of acceptable global 
standards.  The lack of acceptable global standards is also influenced by historical reasons and digital divide. 
6.6. Lack of manpower
Another challenge for e-healthcare adoption in developing countries is the availability of an adequately skilled healthcare 
workforce. In a study by Sood et al.’s (2004) which examined challenges that healthcare workforce face while implement-
ing telemedicine technology in India, computer literacy was considered to be the main challenge. This may be the same in 
Tanzania. As shown in figure 2, there are few physicians, pharmacists, dentists and technicians while the major group com-
prises of nurses and midwives and other healthcare workers.  The latter group is characterised by the low level of education 
compared to the previous group.  With an unequal distribution between these two groups, e-healthcare adoption will succeed 
more slowly when compared to a situation when the distribution is more equal.
7. ICT challenges
The majority of developing countries population live in rural areas. According to the Tanzanian Government website, 80 
percent of its total population live in rural areas (Government, 2009). The ICT, which is the backbone to e-healthcare adop-
tion and implementation, is still out of reach for this large group due to a number of reasons:
Access cost: According to International Monetary Fund, IMF, (IMF, 2005) in 2004, roughly half of the world population live 
on less than one dollar a day. Most of these people reside in developing countries.  Contrary, access to ICT in these develop-
ing countries involve large amount of money which many potential users can not afford.
Education: Despite opting for ICT in their day to day tasks, many organisations in developing countries lack security aware-
ness programs for their employees. According to Desman (2001), security awareness refers to employees’ understanding on 
security control measures and their consequences. The lack of security awareness programs increases the chances of security 
breaches. On a survey done by Lupiana (Lupiana, 2008), identified a huge gap on computer security perception between 
developed and developing countries where Tanzania was considered as a case for developing countries.
Language: Poor literacy is another major problem related to ICT, such as the Internet, in developing countries. As majority 
of the population in developing countries reside in rural areas, they are divided into regions which speak different native 
languages.  And for those who can read, may know only a local language such as Swahili in Tanzania while Internet is 
dominated by English-language.
8. Privacy, confidentiality and security concerns
Despite the presence of other challenges that countries may face in its adoption to e-healthcare; privacy, confidentiality and 
security are the three important challenges involved in protecting patient healthcare information from accidental or intentional 
misuse (Maheu et al., 2001).  According to Rindfleish (August 1997),  in e-healthcare context, privacy is defined as the right 
and desire of an individual to control the collection, use and disclosure of his or her health information while confidentiality 
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refers to the controlled release of personal health information to a care provider or information custodian under an agreement 
that limits the extent and conditions under which that information may be used or released further.  
The confidentiality of the patient healthcare information may be broken either internally, by accidental disclosure, insider 
curiosity or by an insider subornation or may be broken from outside intrusion through unauthorised access (Kelly & Unsal, 
2002).  Security is defined as methods such as policies, procedures or safeguards by which access to patient health information 
is controlled and protected from accidental or intentional disclosure to unauthorised persons, and from alteration, destruction 
and loss (Maheu et al., 2001; Rindfleisch, August 1997).
IT solution companies are among the main enforcers to e-healthcare adoption and implementation.  These companies are 
interested with the financial gain from e-healthcare products that they produce.  They concentrate much in producing usable 
products and hence causing security to suffer. Insufficient security which causes breaches in e-healthcare information systems 
results into privacy, security and confidentiality concerns. These three are also the major challenges in developed countries. 
Other challenges in developed countries include
8.1 Resistance to Information and Communication Technology 
IT solution companies claim over a number of benefits, such as reduction in medical errors and cost of delivering care and 
improvement in physician efficiency that can be offered through e-healthcare adoption.  Despite being outlined with these 
benefits, healthcare professionals still resist to incorporate computer technology while attending patients.  These professionals 
prefer to write prescriptions for example by hand rather than using the technology more efficiently.  The resistance has been 
associated with a number of reasons.  Healthcare professionals claim the whole process of obtaining patients records from a 
range of computer applications as not the clinical skill and wastage of time.  For developing countries Sprague (September 29, 
2004) and Sood et.al (2008) identify lack of training in ICT and computer illiteracy as the source of healthcare professionals 
resistance.  For a successful implementation of e-healthcare in the world, computer skills to all healthcare professionals and 
staff involved in the process is a must.
8.2 Number of breaches in e-healthcare information systems
E-healthcare is an information-intensive industry as it contains sensitive information about an individual that may cause 
identity theft and social stigma to an individual if compromised.  This information is also referred to as electronic health 
record (EHR).  The electronic healthcare record is processed and stored in electronic healthcare information systems (Haux, 
2006).  Influenced by the type of information that is processed and stored in these systems, a number of breaches from within 
Figure 2. Healthcare workforce distribution in Tanzania (WHO, 2006a)
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or outside an organisation keep on increasing.  When users learn about these breaches, get worried about their privacy and 
hence resist e-healthcare adoption.  For the organisations where these breaches occur or their products are associated with 
the breaches may suffer from reputation of their brand and from legal liability.
8.3 Fear of losing control of their data
The shift from traditional healthcare to e-healthcare involves the transformation of records from paper-based to digital format. 
These records are referred to as Electronic Healthcare Record (EHR).  Grimson (2001) defines and characterises the next 
generation EHR as the longitudinal cradle-to-grave records readily accessible and available over the Internet.  These records 
will be linked to clinical protocols and guidelines to drive the delivery of healthcare to the individual.  The presence of these 
records over the Internet facilitates record sharing between physicians.   However, patients usually feel that they are losing 
control of their data hence resisting e-healthcare adoption.
8.4 Poor e-healthcare systems design
Many e-healthcare systems are developed by Information Technology (IT) solution companies which operate for the purpose 
of getting profit.  These companies are interested with the financial gain from e-healthcare products that they produce.  They 
concentrate much in producing usable products for healthcare institutions and hence causing privacy, security and confiden-
tiality to suffer.  In order to resolve this, efforts to secure e-healthcare systems need to be taken from design of the systems 
to implementation in order for the developments that have been achieved so far to be rolled to the real world. 
8.5 Proposed Solutions
In this section we propose solutions to the challenges identified in section 4 as follows: Using birth certificates as an alterna-
tive PUI, cheaper operating systems for e-healthcare software, the improvement of computer infrastructures, and in-service 
training and incorporation of new syllabus as training procedures.
8.6 Alternative Patient Unique Identifiers
We are proposing the use of birth certificate numbers as an alternative solution to uniquely identify individuals when adopt-
ing e-healthcare and EHR in particular in Tanzania.  Although national IDs, blood donor IDs and mother’s maiden names 
have been proposed as alternative solutions in other developing countries (WHO, 2006b), these solutions are inappropriate. 
For instance, the use of national IDs as an alternative may result into several problems such as service overload as the same 
ID is used in more than one system.  As previously described EHR have to exist from cradle to grave, however national IDs 
are given to those aged 18 years and above, this will result into e-healthcare delivery bias as only adults would benefit from 
the service. 
Moreover, with blood donor IDs, only few citizens participate in blood donation. As a result only few possess these IDs. 
Therefore, both national and blood donor IDs are inappropriate alternatives as they are only limited to a small group of citizens. 
Additionally, mother’s maiden name is also becomes an inappropriate alternative solution to PUI when a single mother has 
two or more children.  This may result in easy compromises and hence threaten the privacy of individuals.  Therefore, birth 
certificate number remains as an appropriate alternative for PUI in Tanzania.
The Tanzania Birth and Death Registration Act was first established on the 15th of December 1920 aiming to make provision 
for the registration of births and deaths and for the issue by medical practitioners of certificates of the cause of death (RITA, 
2009).  The Birth and Death Act allows every child born alive after the commencement of this Act to be registered within 
three months of birth by father, mother, occupier of the house in which to his knowledge such child is born, person present 
at the birth or the person having charge of such child.  Upon registration, each child receives a uniquely enumerated birth 
certificate.  As every individual is eligible to receive a birth certificate this is an appropriate PUI, as it can uniquely identify 
all citizens, young and old.
8.7 Free and Open Source Software (FOSS)
In relation to the lack of funding for e-healthcare adoption in Tanzania, we are proposing the deployment of FOSS in health-
care industry.  There are huge amount of FOSS, ranging from operating systems such as Linux to e-healthcare software such 
as Care2X (Care2X, 2009) and openEHR (openEHR, 2009). Since the majority of developed countries such as the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and Singapore have engaged themselves in using FOSS such as Care2X and openEHR in e-healthcare 
implementation; it is therefore plausible for developing countries and Tanzania in particular to adopt FOSS. Additionally, 
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since proprietary software involves licensing which is often too expensive, by deploying FOSS we are definite that the cost 
of deploying and running e-healthcare will be reduced.
8.8 Proper cost evaluation
To resolve the issue of perception of cost and ROI, cost evaluators in Tanzania should learn from ongoing e-healthcare projects 
in other developing countries and take proper initiatives to evaluate e-healthcare projects on a long-term basis. They need 
to make proper comparisons between the cost of current systems and the perceived cost of the intended new e-healthcare 
systems against the proposed benefits that the country might receive (WHO, 2004). This evaluation will help the government 
and individuals to understand the benefits of these projects and hence resolve the misleading notion of e-healthcare projects 
involving high costs.
8.9 Computing infrastructure Improvement
Computer infrastructure is the backbone to e-healthcare services implementation. However, Tanzania, for the proper adop-
tion of e-healthcare, must first deploy computers and computer systems for use in the healthcare industry before adopting 
e-healthcare fully.  E-healthcare can then provide more services which requires more technology integration such as tele-
medicine (Perednia & Allen, 1995).   Additionally, the government has to control computer and computer systems prices, so 
that the majority of people can possess them, as well as controlling Internet access costs.
8.10 Training
As highlighted in figure 2, most of healthcare workers in Tanzania are Nurses and Midwives and other healthcare workers. 
These groups form 80 percent of overall healthcare workers.  Unfortunately, these workers lack computer skills as well as 
general skills for the use of E-healthcare information systems.  For the proper implementation of e-healthcare in Tanzania, 
this group should be offered in-service training as they can eliminate manpower issues in short term basis.  As a short-term 
solution, in service training is the appropriate way to ensure availability of the required skills at the required time.  To support 
this, WHO (2006b) highlighted the need for a basic form of training if e-healthcare has to be implemented in a country. 
In the long-term, healthcare institutions, where Nurses and Midwives and other healthcare workers are trained, should in-
corporate e-healthcare syllabus to its respective courses. 
8.11 Regulations
In relation to the privacy, confidentiality and security concerns in e-healthcare adoption, strong security and regulation 
measures need to be taken into consideration by the Tanzanian government. For the case of security concerns such as unau-
thorised access to e-healthcare information systems which might cause social embarrassment, prejudice or affect insurability, 
technological security tools such as encryption and access control are in place to help protect sensitive patient healthcare 
information.  Although we propose security tools to address security concerns, regulations are appropriate for protecting the 
privacy of individuals. The Tanzanian government have to establish regulations for protecting privacy of its citizens before 
e-healthcare adoption.  One among the regulations established for protecting privacy of individuals is HIPAA, Health Insur-
ance and Portability and Accountability Act, (1996) from the United States of America.
8.12 Discussion
One major obstacle in e-healthcare adoption, either in developed or developing countries is privacy, confidentiality and 
security of e-healthcare information systems.  The American government, for instance, for the year 2009 reserved $ 19 bil-
lion for stimulating e-healthcare adoption.  However, despite this huge investment, e-healthcare adoption in the USA is still 
stumbling.  Its users such as physicians are not sure about the security of e-healthcare information systems and hence resisting 
their deployment and use.  Additionally, patients are also concerned about the privacy of their medical records.  This has been 
influenced by a number of existing cases involving breaches in e-healthcare information systems.  However, we argue that 
e-healthcare adoption is not a monetary problem per se.  It goes beyond, to involve human trust.  Therefore, despite focusing 
on securing funds for e-healthcare deployment, developing countries have to consider the human element as well. 
 The lack of PUIs is another big challenge for e-healthcare adoption in developed and developing countries.  Although some 
developed countries have specific PUIs, majority are still opting for existing alternative solutions.  For instance, the Republic 
of Ireland has proposed the use of Social Security Number (SSN) as an alternative to PUIs while we propose to use birth 
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certificate numbers as an alternative for PUI in Tanzania.  In this paper we propose the use of birth certificate numbers, which 
every citizen in Tanzania is legally entitled to possess, for the sake of saving cost as opposed to the national IDs which are 
costly to generate and can result in service overload and will create bias to those who can and cannot receive e-healthcare 
services due to age.  To possess a birth certificate in Tanzania costs less than two dollars.  However, the use of birth certificates 
may also result into service overload.  This is not much of a concern as we lack funding to support these projects; we need 
to seek cost-effective solutions that are beneficial to developing countries.   The only big challenge that will be faced by the 
use of birth certificates is that not all citizens are aware that they are legally allowed to possess birth certificates.  This can 
be overcome by the provision of education to individuals, especially in rural areas. 
Although we propose the use of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) (from operating system to EHR software) due to 
the lack of funds, these products are associated with a number of challenges.  As these products are “free”, its users lack 
support and maintenance from development teams.  The Tanzanian government needs to reserve enough funds for staff train-
ing in the healthcare industry. If e-health is to flourish in Tanzania, it needs to be staged and nurtured.  We need to build on 
our own local skills and infrastructure, based on local demand. Table 1 provides a summary of issues, challenges and their 
suggested solutions.
8.13 Conclusions and Future Work
From research literature, developed and developing countries face different challenges while adopting e-healthcare. Despite 
offering several benefits, lack of patient unique identifier, lack of funds, low rate of Internet penetration and low bandwidth, 
lack of healthcare policies and lack of acceptable global standards are among the common challenges hindering e-healthcare 
adoption in developing countries.  In this paper we have identified challenges that developing countries particularly Tanzania 
will face while adopting e-healthcare. Based on these challenges we have also proposed cost-effective solutions that will help 
the government of Tanzania in its design and implementation of electronic healthcare projects. 
Additionally, apart from the identified challenges; privacy, security and confidentiality are among the common challenges 
to both developed and developing countries. As a future work we propose research to be carried out to identify appropriate 
security to be implemented in FOSS e-healthcare information systems. As the users of e-healthcare information systems such 
as physicians, patients and insurance companies resist their use due to security concerns, assuring their security will boost 
their trust and hence boost their adoption.
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Abstract— Although many of the healthcare decisions are 
influenced by individual’s characteristics and choices, highly 
dynamic nature of the healthcare environment has introduced 
numerous challenges to EHRs such as privacy and security. 
Some accumulating evidences show that adding context in an 
access control model can help improve the security of EHRs by 
providing dynamic levels of access to the records while taking 
into consideration environmental and healthcare professional’s 
context. Contrary to its promises, when appropriately used, 
researchers in the healthcare environment are still using 
contextual attributes proposed by researchers from other 
domains such as Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp). This act, in 
turn, reduces the rate of protection of EHRs as different domains 
consider some contextual attributes to be more important than 
the other. 
Again, with the nature of information that is collected, 
processed and stored using Electronic Healthcare Information 
Systems, close attention should be paid out to who controls what 
is gathered, who has access to it and where that information is 
stored. Taking into consideration the need of knowing where 
EHRs are stored, then contrary to identity, location, time and 
activity, which are mostly used in UbiComp and other domains, 
in our ongoing work, we propose to use subject, time and activity 
while replacing location with resource as location cannot stand 
on its own without resource or subject to be associated with it. 
In this paper we investigate how rich in context the general 
healthcare environment is and thereafter propose relevant 
contextual attributes for the domain. The proposed contextual 
attributes will be used as a guideline while identifying specific 
contextual attributes for the Tanzania’s healthcare environment 
as different healthcare workflows have different context that 
need to be considered important. The approach being adopted 
for our main research is by adding specific contextual attributes, 
from the Tanzania’s healthcare environment, into the Role Based 
Access Control model while developing a dynamic context-aware 
access control model for securing EHRs in Tanzania. 
 
Keywords— Electronic Healthcare Record, Context, Access 
Control, Dynamic Healthcare Environment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of context intersects with a diverse range of 
research from Artificial Intelligence (AI), Ontology, 
Knowledge Representation to healthcare [1].  With this 
multiplicity of domains where context has been differently 
defined and various contextual attributes have been proposed, 
it is therefore, not obvious to define context. However, in 
order to propose contextual features also known as contextual 
attributes that need to be considered while providing 
healthcare professionals with dynamic levels of access to 
patient’s Electronic Healthcare Records (EHRs), clear 
definition of context as well as relevant contextual attributes 
from the domain need to be provided [2]. The term dynamic 
levels of access to patient’s records means healthcare 
professionals will be provided with varying levels of access to 
the records depending on contextual attributes gathered.  
Consider, for example, two healthcare professionals 
requesting access the John’s EHRs; the first healthcare 
professional is requesting to access records while outside of 
the healthcare centre and the other is in the ward (within the 
hospital). While considering location (context) before 
providing access, then these two professionals will be 
provided with two different levels of access to the record as 
the latter may be provided access to only basic information 
while the other being given full access. 
For the whole hospital, context tends to improve 
operational efficiency by integrating real time contextual 
information, such as location and status of medical equipment 
and staff, into the healthcare workflow. As a result, context 
enhances the quality of patient care, increases staff efficiency 
while helping the healthcare organisation manage capital and 
operational costs. In relation to patients in general, context 
enables access to environmental information, such as 
temperature or humidity, to provide an optimal patient 
experience [3] while to patient’s records, the inclusion of 
contextual attributes may result into healthcare professionals 
to be provided with dynamic levels of access to the records 
and hence ensuring confidentiality as well as security of 
records .  
As an example, consider the following scenario for the 
applicability of the contextual attributes in the dynamic 
healthcare environment. 
 
Within a hospital, a healthcare professional can move 
between theatre, ward, pharmacy, office, front desk and 
meeting room. He may also request to access Electronic 
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Healthcare Records while outside the hospital. This movement 
may occur at different times.  
Let’s say John is a healthcare professional at the 
Muhimbili National Hospital in Dar es Salam, Tanzania. He 
has the privileges to access Anna’s sensitive Electronic 
Healthcare Records (EHRs). He requested to access Anna’s 
records at 8:00 am when in a meeting room with other 
healthcare professionals and again requested to access the 
records at 3:0pm while at the front desk and lastly he 
requested to access Anna’s records at 8:00 pm, he while 
outside the hospital.  
 
From the above scenario, let’s say we consider location (of 
the subject) and time as our contextual attributes whereby 
 
Subject_role = (Consultant, Specialist, Doctor, Nurse) 
Location = (theatre, ward, pharmacy, office, front_desk,    
                   meeting_room, outside_hospital) 
Time = (6:00am<time<5:00pm)  
 
Note: Time indicates the duration where healthcare 
professionals can provide services to patients from outside 
(outpatients).  
With these information then we can create a condition in an 
access control model by including these information and 
hence reducing the chances for breaching patient’s 
confidentiality as well as security of the records. Example of 
the conditions may be 
 
{subject: (can_access if subject_role = “doctor” ^ 
location = “theatre, ward, office” ^ time<5:00pm)} 
 
Again as the state-of-art for the protection of EHRs in the 
healthcare environment, various access control models such as 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [4], Team-Based Access 
Control (TMAC) [5] and Task-Based Access Control (TBAC) 
[6] have been used. With RBAC, access control decisions are 
often determined by the roles individual users take on as part 
of an organisation while TMAC and TBAC consider group 
roles and progression of the tasks respectively to control 
access to information. Due to the nature of the healthcare 
environment, these models and others are considered 
insufficient for the dynamic healthcare environment. The 
RBAC does not support the use of contextual attributes as it 
may result into role explosion while TMAC and TBAC are 
special configurations of RBAC. Therefore, with the 
identified promises of context in the dynamic healthcare 
environment, in this paper we look at how researchers other 
domains have attempted to define context in their own work 
as well as propose relevant contextual attributes for the 
domain. 
Organisation of the paper: Section 2 provides a review of 
various definitions of context proposed by researchers from 
different domains. Section 3 discusses categories of context. 
Section 4 presents a review of context specifically for the 
healthcare environment while section 5 provides descriptions 
of contextual attributes. Section 6 provides discussion and 
future work 
A. Aim of the Paper 
Based on the survey performed on existing research 
literature, we intend to analyse how rich in contextual 
attributes the dynamic healthcare environment is and then 
propose relevant contextual attributes, with its associated 
subcategories, for the dynamic healthcare environment. 
B. Methodology Used 
For this study, research has been done through major 
electronic research databases (such as Medline, PubMed), 
scientific journals via their own sites as well as Web Search 
Engines (mostly Google Scholar). These resources were used 
to identify research published from different domains such as 
UbiComp that identify relevant contextual attributes for their 
domains. 
Different themes were used to identify relevant papers for 
this study. The themes used include i. Context ii. Contextual 
attributes iii. Contextual attributes in healthcare iv. Context 
and electronic healthcare. To broaden our research references 
from the main papers were also studied. 
II. CONTEXT 
In this section we review various definitions of context that 
has been proposed by researchers from other domains and 
then evaluate them before proposing relevant contextual 
attributes for the dynamic healthcare environment.  
The first and formal definition of context which enumerates 
context as location of use, identities of the nearby people and 
objects and changes to those objects over time was proposed 
by Schilit [7]. In a similar way, Ryan et al. [8] define context 
as user's location, environment, identity and time while Brown 
et al. [9] considered context as location, identities of the 
people around the user, orientation  of the device, and time of 
the day, season of the year, temperature and so forth. Dey [10] 
enumerates context further as user's emotional state, focus of 
attention, location and orientation, date and time, objects and 
people in the user's environment. 
Although these definitions provide examples of contextual 
attributes, it is difficult to apply any of them when we want to 
determine whether a type of information not listed in the 
definition is context or not. To solve the aforementioned 
problem, Dey and Abowd [11] provided a thorough definition 
which describes context as any information that can be used to 
characterise the situation of an entity where an entity is a 
person, place, or object that is considered relevant to the 
interaction between a user and an application, including the 
user and applications themselves. Therefore from the 
definition, Dey and Abowd propose location, identity, time 
and activity as relevant contextual attributes. 
Contextual attributes proposed by Ryan et al. [8] are 
considered as the consensus to those proposed by Dey and 
Abowd [11]. The only difference that exists in terms of 
contextual attributes between the two is that the latter 
proposed activity as contextual attribute instead of 
environment proposed by the former. Dey and Abowd [11] 
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argue that environment is a synonym for context and does not 
add anything in their research while activity will characterise 
the situation by indicating what is really occurring in such a 
situation. 
III. CATEGORIES OF CONTEXT 
As highlighted in section 1, the principal aim of this paper 
is to propose relevant contextual attributes for the dynamic 
healthcare environment. The categorisation of context will 
help in identifying specific contextual attributes that need to 
be considered while providing healthcare professionals with 
dynamic levels of access to sensitive patient’s EHRs.  
Therefore, from section 2, different researchers have 
provided different categories of context. Dey and Abowd [11] 
while working in the UbiComp domain list location, identity, 
time and activity as important contextual attributes to the 
interaction between user and application while Schilit and 
Theimer [12] suggest location and identity as contextual 
attributes. Summary of the contextual attributes proposed by 
various researchers have been provided in table I. 
TABLE I 
 SUMMARY OF CONTEXTUAL ATTRIBUTES 
No. Author Contextual Attributes 
1 Brown et al. [13] Location, Time of the day, 
Season, Temperature, 
Identities of the people around 
the user, Orientation 
2 Ryan et al. [8] Location, Environment, 
Identity and Time 
3 Dey [10] User's emotional state, Focus 
of attention, Location of 
attention, Date and Time, 
Objects and People in user's 
environment 
4 Dey and Abowd 
[11] 
Location, Identity, Activity 
and Time. 
5 Schilit and 
Theimer [12] 
Location and Identity 
information 
6 Coutaz et al. 
[14] 
Location and Identity 
7 Beresford [15] Summarises Dey and Abowd's 
(2000) categories as 
Identity: identity of relevant 
entities. 
Location: geographical 
position of relevant entities 
Activity: activity or activities 
being performed 
Time: time period at which 
entities perform the activity 
8 Kjeldskov and 
Skov [16] 
Location, Time and Tasks. 
 
Based on the literature review, as indicated in table 1, there 
is a huge variation on contextual attributes proposed by 
various researchers. Location, identity and time appear more 
compared to other attributes such as temperature and season. 
To resolve contextual attributes variation issue, Beresford [15], 
claims that, there are primary and secondary context whereby 
secondary context requires an association with one or more 
primary context to be meaningful. Therefore, for example, 
temperature is a secondary attribute associated with location 
while date of birth and address are secondary attributes 
associated with identity 
IV. CONTEXT IN THE HEALTHCARE ENVIRONMENT 
For contextual attributes in the healthcare environment, 
Bricon-Souf and Newman [1] also argue that location, identity 
of the healthcare professionals and time are the most common 
attributes considered. However, from the literature review 
performed, we argue that the dynamic healthcare environment, 
which at the same time considered collaborative, is rich in 
context and there is lack of research to-date performed to 
identify contextual attributes specifically for the environment. 
For this paper identification of the contextual attributes 
together with their respective subcategories relevant for the 
dynamic healthcare environment is considered to be one of its 
contributions 
Contrary to various contextual attributes proposed from 
other domains, for the dynamic healthcare environment we 
propose the use of resource rather than location. As EHRs are 
processed, stored (databases) and transmitted using EHISs 
then there is a need of using attributes of the database where 
these records are stored. The summary of the proposed 
contextual attributes and their sub categories has been 
provided in table II. In section 5 each proposed category 
together with its subcategory is briefly discussed. 
V. CONTEXTUAL ATTRIBUTES: DESCRIPTIONS 
As presented in table II, contextual attributes in dynamic 
and collaborative healthcare environment can be categorised 
into four groups. These are attributes associated with the 
subject, time, activity and resource, whereby  
• Subject involves individuals involved in the processing 
EHRs 
• Activity: Includes activity or activities being 
performed 
• Time: Is the time period at which entities perform the 
activity 
• Resource: Is the storage space for Electronic 
Healthcare Records 
 
As indicated in table III, Subject has various attributes 
associated with it such as Subject ID, Subject Name, Group 
ID, Group Name, Session Start Time, Session Start Date, 
Session Start Time and Date, IP Address, etc while Resource, 
as indicated in table IV, is associated with Resource Label, 
Resource Name, Row Label, View Label, Schema Label, 
Catalog Label, Database Label, Database Name, Column 
Name etc. 
In addition to subject and resource’s context, there is time 
and activity. Time is associated with Current Time, Current 
Date and Current Date and Time while Activity is associated 
with Activity ID, Activity Type and Activity Request 
Location. 
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With the presence of these and other attributes in the 
healthcare environment, which involves processing of 
sensitive patients information, combining with the fact that the 
more contextual attributes used the more fine-grained access 
control system becomes then there is a need of identifying 
specific contextual attributes for certain environment if EHRs 
need to be protected.  
 
TABLE II 
SUMMARY OF CONTEXTUAL ATTRIBUTES 
Subject Time Activity Resource 
Subject ID Current Time Action ID Resource Label 
Subject Name Current Date Action Type Resource Name 
Group ID Current Time Date Action Request 
Location 
Row Label 
Group Name   Table Label 
Session Start Time   View Label 
Session Start Date   Schema Label 
Session Start Time Date   Catalog Label 
IP Address   Database Label 
DNS Name   Column Name 
Session Label   Table Name 
User Current Location   View Name 
User Allocated Location   Schema Name 
   Catalog Name 
   Database Name 
   Any-row field value 
  
 
 
TABLE III 
SUBJECT ASSOCIATED ATTRIBUTES 
ATTRIBUTE DESCRIPTION 
Subject ID This is the numerical user-ID of the database subject performing the 
current database operation 
Subject Name This is the text user-name of the database subject performing the current 
database operation 
Group ID This is the numerical group ID of the database project performing the 
current database operation 
Group Name This is the test group name of the database subject performing the 
current database operation 
Session Start Time This is the local time the database subject started the current database 
session 
Session Start Date This is the local date the subject started the current database session 
Session Start Date 
Time 
This is the local date and time the database subject started the current 
database session 
IP Address This is the IP network address from which the current database subject 
started the current database session 
DNS Name This is the Domain-Name Service host name from which the database 
subject started the current database session 
Session Label This is the database session label at the time the database operation was 
submitted 
User Current 
Location 
As healthcare professionals tend to move over time, this is the current 
location where the user is. 
User Allocated 
Location 
This is the permanent location where the healthcare professional is 
allocated as his/her area of duty. 
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 TABLE IV 
RESOURCE ASSOCIATED ATTRIBUTES 
ATTRIBUTE DESCRIPTION 
 Resource Label This is the sensitivity label of the database object currently being acted upon. 
Example of the resource label include: For row select: the label is row label, for 
schema open, label is schema label and for database-open the label is database-
label 
Resource Name This is the fully specified name of the database object currently being operated 
upon. For table open, then the table name will be its associated resource name 
while for view-create its associated resource name is view-name. 
Row Label This is the sensitivity label of the database row currently being operated upon. 
This attribute only is associated with row-associated attributes such as row-insert, 
row-select, row-delete etc. 
View Label This is the sensitivity label of the database view currently operated upon. Like in 
row, this attribute is only associated with the database view such as view-open, 
view-create, view-drop operations. 
Schema Label This is the sensitivity label of the database schema currently being operated upon. 
 Catalog Label  is the sensitivity label of the database catalog currently being operated upon 
Database Label This is the sensitivity label of the database currently being operated upon 
Column Name This represent multi valued bag of specified column names of the database row 
currently being operated upon 
Table Name This represents the fully specified name of the database currently being operated 
upon 
 View Name This is the full specified name of the database view currently being operated 
upon. 
 Schema Name This is the fully specified name of the database catalog currently being operated 
upon. 
Database Name This is the name of the database currently operated upon. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have proposed contextual attributes, 
together with their respective subcategories, relevant for the 
dynamic healthcare environment. Contrary to other domains 
where location, identity and time appear to be more important, 
in healthcare we propose the use of these three attributes 
together with resource rather than location. The reason behind 
our selection of resource rather than location is that location is 
basically associated with the subject or resource as it cannot 
stand on its own without resource or subject in place. 
Generally speaking, location is a secondary attribute to subject 
and resource. In addition, resource is more important in 
healthcare as it is where patient’s Electronic Healthcare 
Record is stored. 
As context tends to affect security, together with difficulty 
in defining context, then the proposed contextual attributes for 
the dynamic healthcare environment will be used as a 
guideline while identifying specific contextual attributes for 
the Tanzania’s healthcare environment. The approach being 
adopted for our main research is by adding specific contextual 
attributes, from the Tanzania’s healthcare environment, into 
the Role Based Access Control model while developing a 
dynamic context-aware access control model for securing 
EHRs in Tanzania. As for our future work we intend to 
propose appropriate contextual attributes, specific for the 
Tanzania’s healthcare workflow, after conducting an in-depth 
interview and survey with healthcare professionals in the area. 
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ABSTRACT 
Electronic healthcare, while exciting and promising, 
presents many challenges to patients’ Electronic 
Healthcare Records (EHRs) such as Privacy and 
Security. Some accumulating evidences show that 
adding appropriate context in an access control model 
can help improve the security of EHRs. Contrary to 
such benefits, researchers in the healthcare 
environment are yet to harness it as they keep on 
adopting context proposed in other domains such as 
Ubiquitous Computing. This act, in turn, reduces the 
rate of protection of EHRs as wrong contextual 
information results into wrong access control and 
hence insecure EHR systems. In this paper we analyse 
how rich in terms of context the healthcare 
environment is and then propose relevant contextual 
attributes for the domain. Moreover we examine the 
usage of proposed contextual attributes into the 
existing access control models. 
 
Keywords: Context, Access Control, Electronic 
Healthcare Record 
 
I.INTRODUCTION 
The shift in the healthcare domain from paper-
based towards Internet-related healthcare activities 
often referred to as “e-healthcare” is dramatic and 
considered as the most significant development in 
the healthcare domain. Although this change is 
considered exciting and promising, it presents 
many challenges to patients’ EHRs such as privacy 
and security. While these challenges exist in other 
domains as well, in the healthcare environment 
they are considered critical due to the sensitivity of 
patients’ information that is being processed, 
stored and transmitted using EHR systems.  The 
security breaches towards EHR systems may result 
into patients’ harm, social embarrassment or 
prejudice and may even affect patient’s 
insurability. Despite the presence of association 
between these two challenges, privacy and security, 
in this paper our main focus will be on security. 
Current solutions to this problem (mostly built 
on Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) which uses 
job functions to control access) do not address the 
intricate security requirements of healthcare 
applications. The healthcare industry requires 
dynamic, context-aware access control to provide 
more precise and fine-grained authorisation 
policies for any application. Some accumulating 
evidences show that adding appropriate context in 
an access control model can help improve the 
security of EHRs by maintaining patients’ privacy 
and confidentiality.  Moreover, context can also be 
used to introduce and extend the required 
dynamism in the whole healthcare sector to reflect, 
for example, changes in the working conditions, 
staffing levels, policies and even types of ailment 
being treated within the healthcare sector.  
 Contrary to such benefits of context when 
appropriately used, researchers in the healthcare 
environment are yet to harness it as they keep on 
adopting contextual attributes proposed in other 
domains. This act, in turn, reduces the rate of 
protection of EHRs as wrong contextual 
information results into wrong access control and 
hence insecure EHR systems. In this paper we 
intend to analyse how rich in terms of context the 
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healthcare environment is and then propose 
relevant contextual attributes for the domain. 
Furthermore we examine the usage of proposed 
contextual attributes into the existing access 
control models. To achieve this, research has been 
conducted through major electronic research 
databases (such as Medline, PubMed), Scientific 
Journals via their own sites as well as Web Search 
Engines (mostly Google Scholar). These resources 
were used to identify research published from 
different domains that identify relevant contextual 
attributes for their domains. Different themes, such 
as context, contextual attribute, contextual 
information, contextual attributes in healthcare 
and context and electronic healthcare were used to 
identify relevant papers for this study. To broaden 
our research references from the main papers were 
also studied. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. 
Section II provides background information 
regarding context followed by the review of 
various definitions of context in section III. Section 
IV provides a discussion on the related work in 
relation to context. Section V presents an analysis 
of contextual attributes specifically for the 
healthcare environment while section VI presents a 
discussion on access control models for the 
healthcare environment taking into consideration 
the presence of proposed contextual attributes. 
Section VII provides conclusion and future work.  
 
II.BACKGROUND CONTEXT 
For numerous years, the concept of context has 
been studied by philosophers, linguists, 
psychologists, and recently by computer scientists. 
Its usage, in the Computer Science field, is 
growing rapidly in various applications and 
domains ranging from Information Retrieval, 
Reasoning in Artificial Intelligence (AI), 
Ontology, to Knowledge Representation [1].  
Within each domain, context has been interpreted 
in a certain way that is well-suited for their goal 
and hence making it an elusive concept to define 
[2].  In this section we provide the background 
information regarding context by using a scenario. 
Therefore before delving further into it and discuss 
the benefits of context in the healthcare 
environment, which spans from patients to 
healthcare professionals, let’s consider its usage in 
the following scenario. 
 
Within a hospital, a healthcare professional can 
move between theatre, ward, pharmacy, office, 
front desk and meeting room. He may also request 
to access EHRs while outside the hospital using 
his mobile device. This movement may occur at 
different times during a day.  
Let’s say John is a healthcare professional at 
Muhimbili National Hospital in Dar es Salam, 
Tanzania. He has the privileges to access and 
modify Anna’s sensitive EHRs. He, first, requested 
to access Anna’s records at 8:00 a.m. when in a 
meeting room with a Consultant and again 
requested to access the same records at 3:00p.m 
while at the front desk and lastly he requested to 
access Anna’s records at 8:00 pm, while he is in 
his private office outside the hospital.  
 
The above scenario can be summarised as 
shown in table 1 where resource for all the three 
scenarios is Anna’s EHRs. 
Table 1: Context and Access to patient's 
information 
Subject Location Time 
John Meeting Room 8:00 am 
John Front Desk 3:00 pm 
John Private Office 8:00 pm 
 
Let’s say we consider traditional access control 
models such as RBAC [4], which uses job 
function, to control access to patients’ records. 
With this model then John will be able to access 
records in all the scenarios as only his role will be 
considered while making access decisions.  
Consequently, if we take into consideration new 
models such as Attribute Based Access Control 
(ABAC) [5], which considers dynamic healthcare 
professionals attributes such as current location 
and time of the day, then John’s level of access to 
the records will change. Table 2 presents 
contextual attributes; these are subject role, 
location, time and resource; that may be used to 
control access to patient’s records.  
Table 2: Healthcare environment contextual 
attributes 
Subject_role=(Consultant,Specialist,Doctor,Nurse) 
Location = (theatre, ward, pharmacy, office, 
front_desk,    meeting_room, outside_hospital) 
Time = (6:00am <time< 5:00pm) 
Resource = (patients’ records) 
 
To harness the presence of context then we can 
create a condition in an access control model by 
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including contextual attributes. This will reduce 
chances for breaching patient’s confidentiality as 
well as help in maintaining patients’ privacy. 
Table 3 shows access control condition with 
contextual information. The condition states that a 
doctor can access sensitive patient’s records 
between 6:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. while in the 
theatre or ward.  This condition will limit access 
when a doctor requests to access records while in 
the front desk or his office. 
Table 3: Access control condition with contextual 
information  
 
 
 
 
From the above scenario then benefits of context 
in the healthcare environment can be summarised 
as follows.  
For the patients, the appropriate usage of 
contextual information is expected to enhance the 
security of patients’ records and help maintaining 
patients’ privacy. That is, it provides healthcare 
professionals with dynamic levels of access to the 
records depending on the captured contextual 
information. To elaborate this, consider, for 
example, two healthcare professionals requesting 
access to Anna’s EHRs; the first healthcare 
professional is requesting to access records using 
his mobile device while he is in his private office 
(outside the hospital) and another professional is in 
the ward (within the hospital). While considering 
location, which is contextual information, before 
providing access, then these two professionals will 
be provided with two different levels of access to 
the records as the latter may be denied access or 
granted access to basic information only while the 
other being given full access. 
For the healthcare centre, context tends to 
improve operational efficiency by integrating real 
time contextual information, such as location, 
status of medical equipment and staff, into the 
healthcare workflow [6]. As a result of this, 
context then enhances quality of patient care, 
increases staff efficiency while helping the 
healthcare organisation to manage capital and 
operational costs. Yet again for patients within the 
healthcare centre, context enables access to 
environmental information, such as temperature or 
humidity, to provide an optimal patient experience  
[6].  In section III a review of various definitions of 
context proposed by researchers from different 
applications and domains will be provided. 
 
III.CONTEXT 
In this section we review various definitions of 
context that has been proposed by researchers from 
different applications and domains and then we 
evaluate them before proposing a general 
definition of context that will be considered 
relevant for the rest of this paper. These definitions 
will later be referred while proposing appropriate 
contextual attributes for the healthcare 
environment.  
Although the word context has been used for a 
number of years in many scientific descriptions, 
literature essays and in philosophical discourses, 
there is no single agreed definition  which is yet 
available, though there is a serious ongoing effort 
to make a precise working definition of context [2, 
7]. 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) refers context 
to as the merging together of circumstances that 
form an event. To emphasise a common social 
usage of context, OED [8] includes a quotation 
from R. Cobden speeches “I wish honourable 
gentlemen would have the fairness to give the 
entire context of what I did say, and not pick out 
detached words”. Consider the following event as 
an example of the usage of the entire context in the 
healthcare environment “Doctor John will be 
attending a consultation meeting in room G20 
from 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon”.  
For the Computer Science field, the first and 
formal definition of context which enumerates 
context as location of use, identities of the nearby 
people and objects and changes to those objects 
over time was proposed by Schilit [9]. In a similar 
way, Ryan et al. [10] define context as user's 
location, environment, identity and time while 
Brown et al. [11] considered context as location, 
identities of the people around the user, orientation  
of the device, and time of the day, season of the 
year, temperature. Dey [12] enumerates context 
further as user's emotional state, focus of attention, 
location and orientation, date and time, objects and 
people in the user's environment. 
Although most of these definitions, except 
OED’s, propose contextual attributes instead of 
defining what context is, it is therefore difficult to 
apply any of them when we want to determine 
whether a type of information not listed in the 
definition is context or not. To solve the 
aforementioned problem, Dey and Abowd [13] 
provided a thorough definition which describes 
{Subject: (can_access patient record if 
subject_role = “doctor” ^ location = 
“theatre, ward” ^ 6:00a.m. <time<5:00pm)} 
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context as any information that can be used to 
characterise the situation of an entity where an 
entity is a person, place, or object that is 
considered relevant to the interaction between a 
user and an application, including the user and 
applications themselves. Therefore from the 
definition, Dey and Abowd propose location, 
identity, time and activity as relevant contextual 
attributes. 
Contextual attributes proposed by Ryan et al. 
[10] are considered as the consensus to those 
proposed by Dey and Abowd [13]. The only 
difference that exists between the two is that the 
latter proposed activity as contextual attribute 
instead of environment proposed by the former. 
Dey and Abowd [13] argue that environment is a 
synonym for context and does not add anything in 
their research while activity will characterise the 
situation by indicating what is really occurring in 
such a situation. However, as the intention of this 
section is to provide a generic definition of context 
only then we adopt a definition proposed by OED 
which briefly refers context to as the merging 
together of circumstances. This definition indicates 
what context is without paying much attention to 
the presence of contextual attributes in order to 
define context. The appropriate contextual 
attributes for the healthcare domain will be 
provided in section V. 
 
IV.RELATED WORK 
As discussed in section I, the principal aim of 
this paper is to propose relevant contextual 
attributes together with their extended 
subcategories for the healthcare environment. In 
order to accomplish it, in this section we review 
contextual attributes (information) that has been 
proposed by researchers in various domains and 
applications. This analysis will help in identifying 
specific contextual attributes that need to be 
considered while making access decisions in the 
healthcare environment. 
Moreover, as discussed in section II, researchers 
in various domains and applications have provided 
different contextual attributes depending on their 
goals and the domain that they are working in. In 
1993, Weiser [14], who is widely considered as the 
father of UbiComp, introduced situation as one of 
the important contextual attributes  while working 
at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) 
laboratory.  Since then situation has been widely 
used and applied in various domains.  
Inspired by the vision of UbiComp and their 
own experiences, Schilit et al. [15] suggested 
situation and location as important contextual 
attributes in Mobile Computing. Their reason 
behind suggesting these two related attributes is 
that computer users may move from one location to 
another joining and leaving groups of people and 
frequently interacting with computers while in 
changing social situations. 
Bertino et al. [16] have proposed time while 
developing a time-based authorisation model. This 
model was later generalised and extended to role-
hierarchies, separation of duty and cardinality 
constraints; Generalised Temporal Role-Based 
Access Control (GTRBAC) [17], in which the 
notion of time has been considered only. 
Dey and Abowd [13] while working in the 
UbiComp domain and following closely Weiser’s 
work list location, identity, time and activity as 
important contextual attributes to the interaction 
between user and application. Moreover, Schilit 
and Theimer  [18] suggest location and identity as 
contextual attributes while Chandaran et al. [19] 
imply time and location constraints. Table 4 
provides a summary of contextual attributes 
proposed by researchers in various domains. 
Table 4: Summary of Contextual Attributes 
(Source: Author) 
No. Author Contextual Attributes 
1. Weiser [14] Situation 
2. Schilit et al. [15] Location and situation 
3.  Brown et al.[20] Location, Time of the 
day, Season, 
temperature, Identities 
of the people around 
the user, orientation 
4. Ryan et al. [21] Location, 
Environment, Identity 
and Time 
5. Bertino et al.[16] Time 
6. Dey [12] User's emotional state, 
Focus of attention, 
Location of attention, 
Date and Time, 
Objects and People in 
user's environment 
7. Dey and Abowd 
[13] 
Location, Identity, 
Activity and Time. 
8. Schilit and 
Theimer [18] 
Location and Identity 
information 
9.  Coutaz et al. [22] Location and Identity 
10. Beresford [23] Identity, Location, 
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Activity and Time 
11. Chandaran et al. 
[19] 
Location and Time 
12 Kjeldskov and 
Skov [24] 
Location, Time and 
Tasks. 
13.  Tahir [25] Purpose, location and 
time 
 
As depicted in table 4, there is a huge variation 
on contextual attributes proposed by various 
researchers. Location, identity and time appear 
more compared to other attributes such as 
temperature and season. From the review done for 
this paper, out of 13 papers reviewed for the 
contextual attributes, 10 propose location, 6 
propose identity and 8 suggests time while 4 used 
all of the three attributes. To resolve contextual 
attributes variation issue, Beresford [23], claims 
that, there are primary and secondary context 
whereby secondary context requires an association 
with one or more primary context to be 
meaningful. Therefore, for example, temperature is 
a secondary attribute associated with location 
while date of birth and address are secondary 
attributes associated with identity. Based on 
Beresford’s claim, various researchers [26, 27] 
have used these four attributes regularly which 
made them popular  than others. 
 
V.CONTEXT IN THE HEALTHCARE 
ENVIRONMENT 
For contextual attributes in the healthcare 
environment, Bricon-Souf and Newman [1] also 
argue that location, identity of the healthcare 
professionals and time are the most common 
attributes considered. However, from the review of 
literature performed, in this paper we argue that 
the healthcare environment, which at the same 
time considered collaborative, is rich in context 
and there is a lack of research to-date performed to 
identify contextual attributes specifically for the 
domain.  
To support our argument on the existence of 
various context in the healthcare domain, 
Beznosov [28] proposed affiliation, role, location, 
time and relationship as requirements for access 
control  in the United States healthcare domain. 
Tahir [25]  who engrossed to know not only who, 
when and from where but also for what purpose an 
access request is made introduced new contextual 
attributes from the common ones. He introduced 
purpose in his flexible access control model 
referred to as Context-Role Based Access Control 
(C-RBAC). The C-RBAC model, which aims at 
preserving patient’s privacy, extends the 
traditional RBAC model not only with location, 
identity and time but also with the notion of 
purpose. 
Contrary to the four common contextual 
attributes, which are location, identity, time and 
activity, proposed and used in various applications 
and domains, in the healthcare environment we 
propose the use of the subject, activity, resource 
and time (which is environmental attribute) as 
shown in figure 1. Generally speaking, we 
associate location and identity as subcategories for 
the Subject attribute. Apart from that, we add a 
Resource as a category that need to be considered 
while controlling access.  There are several reasons 
behind this substitution of contextual attributes. 
 
Figure 1: Context in healthcare domain        
(Source: Author) 
 
For the resource, as EHRs are processed, 
transmitted and stored (in databases) using EHR 
systems, then there is a need of using attributes of 
the resource while controlling access to such 
sensitive information.  For the location which is 
referred to as where the user is accessing 
information services from, then we argue that 
location cannot stand on its own without the 
presence of the healthcare professional in order to 
be considered meaningful in the healthcare sector.   
Consider a policy which states that “a nurse 
should have access to medical record of the patient 
if the nurse is currently working on the same 
“floor” as the patient”. With this policy, we argue 
that location is binded to both patient and a nurse, 
therefore from Beresford’s categorisation; location 
is just a secondary attribute of the subject.  
The four contextual attributes in the healthcare 
environment are defined as follows: 
 Subject contains attributes that refers to an 
individual requesting access to patient’s EHRs 
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 Activity: refers to action that Subject is 
requesting to perform to  the  resource 
 Time  Is the time period at which healthcare 
profesional is requesting to perform an activity 
to the resource. 
 Resource: For the healthcare environment, 
EHRs are the resource. We can extend to 
include charactristics of the database where 
these records are stored. 
 
As indicated in Figure 2, these attributes can be 
extended with various subcategories. Subject, for 
example, can be extended into Subject ID, Subject 
Name, Group ID, Group Name, Session Start 
Time, Session Start Date, and the combination of 
Session Start Time and Date, IP Address, etc while 
Resource can be extended with Resource Label, 
Resource Name, Row Label, View Label, Schema 
Label, Catalog Label, Database Label, Database 
Name, Column Name etc. 
In addition to subject and resource’s 
subcategories, there is time and activity. Time is 
associated with Current Time, Current Date and 
the combination of Current Date and Time while 
Activity is associated with Activity ID, Activity 
Type and Activity Request Location. 
 
With the presence of these attributes and their 
subcategories in the healthcare domain, which 
involves processing of sensitive patients’ 
information, combining with the fact that the more 
contextual attributes used the finer-grained access 
control system becomes then there is a need of 
identifying specific contextual attributes for certain 
environment if EHRs need to be protected. 
However to avoid ambiguities associated with 
access control, researchers need to provide 
description for each contextual attribute and their 
subcategories [29]. In section VI we analyse access 
control models based on their applicability in the 
healthcare domain as well as the presence of 
proposed contextual attributes in those models. 
 
 
Figure 2: Extended Contextual Attributes (Source: Author) 
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VI. ACCESS CONTROL MODELS 
In computing, access control refers to security 
features that control which principals (can be 
persons, processes or machines) have access to 
which resources. To achieve this, various access 
control models, such as Discretionary Access 
Control (DAC) [30], Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC) [30], Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
[4] and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) 
[5], have been developed.   
The traditional access control models, such as 
DAC and RBAC, are usually static as they don’t 
take into consideration contextual information 
while making access decisions. However this act is 
considered inadequate for specifying access control 
needs of complex real world applications such as 
in the healthcare domain.  In this section we 
analyse applicability of various access control 
models for the healthcare domain.  
VI.I. DISCRETIONARY ACCESS 
CONTROL (DAC) 
According to the Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria, TCSEC [30], DAC is a means 
of restricting access to objects based on the identity 
of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. 
The control is discretionary in the sense that, DAC 
leaves certain amount of access control to the 
discretion of the object’s owner or anyone else who 
is authorised to control object’s access [31]. 
With DAC model, user who created the object 
has all the permissions about it and also can 
delegate his/her permissions to others. The DAC 
policy tends to be very flexible and has been 
widely used in commercial and government 
sectors. Despite its widely use, we consider this 
model as inappropriate for the healthcare domain 
as healthcare professionals create patient records 
but they are not considered as the data owners and 
delegation can result into the breach of patient’s 
privacy and information security. 
VI.II. MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL 
(MAC) 
The TCSEC [30] defines MAC as a means of 
restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity 
of information contained in and the formal 
authorisation i.e. clearance of subjects to access 
information of such sensitivity. With MAC, 
security policy is centrally controlled by a security 
administrator and hence users do not have an 
ability to override the policy. The MAC policy is 
widely applied in military information systems 
where the individual data owner cannot decide 
who has the Top Secret Clearance nor can the 
owner change the classification of the object from 
for example Top Secret to Secret. 
In relation to its use in the healthcare domain, 
like DAC, MAC is also considered inappropriate. 
For the healthcare environment, in case of an 
emergency, healthcare professionals require an 
ability to override security policies in order to 
provide care to patients. As previously discussed, 
this is not possible in MAC as only security 
administrator is allowed to make changes and 
therefore hence making this model inappropriate 
for the healthcare environment. 
VI.III. ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
(RBAC) 
In many organisations, users do not own 
information which they created or are allowed 
access to [32, 33]. For such organisations, 
corporation/agency is the actual ”owner” of the 
system objects as well as programs that process it 
and control is basically based on the user’s 
functions rather than data ownership [32]. When 
using job functions that an individual user take as 
part of the organisation to control access, then the 
model being considered is RBAC [34]. 
In RBAC, permissions are associated with roles 
and users are assigned to appropriate roles [4, 34]. 
This assignment greatly simplifies security 
administration [4]. Consider for example, if within 
a hospital, an individual user has been moved from 
staff nurse to specialist nurse then using RBAC, 
the individual user can be assigned to a new role 
and removed from the old one whereas in the 
absence of RBAC, the user’s old permissions 
would have to be individually revoked and new 
permissions would have to be granted. RBAC is 
also considered useful as it supports review of 
permissions assigned to users. 
Despite its various benefits, RBAC has 
frequently been criticised for its difficulty in 
setting up an initial role structure also known as 
role engineering and its inflexibility in rapidly 
changing environments like healthcare [35]. A 
pure RBAC solution may provide inadequate 
support for dynamic contextual attributes such as 
current location, current date and time of the day. 
Capturing context using RBAC would mean 
defining large set of roles for each possible 
contextual attribute. Moreover, to define fine-
grained permissions would also create large sets of 
permissions and hence resulting into role 
explosion [35]. To make RBAC simple and 
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flexible for the dynamic environments like 
healthcare, this widely used model need to be 
enhanced with contextual attributes. Using 
XACML ABAC [36], for example, role is defined 
as subject_role and considered as contextual 
information. Various researchers [17, 19, 25, 37-
39] have extended RBAC model with contextual 
attributes such as environmental roles, location, 
location and time, location  and location, time and 
purpose respectively. 
VI.IV.TEAM-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
(TMAC) 
TMAC is an approach of applying RBAC in 
collaborative environments where an activity is 
best accomplished through teams [40]. Alotaiby 
and Chen [37] present a TMAC extension model, 
called TMAC04, built on RBAC which efficiently 
represents teamwork in the real world. The 
TMAC04 model allows certain users to join a team 
based on their existing roles in an organisation 
within limited context and new permission to 
perform the required work. 
In relation to the identified need of contextual 
attributes which are considered important for 
providing fine-grained access control in a dynamic 
healthcare environment, TMAC doesn’t bring 
anything new from RBAC’s perspective. 
VI.V. TASK-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
(TBAC) 
Contrary to other access control models where 
access rights are granted to subjects, with TBAC 
access rights are granted to tasks in steps related to 
the progress of the tasks [41]. Based on its 
provision of access rights to tasks, this model is 
considered as a dynamic access control technique 
[42]. TBAC is also considered to be suitable for 
automated processes where activities of the tasks 
cross computer boundaries. Despite being 
acknowledged as a dynamic access control 
technique, the use of tasks adopted by TBAC is 
regarded as a specific configuration of RBAC 
where context (tasks) can be viewed as constraints. 
 
VI.VI. ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS 
CONTROL (ABAC) 
 
This model, which also referred to as Policy or 
Claims Based Access Control, is quite the opposite 
of RBAC. It was introduced to address issues 
associated with RBAC model such as role 
explosion which occurs when contextual attributes 
are captured and defined in RBAC and hence 
resulting in to thousands of roles associated with 
thousands of permissions. 
ABAC’s central idea is to use individual user’s 
attributes to provide access decisions [5, 35]. 
ABAC policy specifies which claim(s) need to be 
satisfied in order to grant access to the resource. 
Any user who can prove such a claim is granted 
access. Consider, for example, an ABAC policy 
contains the claim “above 18“, then any person 
who can prove this claim is granted access. 
Among the attributes associated with ABAC 
include: the subject who is demanding access, the 
action which the subject want to perform, the 
resource being accessed and the environment or 
context in which access is requested. These four 
attributes, which resembles to what we have 
proposed for the healthcare environment are 
considered as general attributes which contain 
other attributes within as shown figure 2. 
Contrary to RBAC which is considered 
inappropriate for dynamic environments like 
healthcare as it does not support the use of context 
and capturing context may result in to role 
explosion, ABAC is considered to be flexible as it 
does not require separate roles for relevant sets of 
subject attributes and rules can be implemented 
quickly to cater for the changing needs [5]. In 
general, ABAC’s approach made it easy to include 
context in the access control decisions. As a trade-
off to its flexibility, this model suffers from 
complexity associated with the number of cases 
that need to be considered for the model as for n 
attributes or conditions using attributes, there are 
2n possible combinations. The model also requires 
an agreement on the meaning of attributes [5]. 
From these access control models and others, 
Role-Based Access Control has proved to be more 
popular and is considered as an efficient way of 
assigning access rights to users while at the same 
time ensuring data security. Despite its popularity, 
RBAC is criticised for its difficulty in setting up an 
initial role structure and for its inflexibility in 
rapidly changing environments [35]. To cater for 
the dynamic environments like healthcare which 
involves processing, transmitting and storing 
sensitive EHRs, RBAC needs to be enhanced with 
contextual attributes such as subject’s current 
location, current date and time of the day. 
Moreover from analysis of access control models 
performed, there is no single access control model 
which has been developed and comprises all 
contextual attributes rather it includes part such as 
location and/or time [25]. In this paper, we argue 
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that in order to ensure security of patient’s 
information all appropriate contextual attributes 
should be used while designing and developing 
and access control model as wrong or partial 
contextual attributes means inappropriate access 
control and hence threatening the security of 
patients’ information. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have analysed how rich in 
terms of context the healthcare environment is and 
then we have propose relevant contextual attributes 
for the domain. Moreover we have examined the 
usage of proposed contextual attributes into the 
existing access control models. Contrary to other 
domains where location, identity, activity and time 
appear to be more important, in healthcare domain 
we have proposed the use of subject, activity, time 
and resource. Generally speaking, in this paper we 
have associated location and identity as 
subcategories or secondary categories for the main 
Subject attribute. For the case of location for 
example, for it to be meaningful it needs to be 
associated with the Subject. In addition we have 
included resource which is considered to be more 
important in healthcare as it is where patient’s 
Electronic Healthcare Record is stored. 
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Abstract: Although access control is considered as a well known and used 
concept in various domains, its usage for the areas with the limited number of 
professionals is considered minimal. In this paper we present a dynamic 
context-aware access control model by extending the traditional role-based 
access control model with location, and other, information. The presented 
model aims at improving security of patient’s Electronic Healthcare Records 
(EHRs) for the areas with the shortage of healthcare professionals.  
Introduction 
In recent years, various domains, ranging from Insurance[1] to 
Ubiquitous Computing [2], have been using location, and other, information 
to provide context-specific services to their customers. For Ubiquitous 
Computing, for example, location information has been widely used to 
remotely monitor elderly anytime anywhere and provide tailored services 
for each person based on the person’s condition. An example of such a 
mobile health monitoring system for the elderly is proposed by [3]. 
Apart from monitoring elderly from the comfort of their homes, which is 
much common in Ubiquitous Computing [4], in the healthcare domain, 
location information is mainly used to control access to sensitive records. 
This main role of location information, to healthcare domain, can be 
categorised further into three subtasks, these are: controlling access to 
sensitive healthcare information [5], establishing the level of trust to the 
domain and deriving emergency level of access [6].  
In order to control access to sensitive patient’s information, an access 
control policy should be defined in such a way that it takes into 
  
  
consideration location and other contextual information while making 
access control decision [7]. An example of such a policy that aims to control 
access to the records would be, “a nurse should have access to the 
sensitive records of the patient if s/he is scheduled on the same 
department as to where the patient is admitted and no bigger role than 
nurse is currently working in the department”. 
For the establishment of the level of trust to the domain, a reasonable 
policy should deny access to sensitive patient’s information to anyone 
trying to access records from untrustworthy areas. Furthermore, a realistic 
policy for the healthcare domain should allow different levels of access to 
the records depending on the contextual information gathered.  Let’s say for 
example, two professionals with the same role (nurse, for example), one in 
the reception area and the other in the ward, should have different levels of 
access to the patient’s records. 
With its numerous uses, location information, which is defined as to 
where the user is accessing information services from [8], is considered as 
one of the powerful and yet useful concepts in various domains [9]. This 
paper presents a dynamic context aware access control model that 
dynamically grants permission to users based on current context. The 
proposed mechanism, which is aimed at improving security of patient’s 
EHRs in areas with shortage of healthcare professionals, extends the 
traditional RBAC [10] model, while retaining its advantages (such as ability 
to define and manage complex security policies). The model dynamically 
adjusts Location Assignment and Permission Assignment based on location, 
and other contextual, information gathered.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an 
overview of the background work where various access control models are 
discussed. Section 3 presents the dynamic Role-And-Context Based Access 
Control model, which is an extension of the traditional Role-Based Access 
Control model. Section 4 presents the conclusion and future work. 
Background 
In computing, access control refers to security features that control which 
principals (can be persons, processes and machines) have access to which 
resources.  
Several access control models [10-13] have been developed to ensure the 
security of sensitive information. Among the common models include 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
  
  
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Team-Based Access Control 
(TMAC), and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC). 
From these and other models, RBAC, which associates users to roles and 
roles to permissions, has proved to be more popular and is considered as an 
efficient way of assigning access rights to users while at the same time 
ensuring data security [12]. Despite its popularity, RBAC is criticised for its 
difficulty in setting up an initial role structure and for its inflexibility in 
rapidly changing environments like healthcare [12]. Additionally for the 
areas with the shortage of healthcare professionals, in this paper we argue 
that, the usage of traditional RBAC, in the healthcare domain, might result 
in lack of services to patients.  To cater for such environments, RBAC 
needs to be extended with dynamic contextual attributes, and for this paper 
location information is mainly proposed.  Section 3 presents the dynamic 
Role-And-Context Based Access Control model. 
RAC-BAC Model 
As highlighted in related work section, the approach adopted for this 
work involves re-modelling and extending the traditional RBAC model with 
contextual information, and to be more precise this work is much more 
focused on modelling location information.  
The extended model from the traditional RBAC model, as presented in 
figure 1, introduces the notion of Location Assignment (LA), which is a 
relation between Location and Role. The model dynamically adjusts 
Location Assignments and Permission Assignments based on contextual 
information gathered. In our approach, each user of the system is assigned a 
temporary role depending on location, and other information, from where 
access to records is made.  
Rather than only addressing access control requirements for the general 
healthcare environment [8], the presented model, which can be used in 
various applications, is considered appropriate for controlling access to 
sensitive records in areas where there is a limited number of professionals.  
Additionally, as traditional RBAC lacks the ability to support expression 
of access control that refer to the condition of the system [14, 15] then with 
this model, the idea is to use both dynamic (such as, user’s location), and 
static (such as, user ID) contextual information for authorisation constraints 
while making access control decisions.  
 
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 1 
 
 Proposed Access Control Model 
 
Conclusion and Future Work 
Although access control is a well known and used concept in various 
domains, its usage for the areas with the limited number of professionals is 
considered minimal. In this paper we have presented an approach for 
extending the usage of location information, in the healthcare domain, to 
improve the security of patient’s records for the areas with the shortage of 
healthcare professionals.  As for future work, the presented model will be 
formally defined and a prototype system will be developed before its 
evaluation. 
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